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ABSTRACT
Since 1980, the Refugee Act has offered asylum to people who flee
to the United States to escape persecution in their homeland. In 1996,
however, Congress amended the law to bar asylum-regardless of the
merits of the underlying claim-for any applicant who fails to apply
within one year of entering the United States, unless the applicant
qualifies for one of two exceptions to the rule.
In the years since the bar was established, anecdotal reports have
suggested that genuine refugees, with strong claims to asylum, have
been rejected solely because of the deadline. Many scholars and
practitioners suspected that this procedural bar had a dramatic
effect on the U.S. asylum system. Until now, however, there has been
no systematic, empirical study of the effects of the deadline on
asylum seekers and the asylum system.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which is the first-
level adjudicator of affirmative applications for asylum, supplied the
authors with a database of asylum claims that has never before been
analyzed. This database includes demographic and other character-
istics of all principal applicants for asylum before DHS since
September 1998-more than 300,000 cases-and the decision
reached in each case.2 In this Article, the authors report, for the very
first time, what that database shows about DHS's application of the
one-year deadline. They find, among other things, that
* over the entire time frame studied, DHS determined that nearly
a third of all affirmative asylum applicants missed the filing
deadline;
* in the years immediately after the deadline went into effect,
Fiscal Year (F) 1998 through FY 2002, DHS found only 27
2. The "demographic and other characteristics" of applicants supplied by DHS did not
include the applicants' names, alien numbers, or other identifying information. The terms
"cases," "claims," and "applications" are used interchangeably in this Article. Each term refers
to a single application filed by a principal applicant and any dependents listed on that
person's application. If a spouse or child filed a separate application on the same day with the
same service center, that application was treated as a duplicate and was excluded from the
database by DHS before we received the data. Our database consists of 383,480 cases of
primary applicants. The ratio between applications filed and the total number of persons
seeking asylum pursuant to those applications was 1:1.37.
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percent of applicants to be late, but after that period, DHS
determined a significantly higher percentage to be late (35
percent from FY 2003 through June 8, 2009);
* DHS has rejected the applications, finding no applicable
exception, in the cases of 59 percent of those who were deter-
mined to have filed late, or 18 percent of all affirmative asylum
applicants;
* applicants from certain countries, such as the Gambia and
Sierra Leone, are much more disadvantaged by the deadline
than applicants from certain other countries, such as Haiti and
India. The deadline may particularly impact refugees who,
upon arrival, were not living among a community of emigrants
from their home countries who could warn them about the
deadline's existence;
* it is likely that as a result of the deadline, since April 1998 DHS
has rejected more than 15,000 asylum applications, involving
more than 21,000 refugees, that would otherwise have been
granted.
The authors conclude that because the costs of the one-year deadline
exceed its benefits, it should be repealed as proposed by several bills
that have been introduced in Congress.'
3. Refugee Protection Act of 2010, S. 3113, 111th Cong. § 3 (2010); Comprehensive
Immigration Reform Act of 2010, S. 3932, 111th Cong. § 255 (2010); Restoring Protection to
Victims of Persecution Act, H.R. 4800, 111th Cong. (2010); Comprehensive Immigration
Reform ASAPActof 2009, H.R. 4321, 111th Cong. § 186 (2009). OnJuly 29, 2010, the Senate
Appropriations Committee approved the FY 2011 Department of State, Foreign Operations,
and Related Programs Appropriations Bill, S. 3676, which included a provision, section 7080,
that eliminates the one-year filing deadline for asylum applications. S. REP. No. 111-237, at
211-12 (2010). This is the first bill repealing the deadline that has been approved by a
congressional committee. At the time this Article went to press, the full Senate had not yet
acted on this appropriations bill.
2010]1 653
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1996, Congress passed sweeping changes to the nation's
immigration laws, aimed at tightening America's borders and
deporting unauthorized immigrants.4 Tucked within the voluminous
text of this immigration reform bill was a misguided and potentially
devastating change to the law that protects those who come to our
shores seeking protection from persecution in their homeland.' The
one-year bar requires asylum seekers to file their applications
within one year of entry; those who fail to do so are ineligible for
asylum, regardless of the merits of their underlying claim, unless
they can prove that they were unable to file timely due to "changed"
or "extraordinary" circumstances.' As explained further below, the
rationales for this dramatic restriction on asylum eligibility are
rather murky; it seems that Congress was attempting either to fix
a problem of systemic delays that had already been resolved, or to
triage weak asylum claims with an instrument so blunt that it
undermines the asylum process.
Anecdotal evidence has suggested that the one-year deadline
imposes harsh and unfair denials of asylum on applicants, some-
4. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified in various sections of 8 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
5. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (2006). Since 1980, when Congress passed the Refugee Act,
the United States has made asylum available to persons who are physically present in the
United States, or arrive at its border, and have a well-founded fear of persecution in their own
countries on account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a
particular social group. Id. § 1158(a)(1)-(2)(A). Satisfying the statutory criteria renders an
applicant eligible for asylum, but grants of asylum are considered discretionary. Id. §
1158(b)(1)(A). As a result, an eligible applicant may be denied for other reasons, such as
making false statements less serious than those that would render the applicant ineligible or
failing to pay taxes. Nonetheless, discretionary denials cannot be based on whim. Because
such denials are subject to judicial review for abuse of discretion, and therefore must be
reasoned, the authors have found denials to be exceedingly rare.
6. Id. § 1158(a)(2)(B)-(D). The regulation describing the exceptions appears at 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.4(a) (2010). Illustrative examples of how this regulation should be applied appear in the
DHS training manual for asylum officers. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., ASYLUM OFFICER
BASIC TRAINING COURSE: ONE-YEAR FILING DEADLINE 10-12, 23-24, 26-28, 30-31 (2009),
available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/article/One-Year-Filing-Deadline.pdf [hereinafter
ASYLUM OFFICER BASIC TRAINING COURSE].
7. For the legislative history of this provision and its implementing regulations, see
generally PHILIP G. SCHRAG, A WELL-FOUNDED FEAR: THE CONGRESSIONAL BATTLE TO SAVE
POLITICAL ASYLUM IN AMERICA (2000).
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times resulting in their deportation to countries where their liberty
and lives are endangered.' Though the one-year bar has been in
place for over a decade, this study is the first systematic investiga-
tion of the effects of this policy and, in particular, how the applica-
tion of the deadline has affected asylum seekers of different genders,
nationalities, religions, ages, and locations in the United States.'
DHS, which through its Asylum Office adjudicates most asylum
claims in the first instance, was as interested as we were in
understanding the effects of the asylum deadline."o The agency
8. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, THE ASYLUM FILING DEADLINE: DENYING
PROTECTION TO THE PERSECUTED AND UNDERMINING GOVERNEMENTAL EFFICIENCY (2010),
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/pdf/afd.pdf [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, THE ASYLUM
FILING DEADLINE] (reporting more than two dozen case examples of refugees rejected for
asylum because of the deadline); Karen Musalo & Marcelle Rice, The Implementation of the
One- Year Bar to Asylum, 31 HASTINGS IN'L & COMP. L. REV. 693 (2008) (providing case
studies that illustrate the negative impact of the one-year deadline); Letter from Tori Andrea,
on behalf of Human Rights First and many other human rights organizations and experts, to
Joseph Langlois, Chief, Asylum Div., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs. (Dec. 7,2009) (on
file with authors).
9. Three of the authors previously examined disparities in the adjudication of asylum
cases at all four levels of the process, including appeals. See generally JAYA RAMJI-NOGALES,
ANDREW I. SCHOENHOLTZ & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, REFUGEE ROULETTE: DISPARITIES IN ASYLUM
APPLICATION AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM (2009) [hereinafter REFUGEE ROULETTE]; Jaya
Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities in
Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295 (2007). Our study included an examination of
disparities in grant rates among officers within each of the eight regional offices of the Asylum
Office, but it did not separately investigate the application of the one-year deadline. See
generally REFUGEE ROULETTE.
10. As further explained below, DHS adjudicates only "affirmative" applications for
asylum. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a). Affirmative applications are those filed by persons who come
forward on their own and identify themselves to DHS when they request asylum. EXECUTIVE
OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FY 2008 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK I1
(2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy08syb.pdf [hereinafter DOJ FY
2008 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK]. Aliens who file affirmatively have not been apprehended by
immigration authorities either at the border or after entering the United States. REFUGEE
ROULETTE, supra note 9, at 15 n.2. Persons who are apprehended and placed into removal
(that is, deportation) proceedings may apply for asylum in those proceedings, which are
presided over by immigration judges of the Department of Justice. DOJ FY 2008 STATISTICAL
YEAR BOOK, supra, at 11. These individuals do not have an opportunity to have their asylum
claims determined first by DHS, and they are known as "defensive" applicants. Id. Affirmative
applicants who lose before the Asylum Office and do not maintain an alternative lawful
immigration status are then placed into removal proceedings, during which they can present
their asylum claims anew. See id. These asylum seekers continue to be known as "affirmative"
applicants. See id. Affirmative cases also include those granted asylum by DHS, as well as
those denied asylum who continue to maintain a legal immigration status. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 1240.11(a). Affirmative cases significantly outnumber defensive cases. OFFICE OF
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provided us with data pertaining to its asylum adjudications,
excluding information that could identify individuals, in cases filed
from the start of FY 1996, two and a half years before the deadline
became effective, through June 8, 2009. The database included
383,480 asylum cases in which its officers interviewed asylum
applicants and reached decisions. We have examined these data and
present our findings in this Article.
Over the twelve-year period since the deadline became effective,
DHS has rejected tens of thousands of asylum seekers because they
did not apply before the deadline. Each rejected case met one of
three outcomes. For those whose asylum cases were also denied in
the immigration court and on appeal, the deadline resulted in a
final order of removal of the refugees to their home countries, in
which they feared imprisonment, torture, or death. The "luckier"
refugees, who missed the deadline but could meet a higher burden
of proof and establish that persecution in their homeland was more
likely than not, were granted a lesser form of protection that left
their children and spouses without any derivative immigration
status and did not offer a route to citizenship." And even those
refugees who were eventually granted asylum in immigration court,
either because the judge found the deadline did not apply or that an
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2008 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION
STATISTICS 43 tbl.16, available at http://www.dhs.gov/files/statistics/publications/YrBk08RA
.shtm [hereinafter DHS 2008 YEARBOOK]. In FY 2008, DHS granted asylum to 12,187
applicants and their dependents, id., and referred another 32,946 to immigration courts after
deciding not to grant asylum, either because of the one-year deadline or the merits of the
cases. That year, DHS also denied asylum to 6,158 individuals who maintained their legal
status. E-mail from Michael Hoefer, Dir., Office of Immigration Statistics, Dep't of Homeland
Sec., to Andrew I. Schoenholtz (Feb. 24, 2010) (on file with author) [hereinafter Hoefer E-mail]
(attaching "Asylum Applications FY 2008" and explaining that the table refers to applications
or cases, not persons, and recommending the use of a historical ratio of 1.4 persons per
application or case to convert the figures from cases to persons). The immigration court
received defensive applications regarding 14,067 individuals. DOJ FY 2008 STATISTICAL YEAR
BOOK, supra, at II. So in 2008, affirmative asylum seekers and their dependents constituted
about 79 percent of the total. Id.
11. Immigration court data collection does not track decisions regarding the one-year
filing deadline, and DOJ and DHS do not report information on what happened to cases
rejected by DHS for deadline reasons and referred to immigration court. As a result, we do
not know how many applicants rejected by the Asylum Office for untimely filing were granted
asylum or "withholding of removal" in immigration court, and how many were ordered
deported despite valid claims to asylum. See infra notes 74-81 and accompanying text for a
more detailed description of the differences between asylum and withholding of removal.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
exception to the deadline did apply, were subject to the traumatic
uncertainty of an unnecessarily long asylum procedure during
which they were not authorized to work to support themselves."
Part I of this Article describes DHS's asylum adjudication system.
Part L.A describes the process through which DHS asylum officers
have evaluated applications for asylum both before and after the
imposition of the one-year application deadline in 1998. Part I.B
summarizes the history of the deadline, its exceptions, how issues
involving the application of the deadline and its exceptions are
administered by the asylum officers, and prior critiques of the
deadline. Part I.C explains the database that we received from DHS
and describes the population of applicants over the thirteen-year
period to which the database applies.
Parts II and III describe our findings. Part II reports our study of
the population of asylum seekers, exploring who filed on time and
who missed the deadline, as well as by how much they missed it.
Part III details our study of the cases in which asylum officers found
that late-filing applicants (including members of particular subpop-
ulations) qualified for an exception to the deadline based on changed
or extraordinary circumstances. Because determinations regarding
the applicability of exceptions involved judgments by asylum
officers, we also explore the degree to which these officers' decisions
in similar sets of cases demonstrate consistency or disparity. Part
IV provides our conclusions and our recommendations for legislative
and administrative reform. The Methodological Appendix to this
Article offers a detailed description of the methodology used in our
studies and the database from which we drew our analyses." The
Regression Appendix provides the output from the four regression
analyses on which the Article relies, and the Estimation Appendix
provides confidence intervals and further information on the
estimate of arbitrary denials to genuine refugees that we make in
Part III.
12. See generally Cornelis J. Laban et al., The Impact of a Long Asylum Procedure on
Quality of Life, Disability, and Physical Health in Iraqi Asylum Seekers in the Netherlands,
43 Soc. PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHIATRIC EPIDEMIOLOGY 507 (2008).
13. In about two years, after publication of a second study on asylum adjudication to be
entitled LIVES IN THE BALANCE (NYU Press), we intend to make the raw data from DHS on
which we performed our analysis available at: http://www.law.georgetown.edu/humanrights
institute/LivesInTheBalancel.
658 [Vol. 52:651
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As described in more detail in Part IV, we conclude that the one-
year deadline is not without some value, but that its benefits are far
outweighed by its costs to the government and the public and by the
injustice that it causes. Even without the one-year deadline, the
asylum adjudication system is, to an unfortunate degree, a game of
"refugee roulette."4 At least in its application from its inception
through early 2009, the deadline injected into the asylum adjudica-
tion system several more chance factors that are unrelated to the
merits of an applicant's claim. People from different countries and
regions, for example, were affected differently by the deadline
because members of certain groups missed the deadline more often
than others; this may reflect only the degree of support from
conationals already in the United States, rather than the merits of
their claims. Similarly, asylum officers determined that some
groups of late applicants qualified for exceptions at a much higher
rate than other groups, and within particular regional Asylum
Offices, where cases are assigned to officers at random, some
asylum officers granted exceptions to late applicants at a much
higher rate than other officers sitting a few feet away.
Since 1998 DHS has rejected" the asylum claims of thousands of
refugees because they missed the one-year deadline and did not
qualify for an exception. It has placed the vast majority of those
applicants in removal proceedings. In fact, in Part III, we estimate
that but for the deadline, DHS would likely have granted asylum in
about 15,792 additional cases during the period of our study,
impacting more than 21,000 refugees. Some of these applicants
might later have won asylum from an immigration judge who
determined their dates of entry or eligibility for an exception
differently than the asylum officer did. We cannot tell how many
applicants were successful in court because the data systems used
by DHS and the immigration courts do not regularly coordinate and
track cases from one agency to the other. To the extent that
immigration judges decided these cases the same way that the
asylum officers did, however, these refugees were ordered deported
14. See REFUGEE ROULE'lE, supra note 9.
15. DHS terms these decisions "rejections" rather than "denials," consistent with the
relevant statutory language. 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a) (2010); see infra note 21 and accompanying
text.
2010] 659
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not because they lied about their histories of persecution or because
they failed to meet the statutory tests for asylum eligibility, but only
because they did not file their applications within the one-year
period that Congress specified.
A. Adjudication Procedures for Affirmative Applications for
Asylum
A foreign national who is physically in the United States may
apply affirmatively for asylum by completing DHS Form 1-589 and
mailing or delivering it to a DHS service center." Nearly 80 percent
of all asylum applications are initiated in this manner." These cases
are known as "affirmative" applications, and DHS adjudicates them
in the first instance, although if DHS does not grant the application,
it may be renewed during a removal hearing in a Department of
Justice (DOJ) immigration court.' The other fifth of asylum
applications, termed "defensive" applications, are filed directly in
the DOJ immigration court and are never adjudicated by DHS.'9
This Article is concerned only with DHS adjudication and therefore
involves only the affirmative asylum cases.
In general, three outcomes are possible before the Asylum Office.
First, if an applicant files on time and meets the statutory require-
ments for asylum, including meeting the one-year deadline or
qualifying for an exception, DHS grants the application.2 0 Second,
if an applicant cannot prove that she filed within a year of entering
the United States and has not proven a changed or extraordinary
circumstance to justify a later filing, or if the applicant proves such
16. 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(b).
17. See supra note 10.
18. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(c).
19. DOJ FY 2008 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK, supra note 10, at II. Defensive applications
include those that are filed by persons arrested in DHS raids or placed in DHS custody after
being arrested for crimes unrelated to immigration. REFUGEE ROULETTE, supra note 9, at 11.
They also include applications filed by persons who arrive at airports or seaports without U.S.
visas, or who are apprehended within the United States near a land border, claim to fear
returning to their countries, are detained by DHS, and are found to have credible fear of being
returned involuntarily. Id. at 15 n.2; see 1 U.S. COMM'N ON INT'L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, REPORT
ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL (2005), available at http://www.uscirf.gov/
images/stories/pdflasylumseekers/VolumeI.pdf.
20. 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(b).
[Vol. 52:651660
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a circumstance but did not apply within a reasonable time after the
circumstance justifying the delay no longer applied, DHS "rejects"
the application and "refers" the case to immigration court."' Finally,
if the applicant files on time or proves a changed or exceptional
circumstance but does not prove eligibility for asylum, or is barred
by some other law, such as the ban on granting asylum to those who
have committed certain crimes,2 2 DHS also "refers" the applicant to
immigration court for a removal hearing.2 3 In immigration court, an
applicant who was rejected for failing to meet the deadline, or was
referred because of the DHS evaluation of the merits of the claim,
has a second chance to prove eligibility for asylum. Unlike DHS
adjudications, though, immigration court hearings are adversarial
proceedings with DHS attorneys arguing in favor of deporting the
applicant.24
Asylum officers employed by DHS adjudicate affirmative asylum
applications based on the written responses to the questions on
Form 1-589, corroborating evidence filed by the applicant, and oral
responses to questions posed during a personal interview that
21. Id. § 208.14(c).
22. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)-(3) (2006).
23. If the applicant has some other lawful immigration status, such as a current student
visa at the time DHS decides the case, DHS "denies" the application rather than referring it
because the applicant is not subject to removal at that time. 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(c)(2). But fewer
than 15 percent of applicants have another lawful status at the time of DHS's adjudication.
In FY 2008, for example, DHS granted asylum in 12,187 cases and referred 32,946 cases to
immigration court but "denied" only 6,158 cases-12 percent of the total. Hoefer E-mail, supra
note 10 (attaching "Asylum Applications FY 2008"). Some of the applicants that were granted
asylum were likely also persons in lawful status, so the total percentage in lawful status is
likely to be slightly larger than 12 percent. Id.
24. Occasionally, after reviewing the applicant's file, hearing the applicant's testimony in
court, and cross-examining the applicant, DHS attorneys state on the record that the
government has no objection to a grant of asylum by the immigration judge. But in the vast
majority of cases, DHS attorneys challenge applicants' corroborating evidence, cross-examine
applicants to elicit contradictions, argue that applicants do not meet the statutory standards
for asylum, and in other ways vigorously oppose a grant of asylum, treating asylum
applications in immigration court like other forms of contested civil or criminal litigation,
even when applicants are unable to afford or obtain representation. See, e.g., DAVID NGARURI
KENNEY & PmLIP G. SCHRAG, AsYLUM DENIED: A REFUGEE'S STRUGGLE FOR SAFETY IN
AMERICA 147 (2008) (presenting a case study and anecdotal evidence); REFUGEE ROULETTE,
supra note 9, at 14 (noting customary procedures for DHS attorneys). The only truly
nonadversarial investigation of an asylum claim occurs at an asylum officer interview. 8
C.F.R. § 208.9(b).
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usually occurs within sixty days after the applicant files the form.2 5
Form 1-589, which must be completed in English, requires the
applicant to provide exhaustive information about her identity,
family relationships, education, employment, travel, and reasons for
fearing persecution or torture in her home country.26 In particular,
the form requires the applicant to describe her prior political, reli-
gious, and ethnic affiliations and activities; any past mistreatment
or threats, including arrests, detentions, and torture; and the
reasons they fear returning to their home countries.2 7 The applicant
is required to respond in detail and to provide corroboration. The
form directs each applicant to
provide a detailed and specific account of the basis of your claim
to asylum or other protection. To the best of your ability, provide
specific dates, places, and descriptions about each event or
action described. You must attach documents evidencing the
general conditions in the country from which you are seeking
asylum or other protection and the specific facts on which you
are relying to support your claim. If this documentation is
unavailable or you are not providing this documentation with
your application, explain why."
A friend or relative, or a professional such as an attorney or staff
member of a nongovernmental organization, may help an asylum
applicant to fill out the form, but that person must also sign the
form." Although an affirmative asylum applicant may complete an
application by writing brief answers on the form itself, the form
encourages an applicant to attach a narrative statement describing
past persecution or reasons to fear persecution in the future, and to
annex additional documents to prove the applicant's identity and
support the claim.ao These additional documents may include,
among other things, statements or affidavits from witnesses, copies
of arrest warrants, medical records showing treatment for injuries
25. 8 C.F.R. § 208.9(e).
26. See U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Form 1-589, Application for Asylum and
for Withholding of Removal, available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/form/i-589.pdf.
27. Id. at 5-6.
28. Id. at 5.
29. Id. at 9.
30. Id. at 5.
662 [Vol. 52:651
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received during demonstrations or detentions, and published reports
about human rights violations in the applicant's country."' Particu-
larly when prepared by professionals, asylum applications can
include hundreds of pages of supporting documents.
At the service center, employees enter much of the information
from the 1-589 form into a computer system known as RAPS (the
Refugee Asylum and Parole System).'2 Data in RAPS are visible to
all DHS personnel who subsequently participate in the adjudication
of the case. 3 The service center personnel send the 1-589 form and
its attachments to the regional Asylum Office whose catchment area
includes the address at which the applicant resides.3 ' The applicant
is then invited to a personal interview with an asylum officer at the
regional office.
At any given time, nearly three hundred asylum officers are on
duty in eight regional DHS Asylum Offices." Asylum officers take
an initial training course and also receive weekly training on
immigration law, human rights conditions around the globe, and
interviewing techniques.37 Within each region, cases are assigned
randomly to asylum officers. Officers work under the pressure of
high caseloads. 3 9 An asylum officer does not read an application
31. See U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Form 1-589 Instructions, Application for
Asylum and Withholding of Removal 8, available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/formli-
589instr.pdf.
32. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., AFFIRMATIVE ASYLUM PROCEDURES MANUAL
7, 133-36 (2007), available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/nativedocuments/AffrmAsy
ManFNL.pdf [hereinafter USCIS ASYLUM MANUAL].
33. See id. at 10.
34. See id. at 9-10.
35. Id. at 10-12.
36. Between FY 2003 and FY 2009, the number of asylum officers active at any particular
time ranged between 268 and 334, with a high mean of 308 and a low mean of 286. E-mail
from Jedidah Hussey, Deputy Chief, Asylum Div., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., to
Jaya Ramji-Nogales (Aug. 26, 2010) (on file with author). Our database includes many more
officers because it spans more than a decade.
37. For a more detailed description of the training that asylum officers receive, see U.S.
Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Asylum Division Training Programs, http://www.uscis.
gov/portal/site/uscis (follow "Refugees & Asylum" hyperlink; then follow "Asylum" hyperlink;
then follow "Asylum Division Training Programs" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 12, 2010).
38. USCIS ASYLUM MANUAL, supra note 32, at 17.
39. See U.S. GOV'TACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE GAO-08-935, U.S. ASYLUM SYSTEM: AGENCIES
HAVE TAKEN ACTIONS To ENSURE QUALITY IN THE ASYLUM ADJUDICATION PROCESS, BUT
CHALLENGES REMAIN 61-62 (2008) [hereinafter GAO ASYLUM STUDY] (noting that asylum
officers are faced with increased adjudication requirements without any corresponding
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until the applicant arrives in the office, at which point the case is
assigned to the officer.40 Officers usually have an hour or less to
read an application or otherwise prepare for the interview.' On
average, asylum officers are expected to spend only four hours on
each case, including reading the application, conducting any
necessary background research on conditions in the applicant's
country, interviewing the applicant, checking the applicant's immi-
gration history and fingerprints, and writing a recommendation and
report to a supervisory asylum officer.42
The interview by the asylum officer is nonadversarial;4 1 the
asylum officer is charged with determining whether the applicant
is eligible for asylum under the applicable statute44 and regu-
lations." An applicant who does not speak English may bring an
interpreter to the interview, but the government does not supply
interpretation. 46 The applicant may also bring a lawyer or a lay
representative, but the government does not provide representation,
even for indigent applicants. 47 Nevertheless, the interview is usually
searching. The applicant is sworn, and the asylum officer typically
elicits details of the applicant's personal history, comparing the
sworn oral answers to the facts asserted in the 1-589 application and
any attached statements, as well as to published reports, such as
increase in time to adjudicate their cases).
40. See USCIS ASYLUM MANUAL, supra note 32, at 17-18 (describing the random
assignment of cases).
41. See GAO ASYLUM STUDY, supra note 39, at 58-59 (reporting that time constraints
caused asylum officers to "rush through their work").
42. Id. at 57-63. The four-hour standard was adopted in 1999 with no empirical data to
support it. Id. at 61. But 65 percent of asylum officers and 73 percent of supervisors believe
that asylum officers need more than four hours to complete a case, 39 percent of asylum
officers say that they rush through their work, and 43 percent say that the standard
"hindered their ability to properly adjudicate in about half or more of their cases." Id. at 58.
43. 8 C.F.R. § 208.9(b) (2010).
44. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (b)(1)(a) (2006), an applicant is eligible if she is a "refugee," a
term defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) as a person who is "unable or unwilling to return to
[the applicant's home] country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution
on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion."
45. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b).
46. Id. § 208.9(g). For examples of serious errors caused by poor, nonprofessional
interpretation at Asylum Office interviews, see WELL-FOUNDED FEAR (PBS television
broadcast June 5, 2000).
47. 8 C.F.R. § 208.9(b); see also REFUGEE ROULETTE, supra note 9, at 14.
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the U.S. State Department's annual human rights reports," about
events in the applicant's country. The applicant's representative is
not permitted to question the applicant but may make a closing
statement at the end of the interview.49 The applicant has the
burden of proving her eligibility,"o and inconsistencies between the
written application and the testimony may doom the application."
Similarly, the inability of an applicant to provide sufficient detail
about his country or his claim may cause an asylum officer to doubt
the applicant's truthfulness, resulting in a decision not to grant
asylum.
If the interview reveals a significant error in the data that have
been entered into the RAPS system-for example, if RAPS indicates
that the applicant has Ethiopian citizenship, but the applicant
demonstrates that although she lived for some time in Ethiopia, her
nationality is Eritrean-the asylum officer corrects the RAPS
entry.52 However, asylum officers report that they rarely change
data in RAPS except to correct the spelling of the applicant's name"
or change the date on which the applicant entered the United
States.54
Since April 16,1998, when the one-year deadline on asylum appli-
cations became effective, part of the interview process involves an
inquiry into whether the applicant sought asylum within one year
of entering the United States." If the applicant was admitted to the
United States after being "inspected"-that is, after presenting a
passport to an immigration officer at an airport, seaport, or land
48. 2009 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE ANN. REP. ON HUM. RTS., available at http://www.state.
gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/.
49. 8 C.F.R. § 208.9(d).
50. Id. § 208.13(a).
51. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2006) (providing that a trier of fact may base a credibility
determination on, among other things, the internal consistency between an applicant's
written and oral statements, even with respect to statements that are not material to the
applicant's asylum claim).
52. USCIS ASYLUM MANUAL, supra note 32, at 37.
53. Telephone Interviews with three former asylum officers, U.S. Citizenship &
Immigration Servs. (July & Aug. 2009).
54. As noted infra notes 260-61 and accompanying text, the asylum officers' manual
directs them to delete a purported date of entry if the asylum applicant has not established
proof by clear and convincing evidence, see USCIS ASYLUM MANUAL, supra note 32, at 126,
but not all officers make this change in RAPS.
55. See ASYLUM OFFICER BASIC TRAINING COURSE, supra note 6, at 4-5.
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border crossing-the determination of whether the deadline was
met is generally simple; the asylum officer compares the date of
entry stamped on the passport with the date the asylum application
was received by DHS. If this comparison shows that the applicant
filed more than one year after entry, the asylum officer must inquire
into whether the applicant qualifies for one of the exceptions to the
one-year rule and, if so, whether the applicant filed within a
reasonable period of time after the exception no longer excused the
late filing.56 Persons who entered without inspection, for example,
by crossing the Mexican or Canadian border at a place other than
a designated border crossing, may apply for asylum, but because
their entry dates are not stamped in their passports, they must
present other evidence to prove their date of entry.
At the end of the interview, the applicant is directed to return to
the regional Asylum Office in two weeks for a written decision." The
applicant is not permitted to supply additional documentation or to
communicate orally with the asylum officer while the decision is
pending, with rare exceptions." After the interview, the asylum
officer makes a written recommendation of a disposition, justifying
the proposed decision to a supervisory asylum officer by reference
to the application and the officer's interview notes." Asylum officers
do not have a "deadline quota"; they may accept, reject because of
the deadline, or refer on the merits as they see fit. When the asylum
officer determines that the application fails for both reasons, that is,
the applicant has not met the deadline and is not eligible for asylum
on the merits, she must give failure to meet the deadline as the
reason for not granting asylum.61 The supervisory asylum officer
56. Id. at 8. For a discussion of the exceptions, see Part I.B.2.
57. Similarly, applicants who entered with false passports that they then returned to
smugglers must present alternative evidence of their date of entry. This evidence may consist
of, among other things, bus tickets from the border, airline tickets, or witness testimony. See
id. at 7-8. It may also consist of proof that they were in another country less than a year
before applying for asylum; if so, they must have entered the United States within a year
before applying. Id. at 25.
58. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.19 (2010).
59. See USCIS ASYLUM MANUAL, supra note 32, at 92.
60. See id. at 46-47.
61. In such cases, asylum officers are directed to conduct a thorough inquiry into both
issues. Id. at 124 ("Regardless of the filing date of an application, Asylum Officers are to give
all applicants an asylum interview."). Referral based on the deadline is mandatory for
applicants who do not meet the deadline, or establish an exception and file within a
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may approve or disapprove the proposed disposition. The supervisor
may also ask another asylum officer to review the case.62
When the applicant returns, she is given a summary decision in
writing.63 The decision may be a grant of asylum or, if asylum is not
granted and the applicant has no other lawful immigration status
at the time of the decision, a "referral" to immigration court. 64 The
"referral" document (technically called a "notice to appear") is a
summons to be present at a removal hearing in immigration court
at which the application for asylum may be renewed.65 If the
applicant does not attend that hearing, or if she appears but is not
found eligible for asylum or any other relief, the immigration judge
will order her to be removed from the United States to her home
country. 6 If she participates in the hearing, her asylum application
will be adjudicated de novo; that is, the fact that the asylum officer
did not think she had proved her eligibility for asylum does not
govern the immigration judge's decision. However, unlike the
Asylum Office interview, the immigration court hearing is adver-
sarial in nature; a DHS lawyer will cross-examine the applicant
vigorously and will usually argue against asylum and in favor of
reasonable time, although cases referred based on the deadline need not include an
assessment of whether the applicant should be granted asylum on the merits. Id. The
precedence given to deadline determinations may stem from the peculiar wording of the 1996
law that established the deadline. Instead of providing that an application should be denied
if it was not filed on time, the law states that the provisions allowing a person to apply for
asylum "shall not apply" to an alien who does not prove entry within a year of the application,
8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (2006), suggesting that a late application does not advance far enough
along in the process to be turned down.
62. USCIS ASYLUM MANUAL, supra note 32, at 47.
63. See id. at 47-48.
64. In the small percentage of cases in which the applicant does not meet her burden of
proof but has another lawful U.S. immigration status at the time of the asylum officer's
decision, such as a still-valid student visa, she is given a "notice of intent to deny" the
application instead of a referral, because she is not subject to removal at that time. The notice
explains the reasons for the proposed denial in more detail than the summary explanation
that is given to applicants who are referred. The applicant is given sixteen days in which to
submit a written rebuttal to the notice. Id. at 45. If the asylum officer and the officer's
supervisor are not persuaded by the rebuttal, her application is formally denied, but she may
remain in the United States until her lawful status expires. Id. at 46.
65. The notice to appear is formally issued by the supervisory asylum officer. 8 C.F.R. §
239.1(a)(15) (2010).
66. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5).
67. Id. § 1229a(c)(1)(A).
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removal." Furthermore, any statements that the applicant made on
her asylum application and accompanying documents, and the
statements that the applicant made in the interview with the
asylum officer, as reflected in the officer's notes, may be used to
impeach the truthfulness of the applicant."
B. The One- Year Deadline
In the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Congress added a new twist to the asylum
standards and application procedures. The Act prohibited asylum
for anyone who applied more than one year after last entering the
United States and imposed on applicants the burden of proving
their date of entry by "clear and convincing evidence."o An appli-
cant who cannot prove filing within a year of entry can be granted
asylum only if she proves the existence of a changed circumstance
that materially affects her eligibility for asylum or an extraordinary
circumstance relating to the delay." Such a person must also have
applied within a "reasonable period" of time after the changed
circumstances occurred," or within a "reasonable period given [the
extraordinary] circumstances.""3
The deadline does not bar applicants from being granted
"withholding of removal.""4 Like asylum, this status allows an ap-
plicant to remain in the United States and, at least temporarily,
avoid deportation to a country in which she fears persecution. A
person who obtains withholding is allowed to work in the United
States." But in an important way, withholding is harder to win
than asylum. Although the deadline does not apply, a person
seeking withholding must prove that persecution is more probable
than not, rather than demonstrating a "well-founded fear" of per-
secution, a much lower standard." Despite having a higher burden
68. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.2.
69. Id. § 1240.7(a).
70. This standard is codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B).
71. Id. § 1158(a)(2)(D).
72. 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(4)(C)(ii).
73. Id. § 208.4(a)(5).
74. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3).
75. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(a)(10).
76. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 423 (1987).
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of proof, an applicant who wins withholding receives far fewer
benefits than an asylee. Unlike an asylee, she is not eligible to
change her immigration status to that of a lawful permanent
resident, and eventually, a citizen." She cannot have her spouse or
minor children join her in the United States, or pass along her
lawful status to a "derivative" spouse or child in the United States,
even though they may be at risk of persecution because of her past
activities or her flight from her home country." She can be deported
to a country other than the country from which she fled," and
during her entire lifetime, her status can be revoked if human rights
conditions in her country improve.so Furthermore, a DHS asylum
officer may not grant withholding of removal to an affirmative
asylum applicant who has missed the deadline and does not qualify
for an exception. The officer must reject the application and require
the applicant to appear for a removal hearing in immigration court,
where she may seek a new determination of her eligibility for
asylum and may seek withholding in the alternative."
1. Legislative History
It is not entirely clear why Congress imposed a deadline. The
sponsors of a deadline, Senator Alan Simpson and Representatives
Bill McCollum, Chuck Schumer, and Romano Mazzoli, originally
proposed a deadline of only thirty days, with virtually no
exceptions.8 2 In their view, all persons fleeing from persecution
would know at once that they wanted asylum and would be able to
apply for it immediately; anyone who did not apply for asylum
immediately after entering the United States was probably not a
genuine refugee." McCollum and Simpson introduced this proposal
77. 8 C.F.R. § 209.2.
78. Id. § 208.21.
79. Id. § 208.16(f).
80. Id. § 208.24(b)(1).
81. Id. § 208.16(a). A late-filing applicant with a lawful immigration status at the time of
the asylum officer's interview would ordinarily qualify for one of the exceptions to the
deadline. See id. § 208.4(a)(4).
82. The history of the adoption of the one-year deadline is described in SCHRAG, supra
note 7. The sole exception in the original proposal would have protected applicants who filed
more than thirty days after entry because human rights conditions in their home countries
had subsequently deteriorated. Id. at 83-84.
83. Senator Simpson opined that "if you are truly a refugee, you need to seek refuge [and]
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in 1995, the first year in which Republicans held a majority in
both houses of Congress since the early 1950s. Other members of
Congress apparently thought that the asylum adjudication system
was broken because foreign nationals could remain in the United
States indefinitely as a result of long delays in the adjudication of
their cases. They were apparently unaware, or at least claimed to be
unaware, that the problem of long delays had just been solved by
recently adopted regulations eliminating temporary work permits
for asylum applicants," and they did not pause to consider the fact
you don't need to sort it out." Telephone Interview with former Senator Alan K. Simpson (July
1, 1998). Representative McCollum thought that those who had fled persecution "have a duty
to come forward. There should be some responsibility to make themselves known." Telephone
Interview with Carmel Fisk, former legislative assistant to Representative McCollum (May
19, 1998). McCollum told the House Judiciary Committee:
I believe this, that, by far and away, the vast majority of those who come here
seeking asylum will know when they set foot on the soil that that's what they
want ... and opening the door for [an exception to the deadline based on] any
change in circumstances opens the door for a lot of mischief.
SCHRAG, supra note 7, at 83 (quoting Transcript of H. Comm. on the Judiciary Mark-up of
H.R. 2202 (104th Cong.), Oct. 11, 1995).
84. Before 1995, applicants were permitted to work in the United States while their
applications were pending. Some people filed nonmeritorious claims simply to be allowed to
work for several months before returning home. As more people did so, the nonmeritorious
applications clogged the adjudication system, increasing the amount of time before
applications were adjudicated. As the delays grew longer, the incentive to file nonmeritorious
cases increased, further lengthening the lag between application and decision. David A.
Martin, Making Asylum Policy: The 1994 Reforms, 70 WASH. L. REV. 725, 733-37 (1995). The
system was changed in January 1995, just a few months before Senator Simpson and
Representative McCollum introduced their proposal for a deadline on applications. Since
January 1995, applicants have not been allowed to work until asylum is granted, unless,
through no fault of the applicant, the government fails to adjudicate the application within
180 days after it is filed. 8 C.F.R. § 208.7(a)(1). The 180-day period includes approximately
two months for an initial decision by DHS and, if asylum is denied and the applicant is
referred for a removal hearing, four more months for a final decision by a DOJ immigration
judge. Any delay caused by the applicant, including a delay granted at the request of the
applicant for securing an interpreter at the DHS interview or for obtaining counsel at any
stage, stops the 180-day clock and prevents the applicant from working unless and until
asylum is granted. Id. § 208.7(a)(2). If asylum is not granted by DHS and is then denied by
an immigration judge, the applicant is barred from working in the United States during the
pendency of any appeals. The operation of this employment clock causes severe hardship for
many asylum applicants, particularly those who miss the one-year deadline and are referred
to immigration courts, where many judges stop the clock for reasons that are not always the
fault of the applicant. For recent criticism of how the clock works in practice, see CTR. FOR
IMMIGRANTS' RIGHTS, PENN STATE DICKINSON SCH. OF LAW, UP AGAINST THE ASYLUM CLOCK:
FIXING THE BROKEN EMPLOYMENT AUTHORIZATION ASYLUM CLOCK 15-23 (2010), available at
http://law.psu.edu/_file/Immigrants/AsylumClock_ Paper.pdf.
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that a thirty-day deadline was a blunt instrument with which to
solve the problem, if it had still existed, of frivolous applications."
In the wake of several terrorist attacks in the United States,
especially the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, which had nothing to
do with immigrants or asylum applicants, and amid growing anti-
immigrant sentiment fueled by certain politicians, members of
Congress wanted to demonstrate that they were doing something to
make American borders more secure.8 6 They supported the thirty-
day deadline, among other proposals, to show their determination
to do something about closing a border that many Americans,
including President Clinton, thought too porous." This restrictive
measure was adopted by the House Immigration Subcommittee, the
House Judiciary Committee, and the Senate Immigration Subcom-
mittee."
Critics of the thirty-day proposal argued that there were many
reasons why some asylum applicants did not apply until they had
been in the United States for a long time. In the words of Senator
Edward Kennedy, the asylum seekers with the most valid claims,
[those] whose lives would be endangered by a forced return to
their particular countries-are often the most reluctant to come
forward [before authority figures]. They are individuals who
have been, in the most instances, severely persecuted .... [and]
brutalized by their own governments .... Many of them are so
traumatized by the kinds of persecution and torture that they
85. The Immigration and Naturalization Service drastically understated the percentage
by which asylum claims had dropped as a result of the January 1995 reform. In addition,
Representative McCollum's staff assistant, the person primarily responsible for introducing
the amendment that created a deadline, was apparently never briefed by INS on the success
of the reform before the amendment was adopted by the House subcommittee and took on a
life of its own. SCHRAG, supra note 7, at 71-72. McCollum himself was unaware, even two
months after the subcommittee vote, that INS had changed its rules on work authorization
for asylum applicants. Id. at 72. But after being briefed by INS, he refused to retreat from his
proposal to impose a 30-day deadline. Id. at 82.
86. On the connection between several terrorist attacks from 1993 through 1995 and the
impetus to restrict immigration, see id. at 38-42, 50-51, 62, 152-54.
87. "[Olur borders leak like a sieve," the President had proclaimed. Remarks and an
Exchange with Reporters on Immigration Policy, 1 PUB. PAPERS 1196 (July 27, 1993).
88. See House Immigration Subcommittee Approves Reform Bill, 72 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 973, 974 (1995); House Committee Approves Major Reform Bill, Floor Action Next,
72 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1503 (1995); Senate Subcommittee Approves Legal Immigration
Reform Measure, 72 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1605 (1995).
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have undergone [that] they are psychologically unprepared to
[participate in any legal process].8
Among other challenges, many asylum applicants were forced to flee
with little more than the clothes on their backs. They arrived in the
United States traumatized and disoriented, unable to speak
English, and their first priorities were to get housed and fed. Many
could not afford counsel and often did not know how to locate pro
bono attorneys. Often they did not even know that the United States
had a formal asylum application procedure."
The critics were unable to defeat completely the idea of imposing
a deadline on asylum applications, but in later stages of the
legislative process, they were able to win significant modifications
of the thirty-day proposal. The limit was changed to one year, and
Congress adopted the two important exceptions to the limit-for
"changed circumstances" and for "extraordinary circumstances"-
that remain in the law today.9
2. Implementation of the Deadline
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), which was
later dissolved and succeeded by DHS, wrote regulations9 2 and a
training manual9 3 for asylum officers to flesh out the meaning of the
exceptions. The regulations provide that the "changed circum-
stances" exception applies not only to the changed conditions in the
applicant's home country but also to activities in which the appli-
cant had become involved, outside of her own country, that placed
89. 142 CONG. REc. 7300 (1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
90. See, e.g., Michele R. Pistone, Asylum Filing Deadlines: Unfair and Unnecessary, 10
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 95, 96-100 (1996); Philip G. Schrag, Don't Gut Political Asylum, WASH.
POST, Nov. 12, 1995, at C7, reprinted in 10 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 93, 93 (1996).
91. 142 CONG. REC. 25,348 (1996).
92. For a history of the evolution of the regulations interpreting the exceptions, see
Michele R. Pistone & Philip G. Schrag, The 1996 Immigration Act: Asylum Application
Deadlines and Expedited Removal-What the INS Should Do, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES
1565, 1568-69 (1996); Philip G. Schrag & Michele R. Pistone, The New Asylum Rule: Not Yet
a Model of Fair Procedure, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 267, 271-78 (1997); Michele R. Pistone &
Philip G. Schrag, The New Asylum Rule: Improved but Still Unfair, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1,
11-17 (2001).
93. The training manual has gone through several iterations. At the time this Article went
to press, the latest version was ASYLUM OFFICER BASIC TRAINING COURSE, supra note 6.
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her at greater risk.94 The regulations define "extraordinary circum-
stances" to include (1) serious physical or mental illness; (2) legal
disability, as in the case of an unaccompanied minor; (3) improper
conduct by the applicant's counsel; (4) the applicant's having other
lawful status in the United States, and therefore no need to seek
asylum; and (5) the death or serious illness of a family member or
legal representative." The regulations do not list unawareness of
the right to seek asylum, or of the existence of the deadline, as an
extraordinary circumstance. However, the list of extraordinary
circumstances in the regulations is illustrative and not exhaustive,
meaning that asylum officers may award exceptions that are not
specifically described therein.96
The training manual provides additional guidance for asylum
officers who must apply the deadline. It discusses in detail most of
the exceptions listed in the regulations." Elaborating on the inter-
pretation of "extraordinary circumstances," the training manual
explicitly recognizes that such a circumstance may be based on
patterns of facts that do not fall within the specified list of excep-
tions." It points out that valid reasons not included in the regula-
94. 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(4) (2010).
95. Id. § 208.4(a)(5).
96. Id. (stating extraordinary circumstances are not limited to the enumerated list).
97. For example, the manual interprets the "clear and convincing evidence" standard for
proof of the date of entry by stating that the proof need not be "conclusive" but should be
somewhere between the "preponderance of evidence" standard used in civil trials and the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard used in criminal trials. AsYLUM OFFICER BASIC
TRAINING COURSE, supra note 6, at 6-7. The training manual is not distributed to immigration
judges, who must also apply the deadline, probably because they are part of DOJ rather than
DHS. In the authors' experience, most immigration judges are unaware of the manual's
existence or content, and the DHS attorneys who appear in immigration court, and who work
in a different division of DHS than the asylum officers, are also not trained on this manual.
For a dramatic example involving the 1994 edition of the training manual, see KENNEY &
SCHRAG, supra note 24, at 156.
98. Some of the guidance is provided by way of example, such as this illustration of the
changed circumstances exception:
A Russian citizen of West African ancestry has lived in the United States since
1989. She filed an 1-589 in June 2000.... [If government-tolerated abuse of West
Africans had existed for a long time and remained constant, her application
would be late, but] if there had been [a recent] escalation of violence between
ethnic Russians and West Africans ... the applicant would be eligible for an
exception, provided the delay in filing is a reasonable period of time.
AsYLUM OFFICER BASIC TRAINING COURSE, supra note 6, at 12.
99. Id. at 20.
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tions may prevent an applicant from applying within a year,
including "severe family or spousal opposition, extreme isolation
within a refugee community, profound language barriers, or pro-
found difficulties in cultural acclimatization.""oo Because this list of
extraordinary circumstances is not exclusive, asylum officers are
allowed some discretion in adjudicating cases in which an applicant
appears to have a good reason for missing the deadline. But as in all
cases in which officials exercise judgment, different officers may
have different views about when it is appropriate to be lenient
toward those who do not file on time.
The training manual also provides partial guidance to asylum
officers on how to determine whether a late applicant who qualifies
for an exception filed his application within a reasonable time given
the changed or extraordinary circumstances.o' Rather than set
inflexible rules, the manual encourages the use of good judgment:
Asylum officers are encouraged to give applicants the benefit of
the doubt in evaluating what constitutes a reasonable time in
which to file. An applicant's education and level of sophistica-
tion, the amount of time it takes to obtain legal assistance, any
effects of persecution and/or illness, when the applicant became
aware of the changed circumstance, and any other relevant
factors should be considered.102
The manual goes on to state that in cases in which the reason for
lateness was that the applicant previously had a lawful immigration
status, waiting more than six months would ordinarily be consid-
ered unreasonable.0 s In 2010, the Board of Immigration Appeals,
the body that hears appeals from decisions of immigration judges,
opined that one year was not per se a reasonable period of time in
which to file in such cases, but that this "reasonableness" determi-
nation must be made on the facts of the particular cases. 104 The
100. Id.
101. Id. at 22-25.
102. Id. at 22.
103. Id. at 24.
104. In re T-M-H-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 193, 195 (B.I.A. 2010), available at http://www.justice.
govleoir/vll/intdec/vol25/3673.pdf (remanding the case to the immigration judge for an
evaluation of the applicant's particular circumstances and noting the six-month requirement
in cases in which the applicant qualified for the exception based on prior lawful status).
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Board seemed to suggest that any delay of over six months will face
a higher evidentiary hurdle to proving that the delay is reason-
able.105
3. Criticisms of the Deadline
Notwithstanding the fact that the statute, regulations, and
manual all provide some exceptions, the deadline has been criticized
over the years as harsh and unfair. 1o A recent article by Professor
Karen Musalo and Marcelle Rice examined 286 cases involving the
one-year deadline.o' Musalo and Rice did not attempt to reach
conclusions through quantitative methods, but attempted only to
illustrate types of problems in the implementation of the deadline
through qualitative research.o They concluded from cases that they
examined that "[t]he one-year bar .... cause[s] the refoulement of
legitimate refugees .... , leads to arbitrary and disparate outcomes,
deters bona fide claims, and squanders precious administrative
resources."' They charge that some asylum officers apply the
exceptions to the deadline formalistically and without regard to the
manual's instruction"0 that "[a]sylum officers must be flexible and
inclusive in examining changed or extraordinary circumstances, if
credible testimony or documentary evidence relating to an exception
exists.""'
105. Id. at 195-96.
106. See, e.g., HEARTLAND ALLIANCE NAT'L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR. ET AL., THE ONE-YEAR
ASYLUM DEADLINE AND THE BIA: No PROTECTION, No PROCESS (2010), available at
http://www.immigrantjustice.org/policy-resources/oneyeardeadlinereport/oneyeardeadline
.html; HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, THE ASYLUM FILING DEADLINE, supra note 8; Leena Khandwala
et al., The One-Year Bar: Denying Protection to Bona Fide Refugees, Contrary to Congressional
Intent and Violative of International Law, IMMIGR. BRIEFING, Aug. 2005, at 1; Musalo & Rice,
supra note 8; articles cited supra notes 8, 90, 92.
107. Musalo & Rice, supra note 8. The clients in these cases had been assisted by lawyers
or psychologists associated with the Center for Gender and Refugee Studies, the East Bay
Sanctuary Covenant, the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission, or
Survivors International. E-mail from Karen Musalo, Clinical Professor & Dir. of the Ctr. for
Gender & Refugee Studies, Univ. of Cal. Hastings College of the Law, to Philip G. Schrag
(Aug. 26, 2009) (on file with author).
108. Musalo & Rice, supra note 8.
109. Id. at 722.
110. Id. at 697, 699.
111. ASYLUM OFFICER BASIC TRAINING COURSE, supra note 6, at 22.
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Similarly, Human Rights First examined case files of asylum
claims that were handled by lawyers to whom it had referred
potential clients. Based on this study, it found that the deadline "is
barring legitimate refugees with well-founded fears of persecution
from receiving asylum in the United States and is leading to the
unnecessary expenditure of government resources."112
Musalo and Rice give this example, among others, to support
their view that asylum officers and immigration judges often apply
the deadline with excessive rigidity:
* A Kenyan woman fled to the United States to avoid
genital mutilation. She applied after the deadline. A
psychologist diagnosed her with post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD) that seriously impaired her ability to
function. But the asylum officer "concluded that the
applicant's disorders could not have directly related to her
delay in filing because the applicant attended church
during her first year in the United States."113
Other examples from the literature and from reported cases provide
equally compelling evidence:
* A Senegalese woman was ordered by her parents to un-
dergo Female Genital Mutilation (FGM). She fled to the
United States. For at least four years, she attempted
without success to change her parents' minds so she could
safely return to Senegal. She finally applied for asylum
when her younger sister was forced to undergo FGM. DHS
rejected her claim because she had not met the deadline,
and the immigration judge concurred. The judge found the
woman credible and observed there was "a reasonable
possibility" that she would undergo FGM in Senegal. But
she was ordered removed because of her late application
and because she could not meet the higher burden of proof
to qualify for withholding of removal.114
112. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, THE ASYLUM FILING DEADLINE, supra note 8, at 1.
113. Musalo & Rice, supra note 8, at 704. The asylum officer in this case may have
overlooked the fact that victims of trauma can sometimes perform ordinary life functions, but
applying for asylum requires them to relive and put on paper an account of the horrendous
events of their persecution. Dredging up these memories may trigger nightmares, flashbacks,
and physical symptoms associated with re-experiencing the trauma. Id. at 703-04.
114. Gomis v. Holder, 571 F.3d 353 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1048 (2009). Ms.
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* A woman from the Gambia was forced into marriage by
her mother at the age of fifteen. Her parents had entered
her into a marriage contract when she was an infant, and
her mother needed the money that had been paid to them
under the contract. "Her husband was from a tribe that
practiced genital cutting, and after the wedding, despite
her strong objections and resistance, she was subjected to
the ritual. Her husband forced her to have sex even
though it was extremely painful for her. He continued to
rape and beat her repeatedly, and also abused their
children. She tried to escape several times, including
leaving the country, but was always forced to return to
him. With the help of her sister, she was finally able to
escape to New York. She learned from her children that
her husband had sent people to New York to find and kill
her. As a result, she remained fearful for her life, ... did
not seek help from authorities, and avoided the Gambian
community. It was only after she sought treatment for
certain medical conditions that her doctor realized she had
been genitally cut and ... advised her that she could be
eligible for asylum. Despite being clinically diagnosed with
PTSD, she was denied asylum on the basis of the one-year
bar, but was found eligible for withholding of deportation.
The applicant will never be able to bring her children to
join her, and they remain in [the] Gambia, where they
continue to be beaten and abused by her husband.""'
* A Chinese student practiced Falun Gong in secret while in
China and then came to the United States to study. In
America, he became well-known as a representative for a
Falun Gong group at his university. He feared that he
would be persecuted for his Falun Gong activities if he
returned to China, but he learned about the American
system of offering asylum only several years after he first
arrived in the United States. DHS rejected his claim
because of the deadline. He is awaiting a hearing in
Gomis's attorney confirmed that DHS rejected Ms. Gomis because of the deadline. Telephone
Interview with Kell Enow, Esq. (Feb. 23, 2010).
115. Khandwala et al., supra note 106, at 9.
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immigration court, but the court is so backlogged that it
cannot schedule the hearing until mid-2011, nearly four
years after he first applied for asylum."6
* A young Eritrean woman was tortured for her Christian
beliefs after the Eritrean government forcibly conscripted
her into the military. She applied for asylum four months
after arriving in the United States. The Asylum Office
rejected her claim because she did not have a passport
showing her date of entry. "In Immigration Court, the
young woman provided three affidavits and documentary
evidence" to establish her date of entry. "The Immigration
Judge told her that she fit the definition of a refugee," but
after three years of litigation, offered her only withholding
of removal. Even though the court determined she would
likely be persecuted in Eritrea, the judge denied her
asylum claim for failure to prove that she filed timely."
A case handled by the clinic that two of the authors direct provides
still another example:
* The applicant was a gay man from Peru, where the
military and the police harass, abuse, assault, and some-
times rape gay men. During his childhood and adoles-
cence, he did not think of himself as gay, but he was twice
suspended from school for effeminate conduct. A few years
later, he was attacked by a gang of men as he was leaving
a gay bar. They called him a faggot, punched him, put out
their cigarettes in his arm, and knocked him unconscious.
He was hospitalized as a result. He knew that the police
would not protect him, so he fled to the United States on
a tourist visa. He then obtained a student visa so that he
could remain in the United States for post-secondary
education. But he was struggling with PTSD and depres-
sion, as diagnosed by a psychiatrist, and began taking
116. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, THE ASYLUM FILING DEADLINE, supra note 8, at 8; Julia Preston,
Reports Say Deadline Hinders Asylum Seekers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2010, at A28.
117. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, RENEWING U.S. COMMITMENT TO REFUGEE PROTECTION 12
(2010), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/asylum/refugee-act-symposium/30th-
AnnRep-3-12-10.pdf (citing Interview by Human Rights First with Lynette Tonin, Esq. (May
14, 2009)).
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prescribed antidepressants. Even so, he stopped attending
school on a full-time basis two years after entering the
United States. For the following year, with his school's
permission, he took a reduced course load. At the end of
that third year, a year after he stopped maintaining full-
time student status, he applied for asylum. His represen-
tatives argued that his PTSD and depression were an
extraordinary circumstance; that his coming to terms with
his sexuality and accepting it, after he had lived in the
United States for a long time and had a relationship with
a man in this country, was a changed circumstance; and
that he filed his application for asylum as soon as he was
able to do so.
The Asylum Office rejected his case. It found that his
change of status when he obtained his student visa was an
extraordinary circumstance, but that the one-year delay
in filing his application after he ceased to be a full-time
student was more than a "reasonable" amount of time.118
Because of the unavailability, until now, of the full statistical
record of the adjudication of cases involving the deadline, the
published regulations, manuals, and critics' commentaries can tell
only part of the story of the deadline's effects. The balance of this
Article seeks to place these anecdotes in a broader perspective, at
least with respect to adjudication by DHS. Unfortunately, we are
not able to analyze the application of the deadline by immigration
judges, because unlike DHS, DOJ does not collect data on which
cases involve challenges to asylum applications based on the dead-
line, or which denials of asylum are based on the deadline. But at
least we can examine, in depth, the effect of the deadline during the
118. In immigration court, the DHS attorney stated that she found the respondent credible
and offered the lesser relief of withholding of removal. His representatives asked the judge
to grant asylum. In the alternative, if the judge thought that the deadline was a bar, they
asked for an arrangement in which (1) the judge would grant withholding and deny asylum,
(2) the government would waive appeal as to withholding, and (3) the applicant would appeal
the denial of asylum. The DHS attorney said that, if the applicant did not accept the offer of
withholding, she would appeal any grant of relief that the judge awarded. Under this
pressure, the applicant accepted the offer of withholding and abandoned his application for
asylum.
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initial stage of asylum application adjudication. Part 1.C describes
the database from which our analysis proceeds.
C. The Database
As the Methodological Appendix describes in more detail, DHS
provided us with a database consisting of much of the information
that it had recorded regarding the asylum adjudications filed
between October 1, 1996, and June 8, 2009."9
The characteristics of the cases in the database are summarized
in Table 1-1, which separates the cases into those filed before the
deadline entered into effect and those filed thereafter.120
119. We studied only the cases in which the applicants were genuinely seeking asylum and
were actually interviewed by asylum officers. Although most of our analyses focused on the
303,601 such cases filed on or after the deadline went into effect on April 16, 1998, we also
made certain comparisons with the 79,879 such cases filed before that date.
For each case that became part of our study, the database included a serial number
generated for the purpose of the study; the applicant's date of entry as asserted by the
applicant, unless the asylum officer found that the applicant had entered on a different date;
the immigration status of the applicant at the time of entry, for example, type of visa, or
information that the applicant apparently entered the United States without being inspected
at an airport, seaport, or land port of entry; the date of the application for asylum; a code
number for the asylum officer who interviewed the applicant and made a recommended
decision (DHS generated these code numbers specifically for this study in order to guarantee
anonymity; they are entirely different from the codes used by USCIS in its systems and
correspondence to identify asylum officers); a code letter A through H, showing in which of the
Asylum Office's eight regions a case was adjudicated; the date of the decision by the Asylum
Office; the decision of the Office; the nationality and gender of the applicant; the age of the
applicant at the time of filing; whether the applicant was represented by counsel at the time
of the asylum interview; whether the applicant was also seeking asylum for dependents
eligible for protection if the applicant was successful (that is, a spouse and any children under
the age of 18, who were in the United States); and the religion of the applicant if the applicant
listed a religion. The eight regional Asylum Offices are located in Arlington, VA; Chicago, IL;
Houston, TX; Los Angeles, CA; Miami, FL; Newark, NJ; New York, NY; and San Francisco,
CA. DHS declined to identify which regional office corresponds to each letter. See
Methodological Appendix, infra, for a more detailed discussion of the database.
120. Our database of cases before the deadline went into effect on April 16, 1998, includes
only those cases filed from October 1, 1995, the beginning of FY 1996, through April 15, 1998.
We did not ask DHS for information on cases in FY 1995 or earlier, because many cases
during that period were likely filed for the purpose of obtaining temporary work authorization
while an asylum application was pending. Work authorization was rarely granted to asylum
applicants who filed on or after January 4, 1995. Therefore, all of the cases in our pre-deadline
sample were filed by applicants who had no expectation of obtaining work authorization
before their asylum cases were adjudicated.
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Table 1-1. Characteristics of Asylum Applicants,
Pre-Deadline and Post-Deadline1 21
Pre-
deadline
cases
Total number
Average number
per month
Percentage
of pre-
deadline
total
79,879
2,619
Post-
deadline
cases
Percentage
of post-
deadline
total
303,601
2,270
54,704 68%
25,175 32%
Inspected
entrants
Uninspected
entrants
Applicant's
region
Latin America
Europe
Central Asia
North Africa &
Middle East
Africa
South Asia
East Asia/Pacific
Canada
Unknown
33,064
46,815
31,588
6,459
2,263
6,289
16,596
9,443
7,076
16
143
41%
59%
40%
8%
3%
8%
21%
12%
9%
0%
0%
179,217 59%
124,384 41%
198,213 65%
105,388 35%
77,910
24,477
16,858
14,910
70,241
17,928
79,019
25
2,233
26%
8%
6%
5%
23%
6%
26%
0%
1%
121. Pre-deadline cases are those filed before April 16, 1998. See supra note 55 and
accompanying text.
Male
Female
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Five most
frequent
nationalities,
pre-deadline'
El Salvador 13,574 17% [2,965] [1%]
Guatemala 7,605 10% [6,156] [2%]
India 7,061 9% [8,786] [3%]
Haiti 5,886 7% [30,552] [10%]
China 5,143 6% [59,805J [20%]
Five most
frequent
nationalities,
post-deadline23
China [5,143] [6%] 59,805 20%
Haiti [5,886] [7%] 30,552 10%
Colombia [360] [1%] 27,861 9%
Indonesia [38] [0%] 11,711 4%
Ethiopia [2,284] [3%] 10,571 3%
Filed within 364
days [36,142] [45%] 210,979 69%
Filed beyond 364
days [43,737] [55%] 92,622 31%
Major religions
(1% or more) 24
Christian 39,060 49% 161,544 53%
Muslim 13,291 17% 37,539 12%
Buddhist 1,670 2% 15,768 5%
Sikh 6,625 8% 7,230 2%
Jewish 1,402 2% 1,784 1%
Age at filing
0-17 1,663 2% 3,216 1%
18-29 37,539 47% 114,385 38%
30-39 25,640 32% 102,086 34%
40-49 10,537 13% 57,360 19%
50-99 4,500 6% 26,544 9%
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Has dependents
in U.S. 11,494 14% 56,921 19%
Has no dependents
in U.S. 68,385 86% 246,680 81%
Unrepresented 56,131 70% 170,709 56%
Represented 23,748 30% 132,892 44%
Outcome
Granted asylum 26,708 33% 121,864 40%
Rejected because
of deadline N/A 54,141 18%
Referred or
denied for
other reasons 53,171 67% 127,596 42%
Several observations emerge from this table. First, consider only
the post-deadline applicants who are the main focus of our study of
the effects of the deadline. About 60 percent of these applicants
were men, and by far the largest religious group of post-deadline
applicants, of those who stated a religion, was Christian. Applicants
came in almost equal numbers from Latin America, Africa, and East
Asia (predominantly China), and these three regions accounted for
three-fourths of all of the affirmative asylum seekers.' 25
Nearly one-fifth of these applicants had a spouse or minor child
with them in the United States for whom they were also seeking
asylum. Sixty-two percent were at least thirty years old when they
applied for asylum. Two-thirds of them arrived in the United States
with visas, such as business, tourist, or student visas, whereas the
122. The brackets indicate numbers and percentages of the five most frequent pre-deadline
nationalities in the post-deadline period.
123. The brackets indicate numbers and percentages of the five most frequent post-deadline
nationalities in the pre-deadline period.
124. 17,314 pre-deadline and 75,496 post-deadline applicants did not list a religion.
125. As noted supra note 10, our study consists only of the approximately 80 percent of
asylum seekers who apply affirmatively and are therefore allowed to ask DHS for asylum in
the first instance; those whom are apprehended before seeking asylum may request that
status only from DOJ.
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other third entered by crossing a border without presenting them-
selves to a border patrol inspector. More than half were unrepre-
sented, even by a lay advocate or a friend, at their Asylum Office
interviews.
It is also worth comparing the pre-deadline population of appli-
cants with the post-deadline population. We see that, in several
respects, major shifts occurred, though we attribute many of these
changes primarily to human rights conditions in the world, not to
the enactment of a deadline.
Although men outnumbered women by more than two to one in
the earlier period, the disparity became less pronounced after
1998.126 Major changes also took place in the nationalities of the
applicants. In the mid-1990s, Guatemalans and Salvadorans were
the largest groups of applicants, making up 27 percent of the entire
pool, but they comprised only 3 percent of the pool after 1998,
probably because persecution and other serious harms associated
with civil wars diminished. Chinese applicants, only 6 percent of the
total in the earlier period, became 20 percent of the later group,
probably because legislation in 1996 clarified that Chinese nationals
fleeing sterilization or forced abortion imposed by the "one-child"
policy were eligible for asylum.'27 Indians, Guatemalans, and
Salvadorans disappeared from the "top five" list after 1998, whereas
several new groups of foreign nationals-Colombians, Indonesians,
and Ethiopians-made the list.128
The group that applied before April 16, 1998, consisted primarily
of individuals who had entered without being inspected, whereas
two-thirds of those in the post-1998 group were people who had
entered with visas and had overstayed their visas before or during
the asylum application process.129 This shift may reflect the
126. By FY 2008, the ratio had dropped further, from 56 percent to 44 percent.
127. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B) (2006).
128. Asylum is available not only to people fleeing government persecution, but also to
persons fleeing from groups that the government is unwilling or unable to control. See In re
O-Z- & I-Z-, 22 1. & N. Dec. 23, 26-27 (B.I.A. 1998), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/v111
intdec/vol22/3346.pdf. In the 1990s, Colombians began to seek asylum because of their fear
of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), which the government could not
control. Luz E. Nagle, Colombian Asylum Seekers: What Practitioners Should Know About the
Colombian Crisis, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 441, 441, 443 (2004).
129. Our calculation of those who entered with and without inspection is based on the data
provided by DHS, which reflect the method of entry that the applicant claimed to have used.
In some cases, the applicant may have lied. For example, an applicant who entered without
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increasing difficulty of entering the United States after the mid-
1990s, when the U.S. government began increasing the number of
border guards and sensors, particularly along the Mexican border.
Another explanation is that only the former group included a large
proportion of Guatemalans and Salvadorans, who were likely to
arrive in the United States in the mid-1990s by waving a purported
border crossing card while on a truck full of Mexican laborers with
valid cards, or by avoiding crossing at a port of entry.130
Representation increased significantly over the years. This may
reflect a greater perceived need for representation, as antiimmi-
grant sentiment hardened, particularly in the wake of the 9/11
terrorist attacks, and the asylum laws became more complex. 31 It
may also reflect the greater availability of representatives, as
immigration and human rights became more prominent public
issues. Before 1998, only 30 percent of asylum seekers were
inspection by crossing a land border may present a false passport, with a visa stamp,
belonging to a friend or relative whose picture resembles the applicant. But fingerprints
would ordinarily reveal the fraud, and DHS would report that entrant as uninspected.
Slightly more frequently, but still rare in our experience, an applicant who entered with a visa
may claim to have entered without inspection by crossing a land border. For example, an
applicant might enter at an airport by "borrowing" the passport and visa of a relative in a
desperate maneuver to seek safety abroad. This applicant might claim to have come across
a land border without inspection to avoid possible prosecution of the relative for "lending" the
passport. In this scenario, DHS would have a more difficult time rebutting the applicant's
claim to have entered without inspection. But inspection documents provide the best way of
proving a date of entry to satisfy the one-year deadline, so we do not think that many
applicants falsely claim an uninspected entry.
130. Although we know from our clinical experience that some African and Asian asylum
seekers do enter without inspection by taking a plane or ship to Latin America and then
crossing the Mexican border, most Africans and Asians who are fleeing persecution and
seeking asylum in America find a way to obtain a visa, submit to inspection, and thereafter
seek asylum.
131. Amendments to the immigration laws in 1996 added not only the bar to asylum based
on the deadline, with its complex exceptions, but also an expanded list of prior criminal
activity that would preclude a grant of asylum. See Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified
in various sections of 8 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.). After the attacks in 2001, Congress also
imposed more severe bars on anyone who had provided "material support" to a terrorist
organization, which was interpreted to cover even those cases in which aid was de minimis
and/or had been provided under duress. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required To Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 411(a), 115 Stat. 272, 345-48. Beginning in 2005, the law required
asylum applicants in many cases to provide corroborating evidence to support even credible
testimony of persecution. This requirement is now codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii)
(2006).
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represented at this stage of the process; for the post-1998 period,
this figure increased to 44 percent.132
Unsurprisingly, prompt filing increased dramatically with the
law's new requirement: the percentage of those who filed within a
year increased by 50 percent, from 46 percent to 69 percent.
Although the more recent asylum seekers are to some extent
quite different from their earlier counterparts, Table 1-1 also
reveals some similarities. Asylum seekers arrive from all over the
world, but in both groups, only five nationalities comprise at least
46 percent of the applicants. Despite the evolutionary changes in
the composition of the two populations, some of the percentages
shown in the table reveal relatively little change from one popula-
tion to the other.
The average number of cases filed per month was moderately
smaller after the deadline took effect, decreasing from 2,619 to
2,270. This average monthly decline, however, disguises significant
increases and decreases in affirmative applications during the study
period. Previous research by one of the authors demonstrated that
a significant drop of more than one-third took place in 1998 and
held for a two- to three-year period.133 The number of applications
began increasing in FY 2000, but a big jump of more than one-third
occurred in FY 2001 and held in FY 2002.134 Applications then fell
more than 25 percent in FY 2003, before dropping significantly,
again more than 25 percent, in FY 2004.135
The number of new Central American claims declined signifi-
cantly in 1997 and 1998.136 The then-INS attributed the sharp
decline to the termination of the filing period for Central Americans
under the American Baptist Churches (ABC) v. Thornburgh set-
tlement.1 3 ' The drop that starts in FY 2003 may very well reflect
post-9/11 changes, including stronger border-control efforts, the
132. For applicants who entered in FY 2008, the figure was 61 percent.
133. See Andrew I. Schoenholtz, Refugee Protection in the United States Post-September 11,
36 COLUM. Hum. RTs. L. REv. 323, 337-38 (2005).
134. Id. at 338.
135. Id.
136. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1998 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE 89-90, available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/
yearbook/1998/RefAsy98text.pdf.
137. Id.
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perception of America as less receptive to the foreign-born, and an
economic downturn.138
The percentage of applicants who were Christian increased
somewhat in the later period, whereas the percentage of applicants
who were Muslim declined."s' The population aged somewhat, as
only 51 percent of applicants in the earlier period were over thirty,
compared with 62 percent in the later years.
One of the most dramatic comparisons between the two popula-
tions is that, despite the imposition of the deadline and other new
restrictions, the Asylum Office's grant rate rose, going from 33
percent for the pre-deadline applicants to 40 percent for those who
applied after it went into force. As we will show, important varia-
tions exist within the later period from one fiscal year to another,
and the deadline appears to have been applied more strictly in later
years than in the period immediately after it entered into force.
Nevertheless, the increase is significant, and we think that it is to
the credit of DHS that it did not take the enactment of the deadline
as a kind of signal that Congress meant to make asylum signifi-
cantly more difficult to obtain on the merits.
We do not know to what extent various factors affected the
change in the grant rate. The increase may reflect the fact that
nationals of some of the countries most prominent in the post-
deadline group, for example, Chinese, Haitians, and Colombians,
may have presented much stronger cases on the whole than the
Salvadorans and Guatemalans, who were the largest components of
the former group, once the civil wars in Central America ended. The
increased rate of representation could have caused the change, for
138. Researchers at Georgetown University's Institute for the Study of International
Migration attributed declines in foreign student visas, for example, to a "perfect storm" of
tighter visa procedures reflecting greater security concerns, perceptions of difficulty in
obtaining visas, and an economic recession. B. LINDSAY LOWELL, MICAH BUMP & SUSAN
MARTIN, FOREIGN STUDENTS COMING TO AMERICA: THE IMPACT OF POLICY, PROCEDURES, AND
ECONOMIC COMPETITION 1, 49 (2007), available at http://isim.georgetown.edu/publications/
20070201_ForeignStudentsComing.pdf. We suspect that such factors affected visa
applicants and others contemplating migration to the United States in general.
139. In each year from FY 1998 through FY 2001, which ended on September 30, 2001, just
after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Muslims constituted between 13 percent and 22 percent of the
asylum applicants. In each year starting with FY 2002, they constituted only 10 percent or
11 percent of the applicants, perhaps reflecting a greater difficulty in obtaining visas to come
to the United States. In FY 2009, for which we have only partial data, the percentage of
Muslims among asylum applicants was 8.5 percent.
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example, because professional advocates presented better evidence.
It could be that the asylum officers were more prone to trust the
veracity of applicants who had entered at border crossings and
presented travel documents, a higher percentage of whom were in
the group that filed later. The deadline itself may have increased
the grant rate, because asylum officers were more often presented
with applicants whose memories were fresher and who may have
had better access to corroboration of events that had occurred in the
more recent past.
The fact that the grant rate increased after the deadline went into
effect may mask the possibility that the increase would have been
still larger if this restriction had never become law. We will return
to that subject, and to the results of a more sophisticated statistical
analysis of the problem, later in this Article.'40
II. TIMELINESS
The DHS data reveal interesting and at times surprising patterns
in asylum officer determinations of whether asylum seekers filed
within the permitted one-year period.'' Part II describes, for the
first time, basic but crucial information about the deadline-what
percentage of asylum claims were determined to have been filed late
and how late these claims were filed. It also examines whether
determinations of lateness differed depending on certain personal
characteristics of the asylum seekers-where they came from in
terms of region and nationality, their age, how they entered,
whether they were represented, their gender, and in which of the
eight regional Asylum Offices they filed their affirmative claims.
A grant of asylum brings with it tremendous benefits, including
the chance to become a lawful permanent resident and eventually
an American citizen. Yet more than 30 percent of asylum applica-
tions submitted from April 16, 1998, through June 8, 2009-about
93,000 of the approximately 304,000 claims-were determined to
have been filed late. That is a very high number, in both percentage
and absolute terms, given the nature of the U.S. government's
140. See infra notes 216-20 and accompanying text.
141. Our count of "late" asylum seekers includes those who may have filed within a year
but could not prove their date of entry to the asylum officer by clear and convincing evidence.
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protection responsibilities and the potentially deadly consequences
of being denied asylum if one is a bona fide refugee.
To confirm the statistical significance of the data analysis
presented below, we ran a binary logistic regression on the data-
base of all cases, exploring the dependent variable of timely filing.'42
Unless otherwise noted, these variables were statistically signif-
icantl43 and confirmed the findings of the cross-tabulation analy-
sis.'44 In other words, even with all other variables held constant,
the relationship between timely filing and each of the independent
variables described below was statistically significant.
Just how late were these 93,000 asylum seekers? The largest
identifiable late group, about 28,000 people, filed within one year
after the deadline had passed, as Figure 2-1 illustrates. They
constituted 30 percent of all late filers. For 27 percent of untimely
applicants, or about 25,000 asylum seekers, we do not know how
late they filed because their date of entry was recorded as blank or
"unknowable."45 We do know that a significant percentage of
applicants filed many years after entering the United States. Some
22,000 individuals, nearly 24 percent of all late filers, filed claims
four years or more after entering the United States; 6,184 of these
applicants, nearly 7 percent of all late filers, filed for asylum more
than ten years after entry.
142. The regression model contained the following independent variables: the Asylum
Office in which the applicant's case was heard, the number of cases previously decided by the
asylum officer who heard the applicant's case, whether the applicant entered lawfully, the
applicant's geographic region of origin, the state of political and civil rights in the applicant's
nation of origin, the applicant's religion, the applicant's gender, whether the applicant had
dependents, whether the applicant had representation, the applicant's age at filing, and the
fiscal year during which the applicant filed. The Methodological Appendix discusses how we
measured and coded these variables and how we created the "timely filing" database. In Parts
II.A, C-F, we reference the regression run with the independent variable of asylum applicants'
nationalities recoded into geographic regions, with the sole exception of Part II.B on
nationality, for which we used the results of the regression run with the independent variable
of asylum applicants' nationalities without recoding.
143. The variables were statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
144. For nominal variables, all of the variables that we report in the text had a statistically
significant effect on the likelihood of timely filing. However, in some cases, there were some
statistically insignificant variables that we did not report. For example, for asylum seekers'
geographic region of origin, North America, that is, Canada, was statistically insignificant;
we did not report the relevant cross-tabulation result in the text.
145. The database contains 21,256 applicants with blank dates of entry.
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Figure 2-1. DHS Determinations of Lapse Between Entry
and Filing
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Figure 2-2. Late Cases, by Fiscal Year of Filing
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As Figure 2-2 illustrates, in recent years, asylum officers have
deemed a higher percentage of cases late than in earlier years. From
FY 2000-2002, about 26 percent of asylum seekers filed late. From
FY 2007-2009, some 36 percent filed late. That represents a 38
percent increase in the percentage of cases that asylum officers
determined were untimely filed."'
146. The regression analysis confirms that, with all other variables held constant, timely
filing decreased as fiscal year of filing increased.
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Figure 2-3. Lapse Between Entry Date and Date of Filing,
by Fiscal Year
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As Figure 2-3 shows, the greatest increase in filers regarded as
late occurred within the group of asylum seekers determined to
have filed three or more years late. There was a sharp uptick in the
percentage of cases filed three or more years late, from 6 percent in
1999 to just under 12 percent in 2009.147 During the most recent
five-year period, FY 2005-2009, the number determined to have filed
more than four years after arrival jumped by 26 percent over the
previous five-year period, FY 2000-2004. This finding that the
percentage of very late filers significantly increased as the years
passed is counterintuitive; one would expect that the deadline would
minimize late filers over time. Perhaps in recent years there have
147. In 1998, the percentage of applications filed three or more years late was quite
high-nearly 15 percent-but we consider this an anomaly caused by the start of the
deadline's implementation that year. In subsequent years, from 1999 through 2003, the
number hovered consistently around 5 percent.
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been more applicants who lack ethnic or national communities that
inform them about asylum or the deadline. Or perhaps in the years
immediately after the deadline was enacted, there was more word-
of-mouth publicity about it, but as the publicity diminished, fewer
refugees found out about the requirement that they must file within
a year of entry. Still another possibility is that increased news
coverage of raids and arrests of undocumented immigrants during
the second administration of George W. Bush caused more refugees
who had been living in the United States for a long time to apply for
asylum rather than remain undocumented, given the higher risk
that they would be identified and detained.
Figure 2-3 also shows a large increase in the number of applicants
whose date of entry is blank. The proportion of applicants with
blank or unknowable entry dates grew dramatically over time,
constituting just over 1 percent of all applicants in the second half
of FY 1998 and 14 percent of all applicants in FY 2009-more than
a 1,000 percent increase in just over a decade.14 8 At the same time,
as Figure 2-4 illustrates, the percentage of applicants who entered
without inspection dropped by 83 percent, from just over 53 percent
in the second half of FY 1998 to a fairly consistent 30 percent from
FY 2002 through FY 2009.149 These trends suggest that the growth
in blank or unknowable entry dates may have resulted especially
from stricter application of evidentiary standards by adjudicators
-that is, more applicants missed the deadline because asylum
officers were less accepting of proof of entry other than official docu-
mentation.
148. Although we know that instructions on leaving entry dates blank were not
incorporated into the asylum officers' procedural manual until 2003, the drop in blank entry
dates in 2006 and the increases in 2008 and 2009 lead us to believe that additional factors
were at play. See USCIS AsYLuM MANUAL, supra note 32; infra text accompanying notes 260-
61; infra Methodological Appendix.
149. In 2005, 35 percent of applicants entered without inspection, and in 2003, 31 percent
entered without inspection. In all other years from 2002 to 2009, the percentage was 30
percent.
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Figure 2-4. All Applicants, Uninspected Entry, by Fiscal
Year
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A. Representation"so
The data reveal interesting patterns in the characteristics of
asylum applicants who were determined to have filed late."' To
begin with, late filers generally were represented at higher rates
150. Although DHS codes representatives in terms of whether the applicant has an
"attorney," a positive indication in the attorney column does not necessarily mean
representation by an attorney, because DHS codes any authorized representative as an
"attorney." Applicants may also be represented by persons designated by nonprofit
organizations and accredited by DOJ, by law students and law school graduates who have not
yet been admitted to the bar, and by reputable individuals whose services are requested by
the applicant. Fees may be charged only by attorneys, except that "nominal charges" for
representation may be imposed by accredited nonprofit organizations. 8 C.F.R. §§ 292.1,
292.2(a) (2010).
151. Some characteristics that we analyzed did not reveal noteworthy differences in the
rates at which asylum officers determined that the applicants filed late. These included
whether or not applicants applied with dependents or identified with particular religions.
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than timely filers.' 52 Almost 50 percent of late filers were repre-
sented in contrast with only 41 percent of timely filers.
Why is it that untimely filers were more often represented than
timely filers? Asylum seekers who want to be represented may be
forced to delay their applications beyond a year because of the
information, the time, and the financial resources needed to secure
representation, not to mention the psychological obstacles to
discussing their claims for asylum.'53 Some asylum seekers may be
aware of the one-year filing deadline but not of the exceptions to the
deadline or their eligibility for the exceptions. Once the deadline has
passed, these asylum seekers might decide not to apply for asylum
and might not learn, until they meet with a lawyer, that they are
still eligible for asylum. Similarly, some asylum seekers might not
understand that the mistreatment they suffered in their home
countries could make them eligible for asylum, and might apply only
after they meet with lawyers who can explain the potential grounds
for their claims. It may also be the case that those who missed the
deadline perceived a greater need to obtain counsel to overcome this
bar to asylum.
Part of the explanation for the increased representation of late
asylum seekers may be that, except for the few asylum seekers who
are fortunate enough to obtain free assistance from a nongovern-
mental organization, law school clinic, or pro bono lawyer, represen-
tation is very expensive. Lawyers typically charge several thousand
dollars to prepare an asylum application with the necessary sup-
porting evidentiary documents and accompany the applicant to the
interview. Some asylum applicants, realizing that they will need a
lawyer but are unable to afford one, may postpone filing until they
can work, in most cases without authorization, for long enough to be
able to hire an attorney, meanwhile missing the filing deadline.
152. The regression confirms that, with all other variables held constant, represented
asylum seekers filed timely less frequently than unrepresented asylum seekers.
153. FELINDA MOTTINO, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, MOVING FORWARD: THE ROLE OF LEGAL
COUNSEL IN NEW YORK CITY IMMIGRATION COURTS 22, 24, 27 (2000), available at
http://www.vera.org/download?file=514/533.409747%2BMF.pdf (noting that the "search for
counsel" is often a time-consuming and frustrating experience and that "[1]anguage barriers,
cultural misunderstandings, and lack of familiarity with U.S. systems and procedures
compound the problem"). Mottino's study is the only major study of representation in U.S.
immigration courts that examines the challenges of finding counsel based on interviews with
noncitizens in removal proceedings.
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Figure 2-5 shows an increasing degree of representation for every
year of lateness. Interestingly, for each cohort, the majority of
asylum seekers were unrepresented-except for the group of asylum
seekers who filed four years or more after entry.
Figure 2-5. Representation by Lapse Between Entry Date
and Filing Date
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B. Nationality
What are the demographic characteristics of those determined to
have filed late? Figure 2-6 looks at applicants from the six most
frequent nationalities of affirmative asylum seekers: Armenia,
China, Colombia, Ethiopia, Haiti, and Indonesia.15 4 Considerably
fewer Armenians, Ethiopians, and Haitians filed late compared to
Chinese, Colombians, and especially Indonesians.' 5 Why did only
154. See supra Part I tbl.1-1 (specifying the most frequent nationalities in the post-deadline
database).
155. The regression analysis found that, with all other variables held constant, Indonesians
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15 percent of the Armenians file late, while 45 percent of the
Indonesians failed to meet the deadline? One possibility is that the
communities of immigrants from those nationalities already in the
United States, among whom the new refugees may settle, are
differently organized, leading to differences in levels and effective-
ness of information sharing regarding the deadline requirement.
Figure 2-6. Late Filing by Applicants of the Most Frequent
Nationalities
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filed late most often, followed by Chinese, Colombians, Armenians, Haitians, and Ethiopians.
*
C.
e
Is .
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:651
Figure 2-7. Representation for the Six Most Conunon
Applicant Nationalities
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As Figure 2-7 shows, the two major nationalities that filed late
most frequently, the Chinese with 34 percent and Indonesians with
45 percent, were also most often represented-the Chinese at a rate
of 74 percent and the Indonesians at a rate of 55 percent. This
matches up with our findings that late filers were generally
represented at higher rates than timely filers. Also in line with the
representation data, Armenians and Haitians shared similarly low
rates of late filing, 15 percent and 18 percent respectively, and very
low rates of representation, 15 percent and 11 percent respectively.
Ethiopians bucked the pattern, though, with a low rate of late filing
of 18 percent and a relatively high rate of representation of 46
percent. This is not surprising, of course, as some communities are
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probably better informed about and understand better the value of
representation.1 56
Figure 2-8. Inspected Entry for the Six Most Conunon
Applicant Nationalities
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Figure 2-8 shows that for most of the six most common applicant
nationalities, the cross-tabulation analysis demonstrated a clear
relationship between lawful entry and timely filing, and the
regression analysis tells us that, with all other variables held
constant, applicants who entered lawfully filed timely more often
than those who entered without inspection. As one might expect,
156. As noted supra note 155, the regression analysis shows that, with all other variables
held constant, Armenians filed late at a higher rate than Ethiopians and Haitians. In other
words, one or more variables other than nationality drove down the rate of late filing by
Armenians.
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Armenians, Colombians, and Ethiopians, who all had relatively
low rates of late filing, overwhelmingly entered through official
channels, with rates of inspected entry ranging from 81 percent to
94 percent. Although more Chinese applicants entered with inspec-
tion than without inspection, the proportion of inspected entries was
significantly lower, at nearly 60 percent, so it is perhaps unsurpris-
ing that over one-third of Chinese applicants were found to have
filed late. But we see an interesting phenomenon when it comes to
the Indonesians, who had the highest rate of inspected entry, 98
percent, but also the highest rate of late filing. Departing from the
normal relationship in the opposite direction, Haitians had the
highest rate of entry without inspection, 74 percent, but also one of
the lowest rates of late filing. We wondered what was causing these
counterintuitive results.
What do we know about the Haitian and Indonesian asylum
applicant pool that might explain these outcomes? Haitians have a
large and long-standing diaspora in the United States. Nearly one
in every twenty Haitians resides in the United States.'5 7 In 2008,
there were about 535,000 Haitian immigrants in the United States,
nearly half of whom were naturalized U.S. citizens.' Nearly a
quarter of these Haitians had lived in the United States since before
1980,159 with over a third residing in the Miami area and almost a
third residing in the greater New York City area.6 o It could be that
the relatively tight-knit and well-established Haitian community
helps its nationals to file for asylum within a year, and has figured
out a way to prove their date of entry without providing official
documentation.
The Indonesian immigrant community in the United States, in
contrast, is relatively small and perhaps not as well organized in
supporting its newly arrived nationals. As of 2005, there were only
75,000 Indonesian immigrants in the United States,'' approxi-
157. See Aaron Terrazas, Haitian Immigrants in the United States, MIGRATION INFO.
SOURCE, Jan. 2010, http://www.migrationinformation.org/USFocus/display.cfm?ID=770.
158. Id.
159. U.S. Census Bureau, United States Foreign-Born Population Data Tables: Haiti,
tbl.FBP-1 (2000), available at http://www.census.gov/population/cen2000/stp-159/STP-159-
haiti.pdf [hereinafter Haiti Data Tables].
160. Terrazas, supra note 157.
161. Graene Hugo, Indonesia's Labor Looks Abroad, MIGRATION INFO. SOURCE, Apr. 2007,
http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?ID=594.
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mately a third of whom arrived before 1980.162 In 2000, less than 37
percent of the Indonesians in the United States had obtained U.S.
citizenship. 163 Moreover, most Indonesian asylum seekers face
serious language barriers to obtaining information about the asylum
process and legal representation. These patterns in the data give
rise to a concern that factors such as community networks and
cultural obstacles might play an important role in enabling asylum
seekers to file timely."' This makes us worry that the one-year
filing deadline is an inaccurate and inappropriate tool for weeding
out weak asylum claims.
We are reluctant to push this hypothesis too far, however, as
other data are more ambiguous. For example, among the six largest
groups of applicants in FY 2008, Haitians and Ethiopians had the
highest rates of filing on time, 88 percent and 83 percent re-
spectively. Although there were large numbers of Haitian indiv-
iduals living in the United States-419,315,165 including 8,707
recent (2003-2007) successful asylum applicants-the number of
Ethiopian-born individuals living in the United States was much
smaller-69,530, including 2,722 recent Ethiopian asylees.'6 6 It may
be that the quality of social networks is more important than the
quantity of conationals, or it may be that the relationship we
hypothesize does not hold true in all cases. Further research is
needed on social networks among recent immigrants and new
asylum seekers of the same nationality and, in particular, the
extent to which new asylum seekers are assisted either by estab-
lished residents with whom they share ethnicity or by those with
recent experience with DHS.
162. U.S. Census Bureau, United States Foreign-Born Population Data Tables: Indonesia,
tbl.FBP-1 (2000), available at http://www.census.gov/populationi/cen2000/stp-159/STP-159-
indonesia.pdf.
163. Id.
164. See Khalid Koser, Social Networks and the Asylum Cycle: The Case of Iranians in the
Netherlands, 31 INT'L MIGRATION REv. 591, 602-03 (1997) (discussing the role of social
networks in providing assistance to recently arrived migrants).
165. Haiti Data Tables, supra note 159.
166. U.S. Census Bureau, United States Foreign-Born Population Data Tables: Ethiopia,
tbl.FBP-1 (2000), available at http://www.census.gov/population/cen2000/stp-159/stpl59-
ethiopia.pdf.
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C. Gender
Women filed about 41 percent of the claims in this database.
Women had a rate of untimely filing 13 percent higher than
men-32.7 percent, in contrast with 29 percent. 16
The degree of filing within two, three, and four years of entry is
similar for both males and females, as Figure 2-9 shows. Strikingly,
however, women filed very late claims at a rate more than 50
percent higher than men. Almost 10 percent of female asylum
seekers filed at least four years after entry. This difference may be
due to the particular nature of the persecution inflicted upon these
women. Women are more likely to have suffered sexual violence
than men and therefore may be more reluctant to reveal to govern-
ment officials-or anyone else-what happened to them in their
home countries.' It may take many years before they are psycho-
logically prepared to present an asylum claim. Moreover, women
claiming asylum based on gendered grounds, such as domestic
violence and female genital mutilation, may not be aware that they
are eligible for asylum when they first arrive in the United States,
and as a result might not file within a year of entry. This theory is
supported by the finding that female asylum seekers who filed very
late were represented at a higher rate than male asylum
seekers"'--perhaps because women who did not have a lawyer did
not know that they were eligible for asylum.170
167. The regression confirms that, with all other variables held constant, women filed
timely less often than men.
168. Diana Bogner, Jane Herlihy & Chris R. Brewin, Impact of Sexual Violence on
Disclosure During Home Office Interviews, 191 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 75 (2007).
169. The data reveal that 62.5 percent of the 11,184 women who filed four or more years
after entry were represented, compared with only 51 percent of the 10,702 men who filed four
or more years after entry.
170. Legal recognition of gender-based claims is relatively new. Some asylum applicants
may think, until counseled by a lawyer, that only governmental persecution on account of
political or religious activities would qualify an applicant for protection.
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Figure 2-9. Gender and Lapse Between Deadline and
Filing Date
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Finally, women filed late more often than men despite the fact
that they entered without inspection less often than men did-3 1.1
percent versus 37.2 percent.171 This, too, suggests that other factors,
such as the nature of persecution suffered by women, accounted for
a large degree for higher levels of late filing.
171. See infra Part II.E (showing correlation between entry without inspection and late
filing).
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D. Age
As noted above,17 1 more than two-thirds of asylum applicants filed
their claims between the ages of eighteen and thirty-nine, although
as Figure 2-10 demonstrates, different nationalities produce very
different populations of applicants in terms of their ages.
Figure 2-10. Age of Applicants from the Most Frequent
Nationalities
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172. Supra Part I tbl.1-1.
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Figures 2-11 and 2-12 show that younger adult asylum seekers as
a whole missed the deadline more frequently than older adult
asylum seekers. Although about one in four claimants over fifty
years old filed late, more than one in three between the ages of
eighteen and twenty-nine did so. This relationship holds up for
those who filed in each fiscal year that we studied. For example, in
FY 2003, over 40 percent of asylum seekers between the ages of
eighteen and twenty-nine filed late compared to less than 30 percent
of those ages fifty and over. In other words, asylum seekers over
fifty filed on time over 20 percent more often than those ages
eighteen to twenty-nine.
We know that young adults are more likely to enter without
inspection-nearly 9 percent of that group had a blank or unknow-
able entry date as compared to just under 3 percent of the older
group-and therefore not have official documentation of entry. Yet
even with all other variables, including mode of entry, held con-
stant, the regression analysis confirms that older asylum seekers
filed timely more often than younger asylum seekers."
173. If we consider only inspected applicants, the differences were smaller, but older
applicants still filed timely more often than younger applicants. In all, 29 percent of those who
were under age eighteen and 29 percent of those who were eighteen to twenty-nine years old
filed late, whereas 26 percent of those between thirty and thirty-nine and 24 percent of those
age forty and over were late.
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Figure 2-11. Untimely Filing by Age
40%
30%1=
S25%1
1 0%2
534
10%
0-17 (3,216) 30-39 (102,086) 50-99 (26,554)
18-29 (114,385) 40-49 (57,360)
Applicant's Age (In Years)
REJECTING REFUGEES 707
Figure 2-12. Age and Lapse Between Deadline and
Filing Date
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E. Mode of Entry
As noted earlier, 1 74 almost two-thirds of asylum seekers in our
database gained admission to the United States lawfully. Late filing
was determined in nearly 45 percent more applicants who entered
the United States without inspection than applicants who were
inspected upon entry-38 percent of uninspected entrants, but only
26 percent of inspected entrants, filed late.17 5
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174. Supra Part I tbl.1-1.
175. The regression analysis confirms that, with all other variables held constant,
inspected applicants filed timely more often than uninspected applicants.
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This degree of difference in late filing has changed significantly
over time. As Figure 2-13 shows, those entering lawfully have been
deemed late filers at a fairly consistent rate. Those entering without
inspection, however, have increasingly been deemed late filers over
time.
Figure 2-13. Late Filing by Year and Mode of Entry
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The most recent years, 2007-2009, show an enormous increase in
determinations of late filings to the point that almost 70 percent of
those who entered without inspection were determined to have filed
late claims in 2009, compared to only 24 percent in 1999-a nearly
200 percent increase in a decade. This increase has occurred despite
the fact that the percentage of applicants who have entered without
inspection has remained almost constant. 176
176. See supra Part II fig.2-4.
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What might account for this difference regarding the mode of
entry and this serious increase in late filing? It is possible that since
9/11, asylum officers have required a higher degree of proof of the
date of entry for those who entered without inspection than they
had required previously. Those who are inspected most often have
an immigration officer's "Arrival and Departure" record card stapled
to their passports, including a date stamp indicating when they
arrived in the United States. But those who enter without being
inspected do not have such official evidence to corroborate their date
of entry.
It may also be that asylum officers perceived inspected applicants
to be more credible than uninspected applicants. When we examine
asylum grant rates during the same period, applicants who were
inspected at entry received asylum at higher rates than the
uninspected, regardless of whether they filed late or timely. That is,
untimely inspected asylum applicants who met an exception to the
deadline were granted asylum at a rate of 54 percent, and timely
inspected applicants had a grant rate of 51 percent. But timely
uninspected applicants faced a much lower grant rate on the merits,
44 percent, and untimely but excepted uninspected applicants fared
worse, with a 33 percent grant rate. The moral of the story is that,
even when they were timely, the uninspected lost out on the merits.
Of course, applicants, whether inspected or not, who were untimely
and did not qualify for an exception were the biggest losers, as they
faced a grant rate of 0 percent.
F. Asylum Offices
What about lateness of filings at the different Asylum Offices?
The eight regional Asylum Offices determined asylum seekers to
have filed late at very different rates. In Region H, for example,
applicants were found to have filed late nearly twice as often com-
pared to those in Regions B, C, and F." As shown in Figure 2-15,
those applying in Regions A and G were found to have filed late, but
by less than a year, about twice as frequently as those in Region F,
and those in Region H were found to have filed very late-four or
177. See infra Part II.F fig.2-14.
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more years after arrival-more than twice as often as those in
Region B.178
Figure 2-14. Untimely Filing by Regional Asylum Office
In%
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178. The regression analysis found that, with all other variables held constant, applicants
before the Asylum Office in Region H were most often untimely, followed by Regions E, A, G,
D, F, C, and B. Figure 2-14, based on crosstabs of the data, reflects this order with one slight
difference: according to the crosstabs, applicants in Regions B, C, and F filed untimely at
identical rates.
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Figure 2-15. Lapse Between Deadline and Filing Date by
Regional Asylum Office
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We wondered whether these differences between Asylum Office
regions reflected the mode of entry of the relevant asylum applicant
populations. As discussed above, those who entered without in-
spection and therefore without the best proof of their dates of entry
were more often unable to prove timely filing compared to those
inspected upon entry."' This relationship holds true for Regions E
and H, which had the highest level of both late and uninspected
filers.s 0 But as with nationality, uninspected mode of entry did not
always result in late filing. Region B had the third highest rate of
uninspected entrants, at 39 percent, and one of the lowest propor-
179. See supra Part II.E.
180. See infra Part II.F fig.2-16.
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tions of late filers, at 24 percent. Region A had the third lowest rate
of uninspected entrants, at 31 percent, and the third highest
proportion of late filers, at 35 percent. These data suggest the
possibility that these differences in timely filing rates between
Asylum Offices may reflect different operating assumptions or
procedures in the different regional offices.
Figure 2-16. Uninspected Entry and Regional Asylum
Office
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The data reveal that a very large percentage and absolute number
of asylum seekers have been deemed to have filed late. This failure
to meet a procedural requirement has major consequences for those
who suffered or reasonably fear persecution, and for the U.S.
government. A number of characteristics of asylum seekers
correlated with lateness and sometimes the degree of lateness.
These include representation, gender, age, nationality, regional
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office in which they filed, and mode of entry. We think it is very
troubling that a procedural bar to asylum should affect refugees
differently depending on these factors, which do not have anything
to do with the severity of the persecution that the asylum seekers
faced, the reasons why they were persecuted, or the credibility of
their testimony. Unfortunately, the arbitrariness that is injected
into asylum adjudication by these factors is compounded by how
these same factors correlate with asylum officers' evaluations of how
the changed and extraordinary circumstances exceptions apply to
the applicants. How those officers applied the exceptions is the
subject of the next Part of this Article.
III. THE REJECTIONS
In Part II, we reviewed the numbers and demographic character-
istics of applicants who did not establish to the satisfaction of
asylum officers that they filed their asylum applications within one
year of entering the United States. We saw that 92,622 individuals,
or 30.5 percent of all affirmative asylum applicants, fell into this
"untimely" category during the period of our study. This figure
understates the proportion of asylum seekers affected by the
deadline. It does not take into account those who failed to apply
because they knew that they missed the deadline and therefore
judged that the risk of applying late, and revealing themselves to
immigration authorities, was greater than the risk of remaining in
the United States without authorization.
In Part III, we examine the relationships between the larger pool
of all untimely applicants and the smaller pool of those who were
ultimately rejected by DHS because they did not qualify for
exceptions to the deadline. We ask what proportion of untimely
applicants were actually rejected, and to what extent the rejection
rate changed over time and was different for certain demographic
subgroups within the population of untimely applicants. We ex-
amine the extent to which asylum officers, to whom cases are
randomly assigned within each of the eight regional offices, vary in
the degree to which they find that applicants qualified for an
exception. And we offer an informed estimate of the extent to which
the rejected applicants would have won asylum if Congress had not
imposed a one-year deadline.
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A. Introductory Note
We begin Part III.A with a note on terminology, discretion, and
the limitations of the data provided to us. Following the practice of
DHS officials, in Part III we use the term "rejectable" to refer to a
case in which the applicant could not prove, by "clear and convincing
evidence," that he or she filed an application for asylum within one
year after entering the United States.' "Rejectable" cases, in other
words, are those to which the one-year deadline could apply. The
law imposes a high burden of proof on applicants, many of whom
lack documentation of their date of entry, and invests asylum
officers with authority to determine whether an applicant has met
that burden or is rejectable.18'
The term "rejected" refers to a case that was referred to immigra-
tion court because of the applicant's failure to prove timely filing or
an acceptable exception-that is, a case to which the one-year
deadline was actually applied as a bar. A rejection precludes the
asylum officer from making a decision on the merits of the case. But
an asylum officer can determine that a rejectable applicant's reason
for filing late constitutes a "changed circumstance" or an "extraordi-
nary circumstance," the two exceptions that Congress provided to
the deadline.' 8' The statute provides an illustrative but not exhaus-
tive list of exceptions to the one-year deadline, enabling asylum
officers to approve exceptions that are not enumerated therein."4
If the applicant qualifies for an exception, the asylum officer then
has the authority to determine whether the applicant filed within
a reasonable period of time after the circumstance that prevented
timely filing was no longer applicable."' Asylum officers, therefore,
181. Here, as elsewhere, we use the shorthand terms "late," "rejectable," and "untimely"
interchangeably. We use the term "timely" to mean that the applicant was found to have filed
within a year of entry.
182. Of course, the database for our studies of rejectable cases includes only cases that
were filed after April 15, 1998, the date the one-year filing bar went into effect, and were
determined to be untimely.
183. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D) (2006).
184. See supra text accompanying note 102 (providing a more detailed description of the
exceptions).
185. For example, during the period of the study, DHS apparently followed advice from
DOJ to the effect that waiting more than six months to apply for asylum after lawful status
under a visa expired was unreasonable. ASYLUM OFFICER BASIC TRAINING COURSE, supra note
6, at 24. DHS did not deem waiting more than six months per se unreasonable in other
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may make as many as three separate determinations pertaining to
the deadline in a particular case: (1) whether the applicant filed on
time or was rejectable; (2) whether a rejectable applicant qualified
for an exception; and (3) whether an applicant who qualified for an
exception filed within a reasonable period after the exception was
no longer applicable.
DHS statistics reveal which untimely applicants were deemed to
qualify for an exception,"s so we can analyze statistically who these
people are, as well as who did not qualify, in relationship to the
larger body of untimely filers. Unfortunately, DHS does not
separately code (a) untimely filers for whom no exception was even
arguably applicable; (b) untimely filers for whom an exception might
be applicable but who did not establish that exception "to the
satisfaction of the Attorney General";... and (c) untimely filers to
whom an exception applied but who were deemed not to have filed
within a reasonable period of time after the exception was no longer
operative. We were therefore unable to evaluate the rate at which
exceptions were applied in relationship to exceptions that were
asserted or might have been applicable, nor were we able to
determine whether cases were rejected because the asylum officer
found that the asylum seeker had not established the existence of
the potentially applicable exception, or because the asylum officer
accepted the exception but decided that the applicant did not file
quickly enough. Similarly, DHS does not record the nature of any
potentially applicable exception, so we were unable to analyze
statistically the types of exceptions that were offered by the asylum
seeker or examined by the asylum officer and the proportions in
situations, but some asylum officers may have applied the six-month rule in other contexts,
for example, when the applicant filed more than six months after learning that human rights
conditions in her country had deteriorated. See Letter from Tori Andrea to Joseph Langlois,
supra note 8.
186. We coded three types of applicants as having qualified for an exception and having
filed for asylum while the exception applied, or within a reasonable period of time thereafter:
(1) those whose date of entry was more than a year before their application, or was blank, and
who were granted asylum; (2) those whose date of entry was more than a year before their
date of application, or was blank, and who were referred to immigration court for a reason
other than late filing; and (3) those whose date of entry was more than a year before their
date of application, or was blank, and who were denied asylum for a reason other than late
filing. The third category refers only to the small number of individuals who were in a lawful
status when DHS reached a decision on their applications.
187. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D).
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which they were accepted. Moreover, DHS does not record the end
date of accepted exceptions nor the length of time after those end
dates that applicants filed asylum claims, so we were also unable to
analyze the range of post-exception filing time periods and which of
those were deemed to be "reasonable." Nevertheless, the data that
DHS does record enabled us to make some interesting observations
about the exercise of discretion by DHS officials.
To confirm the statistical significance of the data analysis pre-
sented below, we ran a binary logistic regression on the database of
all cases, exploring the dependent variable of rejection."'s Unless
otherwise noted, these variables were statistically significant"8 ' and
confirmed the findings of the cross-tabulation analysis.9 o In other
words, even with all other variables held constant, the relationship
between rejection rates and each of the independent variables
described below was statistically significant.
B. The Rejection Rate
From April 16, 1998, when the one-year deadline went into effect,
through June 8, 2009, DHS rejected 54,141 applicants because
either they could not prove that they filed on time; or, if they
conceded that they did not file on time, then in the view of DHS
officials, they failed to prove the existence of a changed or extraordi-
nary circumstance justifying a late application; or, having proved
their eligibility for an exception, they failed to file within a reason-
188. The regression model contained the following independent variables: the Asylum
Office in which the applicant's case was heard, number of cases previously decided by the
asylum officer who heard the applicant's case, whether the applicant entered lawfully, the
applicant's geographic region of origin, the state of political and civil rights in the applicant's
nation of origin, the applicant's religion, the applicant's gender, whether the applicant had
dependents, whether the applicant had representation, the applicant's age at filing, the length
of time elapsed between the applicant's date of entry and date of filing, and the fiscal year
during which the applicant filed. The Methodological Appendix discusses how we measured
and coded these variables and how we created the "rejected" database. In the text below, we
reference the regression run with the independent variable of asylum applicants' nationalities
recoded into geographic regions, with the sole exception of the section on nationality, for
which we used the results of the regression run with the independent variable of asylum
applicants' nationalities without recoding.
189. The variables were statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
190. For nominal variables, all of the variables that we report in the text had a statistically
significant effect on the likelihood of rejection. However, in some cases, as in our study of
timeliness, there were some statistically insignificant variables that we did not report.
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able period of time in light of the exception. These rejected cases
constituted 17.8 percent of all of the asylum cases that DHS
adjudicated and 59 percent of all cases that were filed more than a
year after entry.
Figure 3-1 shows the outcomes by fiscal year of all of the cases in
the database, including those filed in the two and a half years before
the filing deadline was imposed as well as those filed timely.
Figure 3-1. Case Outcome by Fiscal Year
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Figure 3-1 shows that rejections based on the deadline can be
grouped into three periods. In cases filed before April 16, 1998, there
were no rejections based on the deadline because the deadline had
not yet taken effect. From the onset of the deadline through FY
2002, between 11 percent and 17 percent of cases were rejected
because of the deadline. Then, in FY 2003, there was a sudden
increase to 25 percent in the percentage of rejected cases. And in
every year but one since the end of FY 2002, the rejection rate has
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topped 20 percent, with the rate near 25 percent once again in the
last year and a half covered by our study.
Figure 3-1 also shows that from FY 1999 through FY 2009, the
rate at which cases were denied or referred on the merits held
steady at roughly 43 percent. Of course, if the rate of merits denials
held steady, and the rejection rate went up, the grant rate had to
fall during the years in question-and it did. In every year from the
second half of FY 1998, when the deadline first took effect, through
FY 2002, that rate equaled or exceeded 40 percent. But in FY 2003
it dropped to about 33 percent, and it never reached 40 percent
again. In the last two and a half years covered by this study, it
remained at about 33 percent."' Grant rates rose steadily until FY
2000, peaked in FY 2000 and 2001, and fell thereafter.
What are the reasons for the decline in grant rates after FY 2001?
It may be that stricter enforcement of the deadline statute, as
applied during and particularly after FY 2002, contributed to the
drop. Not only did the rate of merits rejections remain fairly
constant from FY 1999 onward, but former DHS asylum officers
have anecdotally told us that they were informally advised by
superiors around FY 2002 to apply the deadline more stringently,
and the statistical evidence suggests that the advice was followed.
Though we believe that DHS officials may have imposed stricter
limits starting in FY 2002 or 2003, we do not know why. It could be
that the 9/11 attacks, just as FY 2002 was starting, heightened
suspicion of immigrants generally, including asylum seekers. It
could be that the transfer of functions, including asylum adjudica-
tion, from INS to the new Department of Homeland Security in the
middle of FY 2003 imposed a new enforcement culture on adjudica-
191. Through FY 2004, the DHS Yearbook of Immigration Statistics showed the asylum
grant rate by year-however, the Bush administration ended that practice starting with the
FY 2005 statistics. See OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2004
YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 55 tbl.18 (2004), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/files/statistics/ publications/YrBkO4RA.shtm. The DHS FY 2004 grant
rate table reports grant rates from FY 1996 through FY 2004. The table shows significantly
lower grant rates, particularly for FY 1997, FY 1998, and FY 1999, compared to those
computed from the database that DHS provided to us. The most likely explanation of the
difference is that the DHS computations included a substantial number of cases filed by
Mexican nationals, who were excluded from our database. See infra note 253. In addition, the
Yearbook statistics are based on the date of completion, so they include many cases from the
backlog of over 400,000 cases filed from the late 1980s through December 1997; our data are
based only on the fiscal year of filing.
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tion officials. It could be that INS was especially lenient in applying
a new law in the years immediately following its entry into force,
and that the "honeymoon" was over by FY 2002. It could be that
senior officials of the Bush administration passed a message down
the line to be more strict in allowing anyone to immigrate or even
to spend more than a few months in the United States.9 2 Of course,
a combination of these factors may have been responsible.
Part of the decrease appears to result from a falloff in the
percentage of applicants after FY 2001 who filed within a year. This
percentage was 64 percent in the six months after the deadline went
into effect and then climbed, running around 73 percent to 76
percent between FY 1999 and FY 2001, although it dropped to about
65 percent in the subsequent years.19' It is not clear whether this
decline in timely filing resulted from fewer applicants filing within
a year of entry, from some asylum officers becoming less accepting
of applicants' claimed entry dates unsupported by official entry
documents, thus creating a smaller pool of timely applicants, or
from both of these factors.
A major aspect of the adjudication of untimely asylum applica-
tions is the adjudication of exceptions to the deadline. As noted
above, 59 percent of all rejectable cases were rejected over the entire
period studied. But the rate of rejection was not uniform among
years, nor was it uniform among subpopulations of asylum seekers.
192. Admissions of refugees to the United States through the State Department's overseas
refugee program fell from about 70,000 persons in FY 2001 to about 25,000 persons in FY
2002. 2008 DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC. ANN. FLOW REP.: REFUGEES & ASYLEES 1 fig. 1, available
at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois-rfa fr 2008.pdf. The number
of student visas issued by the Department of State fell from 319,517 in FY 2001 to 256,534
in FY 2002. DEP'T OF STATE, CLASSES OF NONIMMIGRANTS ISSUED VIsAS, FISCAL YEARS 1998-
2002 tbl.XVI(A), available at http://travel.state.gov/pdflFY2002%20table%20XVI.pdf.
193. See supra Part II fig.2-3.
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Figure 3-2 shows the rate, by fiscal year, at which these rejectable
cases were rejected.
Figure 3-2. Rejectable Cases Rejected by Fiscal Year
Fstal Year
Here, too, we see the steady climb in the rejection rate after the
first few years in which the deadline was in force.'94 In the first
three years, DHS rejected an increasing number of rejectable cases,
ranging from 33 percent in the second half of FY 1998 to 47 percent
in FY 2000. But in FY 2001, the rate jumped to 58 percent, reached
a high of 68 percent in FY 2003, and in subsequent years was never
less than 61 percent."e'
194. The percentages are higher in this figure than in Figure 3-1 because the baseline is
rejectable cases rather than all cases.
195. The regression analysis confirmed that, with all other variables held constant, cases
were more often rejected as years went by.
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C. Magnitude of Lateness
The rate of rejection varied depending on how much later than
one year the applicant filed. Those who filed less than two years
after entry were rejected at a rate of 32 percent, but those who filed
more than two years after entry were in every case rejected at a rate
of at least 57 percent. Our regression analysis confirmed that the
longer the lapse, the more likely an asylum seeker was rejected.
Moreover, having a missing entry date was like losing your ticket
in a parking garage; applicants with no date of entry were penalized
even more severely than those who filed four or more years after
entry. Asylum applicants who could not establish any date of entry
faced an 84 percent rejection rate-35 percent higher than the 62
percent rejection rate faced by those who filed four or more years
after entry, and 65 percent higher than the 51 percent rejection rate
faced by the entire cohort of those who could establish an entry date.
If we look more closely at the rejection rate for applicants who
filed only shortly after the deadline, we can see that those who were
only a few days late were often determined to qualify for an
exception. Figure 3-3 shows the rejection rate for those who were
late but who missed the deadline by 31 or fewer days.
2010] 721
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Figure 3-3. Rejection Rate for Applicants Late 31 or Fewer
Days
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Figure 3-3 shows that the rejection rate remained at 15 percent
or less for those who filed between the 365th and the 384th day
after entry, or 20 days late, but that it began to climb after that,
reaching 21 percent by 30 days after entry. Figure 3-4 reveals what
happened to those who filed still later.
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Figure 3-4. Rejections by Number of Days After Deadline
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These two figures are not surprising, except that the statute
reads as if it created an on-off switch at the one-year mark, whereas
the two graphs show that in practice, asylum officers have created
in the aggregate a sliding scale. Tardier filings resulted in greater
rates of rejection based on the deadline."
196. As we have noted, supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text, the deadline is subject
to exceptions, and the exceptions are themselves subject to a requirement of filing within a
reasonable period of time after the exception is no longer applicable. We do not think that the
"reasonable time" rule accounts for the sliding scale demonstrated by the graph, however. The
"reasonable time" rule applies only if an exception is involved, and the exceptions involve
events that would ordinarily produce substantial delays, that is, months if not years,
including changed country conditions, post-traumatic stress disorder, and the expiration of
lawful status. Figures 3-3 and 3-4 show that the rejection rate climbs steadily even within the
first sixty days of late filing.
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D. Asylum Seeker Characteristics
We were also interested in whether there were differences in
rejection rates for different populations who filed more than a year
after entry. Not all differences among the characteristics of the
applicant pool correlated with disparate rejection rates. Women who
were late filers were rejected at about the same rate as men; the
rate was 56 percent for women and 60 percent for men."e' Late
applicants with dependents were rejected at a rate of 52 percent, but
those without dependents were turned down at a rate of 60 percent,
perhaps reflecting some sympathy on the part of asylum officers for
those with dependents." Except for applicants who were younger
than eighteen years old, for whom the regulations provide a
particular exception to the deadline, the rate of rejection was not
affected much by the applicant's age.
One particularly important attribute, however, was whether the
applicant was represented when interviewed by an asylum officer.99
In all, 44 percent of applicants were represented. As we have
seen,200 applicants who filed late were more often represented-73
percent versus 65 percent-than applicants who filed timely. Among
applicants who filed late, and therefore were rejectable, those who
were represented were less often rejected-55 percent compared
with 62 percent. The regression confirms that, with all other
variables held constant, represented asylum seekers were rejected
less often than unrepresented asylum seekers.
As we have noted, late filers may be more likely to have repre-
sentation because lawyers could help them understand that they
may actually be eligible for asylum in cases in which the law might
be surprisingly protective, such as sexual orientation and domes-
tic violence cases, to someone from a different legal and political
197. The regression analysis confirms that, with all other variables held constant, female
asylum seekers were rejected slightly less often than male asylum seekers.
198. The regression analysis confirms that, with all other variables held constant, asylum
seekers with dependents were rejected slightly less often than asylum seekers without
dependents. Cf. Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz & Schrag, supra note 9, at 341-42 (finding that
immigration judges granted asylum 48.2 percent of the time to applicants with dependents
but only 42.3 percent of the time to applicants without dependents).
199. As noted supra note 150, representation does not necessarily mean representation by
an attorney.
200. See supra text accompanying note 152.
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culture. It also may be that legal representatives help late-filing
asylum seekers to understand the exceptions to the deadline and
their eligibility for these exceptions. In any case, our finding that
represented rejectable asylum seekers were less often rejected based
on the deadline confirms many studies showing the effect of
representation on asylum claims.20'
Figure 3-5 shows the rate at which cases were rejected, broken
down by the region from which the asylum applicants fled, for only
those rejectable applicants who were inspected at entry.2 02
201. See Charles H. Kuck, Legal Assistance for Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal: A
Survey ofAlternative Practices, in II REPORT ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL 232,
239 (2005), available at http://www.uscirf.gov/images/stories/pdflasylum_seekers/ERSRpt
VolIl.pdf; REFUGEE ROULETTE, supra note 9, at 44-45; Donald Kerwin, Revisiting the Need for
Appointed Counsel, INSIGHT, Apr. 2005, at 1, available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org
insight/InsightLKerwin.pdf; Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Jonathan Jacobs, The State of Asylum
Representation: Ideas for Change, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 739, 742 (2002). We were not surprised
that the magnitude of the difference was fairly small-much smaller, for example, than the
difference in the success rates of represented and unrepresented asylum applicants in
immigration court. See REFUGEE ROULETTE, supra note 9, at 45-46. The Asylum Office
interview is nonadversarial, and asylum officers are likely to take special care, in that setting,
to bring out whatever facts may help an unrepresented applicant, even if the applicant,
because of the lack of representation, does not know of the relevance of those facts or the need
to present them. See, e.g., Kuck, supra, at 239 (describing the interview process as
nonadversarial); REFUGEE ROULETTE, supra note 9, at 12.
202. We looked only at inspected applicants for this regional analysis because otherwise
the differing percentages of persons who entered without inspection from each region would
strongly influence the reported percentages of rejections. Figure 3-5 excludes 10 Canadian
cases and 833 cases that DHS coded as persons of "unknown" origin among the 92,622 late
applicants. Africa refers to sub-Saharan Africa. A full description of geographic regions broken
down by nationalities is provided at our website: http://www.law.georgetown.edulhuman
rightsinstituteLivesInTheBalance/.
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Figure 3-5. Rejectable Cases Rejected by Asylum
Applicant's Region of Origin, Inspected Entry Only
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Figure 3-5 shows that there were important differences in the
ultimate rejection rates among inspected untimely filers, depending
on their region of origin, and that those from North Africa and the
Middle East fared best-only 33 percent of late applicants from that
part of the world did not qualify for an exception-but those from
East Asia or Latin America and the Caribbean experienced sig-
nificantly higher rejection rates, of 47 percent and 55 percent,
respectively.203 Inspected Central Asian and European applicants
203. If we look at all inspected applicants, including those who filed timely, the relationship
similarly holds. Latin Americans and East Asians face rejection rates of 15 percent and 12
percent, respectively; North Africans and Middle Easterners have the lowest rejection rates,
at 8 percent. In between, we see Europeans at 12 percent, sub-Saharan Africans at 11 percent,
South Asians at 10 percent, and Central Asians at 9 percent. Looking at all rejectable
applicants, including those who entered without inspection, the relationship is also similar.
Latin Americans and East Asians are most likely to be rejected-at rates of 64 percent and
62 percent, respectively-and North Africans and Middle Easterners are least likely to be
rejected, at 34 percent. We do, however, see some shifting in the middle: inspected Central
Asian applicants are less likely to be rejected than inspected African and South Asian
applicants.
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were more often rejected than inspected African and South Asian
applicants.
We were interested to learn that the findings of the regression
analysis were slightly different, with East Asians most often
rejected, followed by Central Asians and then Latin Americans. In
the regression results, Africans were the next most likely to be
rejected, followed by Europeans; then, as in the cross-tabulations,
South Asians followed by North Africans and Middle Easterners.
These findings indicate that one or more variables other than
nationality and inspected entry impacted outcomes.
Figure 3-6. Inspected Entry by Asylum Applicant's Region
of Origin, Rejectable Cases Only
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lt
tu
fO
7 2. 40
30%
AL 10
Asylum Applicants Geographic Region of Origin
Why is it that late inspected Latin American applicants were 66
percent more often rejected than late inspected North African and
Middle Eastern applicants? Perhaps part of the answer lies in
Figure 3-6, which tells us that there are significantly more unin-
spected rejectable entrants from Latin America and the Caribbean
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and from East Asia than there are from North Africa and the Middle
East. This is not the whole explanation, because we see low
numbers of uninspected rejectable applicants from Central Asia but
relatively high rejection rates for inspected applicants from that
region. But it could be that the large numbers of undocumented
applicants from Latin America and East Asia contribute to negative
perceptions of applicants-even those who enter lawfully and are
inspected-from these regions in some of the eight Asylum Offices.
Figure 3-7 shows the differences in the rejection rate of late filers
from countries from which more than five hundred rejectable cases
were decided during the time frame of our study.204
204. There were thirty-seven countries from which more than 500 rejectable cases were
decided during the time frame of our study. The results of the regression analysis run with
the independent variable of nationality showed that seven of those nationalities- Belarus,
Mali, Somalia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe-were not statistically
significant to the .05 level. We excluded these countries from Figure 3-7. For the thirty
nationalities that were significant to the .05 level, with all other variables held constant, the
order of likelihood of rejection was different than in Figure 3-7. The significant nationalities
were arrayed, from most to least likely to be rejected, in the following order: Mauritania, the
Gambia, C6te d'Ivoire, Indonesia, Haiti, Guinea, China, Guatemala, Russia, Colombia,
Pakistan, Kenya, Burma, Egypt, Armenia, Eritrea, India, Peru, Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Albania, Yugoslavia, Togo, Sierra Leone, Nepal, Iran, Cameroon, El Salvador,
Ethiopia, Iraq, and Liberia. The major differences between the regression and the cross-
tabulation analysis displayed in Figure 3-7 are that nationals of Burma, Colombia, Egypt,
Eritrea, Indonesia, Kenya, Pakistan, and Russia were more frequently rejected than the cross-
tabulation analysis indicated, and nationals of Albania, El Salvador, Guatemala, India, Sierra
Leone, and Yugoslavia were less frequently rejected than the cross-tabulation analysis
indicated. Other differences were a matter of five or fewer percentage points on the graph.
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Figure 3-7. Rejectable Cases Rejected by Nationality
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It shows that although those who filed late from certain countries,
including Iraq, Liberia, Togo, Nepal, and several others, were found
eligible for an exception at very high rates, those from certain other
countries, such as Mauritania, the Gambia, and C6te d'Ivoire, had
much lower rates at which exceptions were found.
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Figure 3-8. Rejectable Cases Rejected by Nationality,
Inspected Entry Only
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If we look only at untimely applicants who were inspected at
entry from these countries in Figure 3-8, we see a similar pattern.
Applicants from Iraq, Liberia, Togo, and Nepal were still likely to
benefit from exceptions to the deadline, but applicants from
Mauritania, the Gambia, and C6te d'Ivoire faced substantially
higher rejection rates.
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Figure 3-9. Deadline Rejections by Nationality,
All Applicants
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We also can graph the percentage of all applicants from these
countries, rather than those who filed more than a year after entry,
who were rejected by asylum officers. Figure 3-9 presents this data,
with the countries of origin listed in the same order as in Figure 3-7.
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In Figure 3-9, we see very different overall rates of rejection for
nationals of different countries. For example, only 13 percent of
Haitians were rejected because of the deadline, compared with 58
percent of Gambians. Comparing Figures 3-7 and 3-9, it is evident
that although Haitians and Gambians who were late were rejected
at about the same rate-72 percent and 77 percent, respectively-
the deadline has a much smaller effect on Haitians because a much
higher percentage of them applied on time.205 Similarly, although
late Indians and Sierra Leoneans were rejected at similar rates-66
percent and 63 percent, respectively-because a significantly higher
percentage of Indians filed timely, more than double the percentage
of Sierra Leoneans were rejected on the deadline.2 06 These results
probably reflect the much better developed social network of Indians
and Haitians in the United States, compared to Sierra Leoneans
and Gambians, and the support that those who are already here are
able to give to newly arrived refugees.207 It is an example of how the
one-year deadline can have a differential impact on various groups
of refugees in ways that were probably not contemplated by
Congress and that are completely unrelated to the degree or nature
of persecution in their home countries.
Figure 3-10 breaks the data down by religion, for those who
stated a major religion.20 8 We start the discussion of the religion
205. Eighty-two percent of Haitians, but only 24 percent of Gambians, were determined to
have filed on time.
206. Only 54 percent of Sierra Leoneans were determined to have filed on time, compared
with 82 percent of Indians.
207. Haitians and Indians are present in the United States in far greater numbers than
Gambians and Sierra Leoneans. The 2000 Census numbers for individuals born in those
countries are as follows: Haitians, 419,315; Gambians, 5,765; Indians, 1,022,550; Sierra
Leoneans, 20,830. U.S. Census Bureau, United States Foreign-Born Populations, Foreign-Born
Profiles,availableathttp://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/foreign/STP-159-2000t1
.html. See supra notes 157-60 and accompanying text for further discussion of the
characteristics of the foreign-born from Haiti in the United States. We do not mean to suggest
that the relationship between the impact of the deadline and the prevalence of coethnic
persons in the United States is as simple as comparing these numbers would suggest. Support
systems are not measured by numbers alone, as they involve the extent to which coethnic
persons are dispersed or live in cities in which new immigrants arrive; the degree of
organization of the community; the community's mean age, education, wealth, and social
cohesion; how well the community has already adapted to American life; and other factors.
Nevertheless, we think that our hypothesis is worthy of further study.
208. Not all religions were significant to a .05 significance level; the religious affiliations
that were significant are Christian, Buddhist, Hindu, Other, Muslim, Sikh, and Unknown.
Bahai, Druze, Jain, Jewish, and Zoroastrian were not significant at the .05 level and were not
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data by noting that of 92,622 rejectable asylum applicants, 13,315
were classified as being members of "other" religions and 10,230
were classified as being of an "unknown" religion. As a result, the
discussion below is descriptive only of the data we obtained and
should be treated as tentative. Despite these limitations, we find
that the data offer interesting patterns that are worth cautious
consideration.
Figure 3-10. Rejectable Cases Rejected by Religion
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Figure 3-10 shows that among untimely filers who identified
themselves by stating a religion, Hindus were rejected at the lowest
rate, 39 percent, while Muslims and Sikhs were rejected at a rate
more than 70 percent higher than the rate at which Hindus were
turned down, or 68 percent and 72 percent, respectively. This is
similar to, but slightly different from, the regression, which found
Sikhs most likely to be rejected, followed by Muslims, Christians,
Hindus, and Buddhists. Again, we wondered whether another
included in the figures. We also excluded Other and Unknown from Figure 3-10.
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variable might be driving the differences in rejection rates by
religion. We decided to explore religion and nationality.
Unsurprisingly, the vast majority, or 1,049 of 1,065, of rejectable
Sikhs came from India. Over half, 3,394 of 5,681, of rejectable
Buddhists came from China, a country with a long-standing and
well-documented pattern of persecution of Buddhists. Similarly,
nearly half, 497 of 1,085, of rejectable Hindus came from Nepal, a
country that is majority Hindu but whose residents have suffered
persecution at the hands of secularist Maoist rebels. Given the large
number of Christian applicants, it was not surprising that they did
not fit much of a pattern. Of the 47,288 rejectable Christians, over
1,000 came from each of the following countries: Armenia, Camer-
oon, China, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, El
Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Haiti, Indonesia, and Venezuela.
Digging deeper into the numbers, it turns out that 67 percent of
the 13,350 rejectable Muslim asylum applicants during the time
period studied came from sub-Saharan Africa, and that of the
11,535 rejectable sub-Saharan African asylum applicants rejected
because of the one-year deadline, 58 percent were Muslim. To slice
the numbers a different way, Figure 3-11 shows that 75 percent of
rejectable sub-Saharan African Muslims were rejected for failure to
meet the one-year deadline; in contrast, 38 percent of rejectable sub-
Saharan African Christians were rejected. In striking contrast, for
applicants coming from outside of sub-Saharan Africa, Christians
and Muslims were rejected at almost the same rate. And even if we
look at only inspected or uninspected applicants from sub-Saharan
Africa, the differences are remarkable. In the former group, 61
percent of Muslims were rejected compared to only 31 percent of
Christians; in the latter group, 86 percent of Muslims were rejected
compared to only 64 percent of Christians. We are not sure what
causes these disparities, but the particularly high rejection rates
faced by sub-Saharan African Muslims raise additional concerns
about whether the one-year deadline and its exceptions have been
and can be applied fairly.
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Figure 3-11. Rejectable Cases Rejected by Religion and
Region of Origin
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E. Disparities Across and Within Asylum Offices
We next examined differences in rejection rates in different
Asylum Offices, and differences in rejection rates of asylum officers
in the same regional office to whom cases were randomly assigned.
In our earlier research, we found significant disparities across and
20 35
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within Asylum Offices in terms of their rates of granting asylum.209
With the new data that DHS has supplied, we were able to look at
disparities in the frequency of rejecting untimely applicants.
1. Disparities Across Asylum Office Regions
Figure 3-12 shows that the rate at which rejectable cases are
rejected varies significantly according to the region of the country
in which the asylum officers, and perhaps more importantly,
supervisory personnel, work.
Figure 3-12. Rejectable Cases Rejected by Asylum Office
Region
Reg A Region B Region C Reg':(D eyi;81E
(73) (1 .567) (8,462) (9 2) (
Asylum Office Region
R eginF Regio G eoon H(14287)t (45) (5884)
209. Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz & Schrag, supra note 9, at 310-25.
736
70%
0
60%,
SD%
o40%-
.0%
0 3%
II
I I %
REJECTING REFUGEES
As Figure 3-12 shows, in two of the eight regions, this rate is 43
percent or lower, but in three other regions the rate is 63 percent or
higher. Were these disparities due simply to easily explainable
factors such as population differences in the different regions, or
were there other factors at play? The regression analysis found
statistically significant differences in outcomes between Asylum
Office regions, even holding variables such as nationality of the
asylum seeker constant. We were interested to learn, however, that
the regression showed a different pattern in the Asylum Office
regions' rejection rates than our cross-tabulations did. According to
the regression, Region B was the most likely to reject and Region C
was the least likely to reject asylum seekers. In the middle, arrayed
from most to least likely to reject, we had Region E, Region A,
Region F, Region H, Region G, and Region D. This revealed that
there are other variables driving the differences between Asylum
Office regions. To investigate this puzzle further, we explored
rejection rates by applicants' modes of entry.
We started with a bird's-eye view, comparing how the eight
regional Asylum Offices treated untimely applicants. The data
points in Figure 3-13 indicate for each regional office (a) the rate at
which they found all late applicants to have qualified for an
exception; (b) the uniformly higher rate at which they determined
that exceptions existed for those applicants who had presented
themselves for inspection when they entered the United States, that
is, applicants who had entered the United States lawfully, even if
they no longer had a lawful status when they applied for asylum; (c)
the uniformly lower rate at which they determined that exceptions
existed for those applicants who did not present themselves for
inspection when they entered the United States; and (d) the
percentage of applicants in the region in question who had pre-
sented themselves for inspection.
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Figure 3-13. Award Rate for Exceptions by Asylum Office
Region
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This Figure showcases two important, and to us, surprising
findings. First, a wide disparity among regions existed in the rate
at which they awarded exceptions to inspected applicants, with
three regions awarding exceptions to about 45 percent of inspected
applicants and two regions awarding exceptions to about 70 percent,
a rate that is about 55 percent higher. In addition, there seems to be
a strong correlation between the percentage of inspected applicants
in a region and the rate at which that region's officers granted
exceptions to all late applicants, including those who had not been
inspected.
Figure 3-13 also compares the rates at which the officers in the
eight regions, in the aggregate, found that exceptions applied to the
rejectable asylum seekers. These disparities in grant and exception
rates may be caused to some degree by the different locations of the
Asylum Offices. Some of the eight regions, for example, those nearer
to the Mexican border, may have had a larger percentage of
uninspected late applicants; and uninspected applicants who filed
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within a year may have been rejectable, to a larger degree, because
they could not prove any date of entry or applicability of any
exception. Knowing the identity of the regional offices would
probably help our understanding of these differences.
2. Disparities Within Asylum Office Regions
For a more meaningful measure of consistency or disparity, we
examined the rate at which the asylum officers within each region
rejected rejectable applicants. By limiting our investigation to a
particular region, we eliminate any effects caused by particular
populations, for example, applicants from a particular country or
region, having settled in certain regions of the United States.
Within each region, furthermore, cases are assigned by clerks
randomly to the various asylum officers. Therefore, the rate at
which each officer within the same office rejected late applicants
should be approximately the same. We might expect some variation,
of course-perhaps as much as 25 percent from the mean in that
office. But we would not expect a very large degree of variation from
officer to officer considering essentially the same pool of appli-
cants.210
We can see from Figure 3-14 that the disparities in individual
asylum officer rejection rates within and between Asylum Offices
are striking. The boxplot provides the median rejection rate for each
office, which is the black line in the middle of each box; the middle
50 percent of rejection rates for each office, which is the box; and the
most and least extreme rejection rates for each office, which are the
ends of the lines sticking out of the boxes. 21' As discussed above,
210. We do not know whether a 25 percent rate of deviation from the norm is reasonable
or acceptable. We use it here only as a means of comparing the rates of deviations from the
norm among regional offices. Note that the 25 percent variance lines apply to different mean
rejection rate numbers in different regions. It would be possible instead to measure variance
by selecting an absolute number of percentage points, rather than by a percentage of a
percentage, by which an officer diverged from the mean. But that method of measuring
disparity has problems of its own. See REFUGEE ROULETTE, supra note 9, at 308-09. Our
Refugee Roulette study relied on a 50 percent deviation rate. We selected a 25 percent
deviation rate for this study because the disparities are not as egregious as those we found
in Refugee Roulette, enabling us to use a finer instrument to explore the disparities that do
exist.
211. The asterisks and circles seen in the boxplot for Regions B, E, F, G, and H, known as
"outlier flags," demonstrate an individual officer's rejection rate in relation to how the middle
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there are significant differences in mean rejection rates across
Asylum Office regions, from 40 percent in Region C to 69 percent in
Region E. The boxplot tells us that there are also significant
disparities among asylum officers within each region, as we discuss
further below, and that there are also significant disparities from
region to region in the degree of disparities among officers within a
regional office. For example, in Region B, the middle 50 percent of
asylum officers reject cases at rates of between 58 percent and 71
percent, a thirteen percentage point spread. But in Region F, with
a mean rejection rate nearly identical to that of Region B, the
middle 50 percent of asylum officers reject cases at rates of between
49 percent and 78 percent, a twenty-nine percentage point spread.212
half of the sample behaves. When a case is 1.5 to 3 box lengths away from the end of the box,
it is flagged by a circle. Likewise, when a case is more than 3 box lengths away, it is flagged
by an asterisk as an extreme outlier.
212. The mean rejection rates in Figure 3-14 are different from those in Figure 3-12
because Figure 3-14 takes into account only the asylum officers in each region who decided
at least 25 rejectable cases.
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Figure 3-14. Individual Asylum Officer Rejection Rates by
Asylum Office Region
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We next looked closely at each of these Asylum Office regions to
further explore these disparities. To avoid any distortion that would
come from examining the rejection rate of officers who decided only
a few cases, for example, two cases, both of which or neither of
which resulted in an exception, we limited this study to officers who
had adjudicated the cases of at least one hundred late-filing
applicants.
The boxplot identifies the officers of Region B as fairly consistent
in their rejection rates. Figure 3-15, in which each bar represents
the rejection rate of an individual asylum officer, shows the rate at
which the asylum officers in Region B who considered at least one
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hundred cases of late filers excepted those late-filing individuals.213
Asylum officers whose rejection rates were over 25 percent disparate
from the mean are shaded black.
Figure 3-15. Rejectable Cases Rejected by Asylum Officer,
Region B
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Figure 3-15 shows that nearly all officers rejected these appli-
cants between 50 percent and 75 percent of the time. The mean
rejection rate in Region B was 62 percent, and only 14 of 65, or 22
percent, of the asylum officers had exception rates higher or lower
than this mean by more than 25 percent.
213. Figures 3-15 through 3-17 include three horizontal lines in addition to those showing
the percentage of rejectable cases. The middle line represents the mean rejection rate for the
region in question. The top and bottom lines show the percentage of rejectable cases that are
rejected that would be 25 percent above and below that mean. The horizontal axis specifies
the DHS serial number given to the authors for each of the asylum officers who adjudicated
at least one hundred late cases. The officers whose rejection rates are above the higher line
or below the lower line are those whose rates are shaded in these graphs.
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Figure 3-16 shows the pattern for Region F, in which the
boxplot revealed a considerably greater range and more disparity.
Figure 3-16. Rejectable Cases Rejected by Asylum Officer,
Region F
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Here, the officers are spread out over a much larger range, with
rejection rates between 0.4 percent and 82 percent. The mean
rejection rate in Region F was 60 percent, and 14 of 41, or 34
percent, of the officers who decided more than one hundred cases of
late-filed applicants, deviated from this mean by more than 25
percent.
Figure 3-17 shows the pattern for Region D, which the boxplot
demonstrated to be very disparate. The pattern demonstrates even
more disparity than Region F. The rejection rate varied from 17
percent to 62 percent, with a mean of 44 percent, and 54 percent of
the officers deviated from this mean by more than 25 percent.
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Figure 3-17. Rejectable
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Cases Rejected by Asylum Officer,
Region D
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F. Were Bona Fide Refugees Denied Asylum Because of the
Deadline?
Our analysis shows that from 1998 through 2009, the deadline
did not operate evenly across the population of asylum seekers.
First, subpopulations of asylum applicants, whether classified by
region of origin, age, nationality, or other characteristics, varied in
the degree to which they applied within the deadline, perhaps
reflecting different degrees of support in coethnic communities in
the United States or other factors. Second, among those who applied
beyond the deadline, certain subpopulations were found to qualify
for exceptions at different rates than others, though there is no
reason to think that these differences reflected the merits of their
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cases. Among other factors, for example, those with representation
fared better than those who lacked a representative, and those from
some countries were much more affected by the deadline than those
from other countries. Finally, even within particular regional
Asylum Offices, where cases are assigned randomly to asylum
officers so that they all decide approximately the same mix of cases,
individual asylum officers granted exceptions at very different rates,
in yet another example of "refugee roulette."
None of this would matter, however, if the late applicants who
were rejected were undeserving of asylum; that is, if they would
have been ineligible for asylum in any event because they did not
have bona fide cases, or worse, had fraudulent claims. To explore
this question, we first compared the grant rate for timely applicants
with the grant rate for late applicants who qualified for an excep-
tion. If late applicants had generally weaker cases than timely
applicants, we would expect the late-but-excepted applicants to have
lower grant rates than the timely applicants.
In fact, we found that the grant rate for both of these categories
was exactly the same: 49 percent in each case.214 Furthermore, this
approximate equality persisted for virtually all subcategories of
applicants. Men who filed on time won asylum 47 percent of the
time; men who were late and qualified for an exception prevailed 48
percent of the time. For women, the corresponding percentages were
51 percent and 50 percent. Represented asylum seekers who filed
within the deadline won asylum at a rate of 51 percent; those who
qualified for an exception won at a rate of 52 percent. For unrepre-
sented applicants, the corresponding figures were 47 percent and 47
percent. As Figure 3-18 shows, for every region of the world from
which substantial numbers of applicants arrive, the excepted, late
applicants had approximately the same grant rate, or, in the case of
North Africa and the Middle East, a higher grant rate, as timely
applicants.
214. The overall grant rate for late filers was much lower because it was, of course, zero
for late filers who did not qualify for an exception, resulting in a grant rate of only 20 percent
for all late filers-both those who qualified for and those who did not qualify for an exception.
2010] 745
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:651
Figure 3-18. Grant Rates for Timely Applicants and
Rejectable Applicants Who Qualified for an Exception, by
Region of Origin
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Figure 3-19. Grant Rates for Timely Applicants and
Rejectable Applicants Who Qualified for an Exception, by
Age at Filing
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Figure 3-20. Grant Rates for Timely Applicants and
Rejectable Applicants Who Qualified for an Exception, by
Stated Religion
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They also generally held true for Christian, Muslim, and
Buddhist applicants.215
215. As noted in Part I, the database contained only small numbers of Sikhs and Jews, and
many applicants in the study did not state a religion.
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Among inspected applicants who filed within the deadline, the
grant rate was 51 percent; and among late applicants who qualified
for an exception and had been inspected at the time of entry, the
grant rate was very similar at 54 percent. There was, however, a
significant difference in the grant rate for applicants who had
entered without inspection in the two groups. For those who proved
that they filed within one year, the grant rate was 43 percent, but
it was only 33 percent for those who were late but qualified for an
exception.
These correspondences may suggest that the pools of applicants
who filed on time and those who filed late but qualified for an
exception were similar. But it is a further stretch to conclude that
those who were actually rejected because of the deadline were also
similar in their characteristics, except for having filed late, to those
who filed on time, and that they too would have had a grant rate as
high as the two other groups.
For a first pass at comparing these two groups, we simply listed
the demographic characteristics of the individuals populating each
group. Table 3-1 shows this comparison.
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Table 3-1. Who Is in the Database? A Comparison of
Timely Filers and Rejected Filers
Timely Rejected
applicants applicants
Gender
Female 40% 42%
Region
Latin America 26% 28%
Europe 8% 7%
Central Asia 6% 3%
N. Africa & Middle East 5% 2%
Africa 24% 21%
South Asia 6% 4%
East Asia/Pacific Islands 24% 32%
Most frequent
nationalities
China 19% 24%
Haiti 12% 7%
Colombia 10% 7%
Religion
Christian 54% 48%
Muslim 12% 17%
Buddhist 5% 6%
Has dependents in U.S. 19% 17%
Unrepresented 59% 53%
Inspected 69% 44%
Perusal of this table suggests that while the makeup of the two
pools of applicants is not identical, they are remarkably similar.
There is a somewhat higher percentage of Chinese and a somewhat
lower percentage of Haitians and Colombians in the pool of rejected
applicants, but the differences are not huge- except in the category
of inspected applicants. As would be expected, a much lower per-
centage of inspected applicants appear in the pool of those who were
ultimately rejected, because uninspected applicants have a harder
time proving any particular date of entry by clear and convincing
evidence.
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Table 3-2 compares the demographics among three groups of
applicants, considering only those applicants who were inspected.
Table 3-2. Demographic Characteristics of Timely and
Untimely Applicants (Inspected Entrants Only),
April 16, 1998, through June 8, 2009
Percentage of each
category listed to
the right who were
Male
Inspected
From
Latin America
Europe
Central Asia
North Africa &
Middle East
Africa
South Asia
East Asia/Pacific
From
China
Haiti
Colombia
Indonesia
Ethiopia
Religion
Christian
Muslim
Buddhist
Sikh
Jewish
Timely
applicants
58%
100%
22%
8%
7%
6%
23%
6%
27%
20%
4%
13%
4%
5%
60%
9%
5%
2%
1%
Late
applicants
who
qualified
for an
exception
54%
100%
19%
10%
5%
7%
26%
6%
26%
15%
2%
12%
8%
4%
58%
11%
6%
1%
1%
Late
applicants
who did
not qualify
for an
exception
54%
100%
28%
9%
5%
4%
22%
4%
28%
12%
4%
15%
12%
1%
58%
15%
4%
1%
1%
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Age
0-17 1% 1% 0%
18-29 32% 42% 31%
30-39 33% 30% 34%
40-49 23% 18% 24%
50-99 11% 9% 11%
Has dependents in
U.S. 23% 25% 27%
Unrepresented 54% 46% 53%
Tables 3-1 and 3-2 demonstrate that although there are a few
demographic differences among the subpopulations considered in
the columns of each table, they are fairly similar virtually across
the board. These tables hint at the possibility that because the
populations of late, rejected applicants are similar in many respects
to the population of timely and untimely but excepted applicants,
the late applicants, particularly the 65 percent of them who were
inspected upon entry, would have been granted asylum at a rate
something like the 49 percent rate at which asylum was granted to
timely and untimely but excepted applicants if there had been no
deadline.
To refine our estimate of the percentage and number of rejected
asylum claims that would have been granted by DHS if no deadline
existed, we used an out-of-sample prediction. We performed a
binary logistic regression on untimely but excepted cases.216 This
regression provided coefficients that described how certain variables
in the database affected an applicant's chances of receiving asylum.
We then applied the regression equation to those cases rejected
because of the deadline. For each case, the values for the database
variables were plugged into the regression equation, and the
216. To perform the prediction, the toughest methodological question was the
determination of the comparison group. There were three possible choices: (1) timely
applicants, (2) untimely and excepted applicants, and (3) pre-deadline cases. We decided
against pre-deadline cases because of the changes in world conditions since the enactment of
the deadline and the uncertainty of comparing two sets of data with relatively little in
common. Because we were concerned about selection effects between timely and untimely
applicants, we chose the untimely and excepted as our comparison group. The predicted grant
rate using timely applicants as the comparison group was 39.36 percent, slightly lower than
the number we report below that relies on untimely but excepted applicants as the
comparison group.
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computation provided the probability of that particular case being
granted asylum. The mean of these values was then found to
determine the percentage of all rejected cases in which asylum
would have been granted had the one-year deadline not been in
effect.217
The total percentage of rejected asylum claims that would have
been granted was predicted to be 43.6 percent.218 Applying this
percentage to the 36,220 asylum applicants who did not have blank
dates of entry in DHS's records,219 we estimate that an additional
15,792 asylum claims would have been granted during the eleven
years after April 16, 1998, if the deadline had not been in force. This
number is already unacceptably high, but it impacts an even
217. One could object that the number of rejected applicants who would have been granted
asylum cannot be estimated by comparing their personal characteristics to those of applicants
who filed untimely but were excepted because DHS only collected data on some of those
personal characteristics, such as age, gender, nationality, representation, religion, and so
forth. It might be argued that some other characteristic, as to which DHS did not collect and
code data, would distinguish late-but-excepted from rejected applicants. For example, perhaps
a very high proportion of late-but-excepted applicants smiled at their interviewers, which
influenced the interviewers positively, but only a few rejected applicants smiled at their
interviewers. This objection, based on potential variables that nobody thought important
enough to consider, applies to all statistical social science projections. It is, of course, worth
pausing to consider whether it is valid in the context of our study. We think not, for two
reasons: First, we have a very large database, so factors other than those for which coded data
was available are less likely to influence one population more than another, as compared to
an analysis based on a small database. Second, we have not been able to think of any
plausible uncoded variable that would cause the merits of the cases of rejected asylum
applicants to be radically stronger or weaker than the merits of the cases of late-but-excepted
filers.
218. The precise percentage was 43.62 percent. The prediction generated standard error
values for each rejected case, which were used to calculate confidence intervals. The standard
errors ranged from .0115 to 1.121 with an average standard error of .0266. For further
discussion of the confidence intervals, see infra Estimation Appendix.
219. This number is artificially low because asylum would likely have been granted to at
least some of the 17,921 individuals with blank entry dates, some of whom surely would have
qualified for an exception and then would have been found to have meritorious cases. In fact,
3.5 percent of those who had blank entry dates and sought asylum between October 1, 1995,
and April 15, 1998, were granted asylum, and 19.9 percent of those who had blank entry dates
and qualified for exceptions after the deadline became effective won asylum. Applying these
percentages to the 17,921 applicants after April 15, 1998, who were not excepted, we might
guess that between 627 and 3,566 additional applicants could have won asylum if there had
been no deadline. But we could not subject this estimate to the rigorous regression analysis
described in the text, so we made the extremely conservative assumption that none of these
17,921 applicants would have won asylum. See infra Methodological Appendix for further
explanation.
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greater number of individuals, as many asylum applicants have
dependents. Including dependents, we estimate that 21,635 genuine
refugees were denied asylum by DHS during the time frame studied
solely because of the deadline.22 0
As noted earlier, some of these rejected asylum seekers ulti-
mately may have been granted asylum by immigration judges who
concluded either that they did prove entry within one year, or that
they did not but qualified for an exception and filed within a rea-
sonable period of time after the exception was no longer operative.
Alternatively, they may have avoided removal from the United
States by winning "withholding of removal" in immigration court.
Because the immigration courts do not collect statistics on how
many cases involve deadline issues or publish data on how immi-
gration judges rule on cases referred by DHS due to the deadline,
however, we do not have the information to report what happened
to rejected cases after they were referred to immigration court. So
we are left with the likelihood that between 1998 and 2009, more
than 15,000 asylum applications (involving more than 21,000
refugees) would have been granted but were instead rejected
because of the one-year deadline.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Summary of Conclusions
The one-year bar on asylum applications has apparently had at
least one salutary effect common to all statutes of limitations: the
deadline seems to have pushed many applicants to file more
promptly than they would have without a deadline. In FY 1996,
which ended just as Congress was passing the deadline, only 39.6
percent of asylum applicants filed within one year of arrival, but of
those who filed since the deadline took effect, at least 69.5 percent
220. E-mail from Jedidah Hussey, Deputy Chief, Asylum Div., U.S. Citizenship &
Immigration Servs., to Jaya Ramji-Nogales (Aug. 26, 2010) (on file with author) (providing
raw numbers of 106,690 asylum applicants and 38,935 dependents with cases completed
before the Asylum Office between FY 1998 and FY 2009, from which we calculated the
applicant to dependent ratio of 1:1.37). Note that this timeframe is a close but inexact match
with the time frame of our prediction, which analyzes cases filed between April 16, 1998, and
June 9, 2009.
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did so within one year of entry.221 We regard this development posi-
tively, because as a result, asylum officers and immigration judges
are on the whole adjudicating cases in which memories of the
details of past persecution are fresher and corroborating evidence
is more readily obtainable. On the other hand, we say that the
deadline has only "apparently" had this effect because we have no
way of knowing how many genuine refugees fail to file at all
because they missed the deadline. That is, in a world without a
deadline, a person with a strong asylum claim who was, for
example, unaware for three years of the right to seek asylum would
be likely to file upon learning of it. In a world with a deadline, such
a person might file for asylum after three years and hope to justify
late filing by showing a changed or extraordinary circumstance, but
might instead decide not to file for asylum, because the act of
applying would bring her to the government's attention thereby
risking deportation. The deadline, therefore, might not be prompt-
ing as much early filing as these percentage comparisons appear to
show, because they do not take into account the people who filed
late in the world as it existed before the deadline became law, but
who do not file in the world as it now exists.
Against this probably positive side of a one-year deadline,
members of Congress must also examine the costs, some of which
we do not have sufficient data to quantify. First, there is the cost to
the taxpayers of determining, in tens of thousands of cases every
year, whether the applicant met the deadline-an investigation that
asylum officers and, in the cases that they refer, immigration judges
did not have to undertake before 1998. Second, to the extent that
those who miss the deadline no longer apply and identify them-
selves to the government by so doing, the United States has a larger
population of long-term undocumented foreign nationals than it
would otherwise, an outcome that serves no one well.
In our view, however, the principal cost of the one-year deadline
is its potential impact on genuine refugees who are excluded from
a grant of asylum by this restriction, which is unrelated to the
merits of their claims. We identify this as the "principal" cost
221. The percentage of those who applied within a year may be even higher, because 69.5
percent represents only the percentage of applicants able to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that they entered within a year.
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because human life is potentially at stake. Those genuine refugees
who are actually deported for failure to meet the deadline risk
imprisonment, torture, or murder in their home countries.222
Others, who meet the higher standard for withholding of removal
but are barred from asylum, lose the opportunity to obtain perma-
nent protection in the United States for themselves. They are also
unable to obtain any protection for their spouses and children, who
either remain abroad, separated from the refugee and possibly at
risk precisely because their refugee relative has fled, or, after
having accompanied their refugee relative to the United States,
must quickly find a route to lawful immigration status or risk
deportation. Even those refugees who are rejected because of the
deadline by the Asylum Office but eventually granted asylum in the
immigration court or on appeal suffer unnecessarily long asylum
procedures during which they are not authorized to work to support
themselves. We do not know how frequent any of these outcomes
are because data on immigration judges' one-year deadline determi-
nations are not systematically collected.223 But we were able to
investigate the very first stage of the chain, the adjudication of
asylum applications by DHS, and the findings of our study warrant
serious concern.
The starting point of our study, and an important finding, is that
more than 30 percent of applicants for asylum in the time frame
studied were determined to have filed for asylum more than a year
after entry. To what extent these determinations of untimely filing
222. Although there are no statistically sound data on the consequences of return for
genuine refugees, and, to our knowledge, no systematic study of the fates of returned asylum
seekers, there have been several journalistic reports of murders of unsuccessful asylum
seekers after they were deported from the United States, Australia, Britain, and other
countries. See Paul Bibby, Deported Refugee Shot Dead, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Aug. 2,
2008, at 1, available at http://www.smh.com.aulnews/world/deported-refugee-killed/2008/08/
01/1217097536265.html; Greg Campbell & Joel Dyer, Death by Deportation, BOULDER WKLY.,
May 27, 2004, available at http://archive.boulderweekly.com/052704/ coverstory.html; Krystel
Rolle, Haitian Political Asylum Seeker Killed: 37-Year-Old Shot in Dominican Republic,
NASSAU GUARDIAN, May 1, 2009, at A5, available at http://archive.nassauguardian.net/
pubfiles/nas/archive/images-pages/05012009_A05.pdf; Anne Barrowclough, Afghan Asylum
Seekers Sent Home by Australia 'Killed by Taleban, TIMES ONLINE, Oct. 27, 2008,
http/www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/worldarticle5025923.ece; DarfurAsylum-SeekerKicked
Out of UK, then 'Murdered' in Sudan, HUFFINGTON POST, Apr. 17, 2009, http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2009/03/17/darfur-asylum-seeker-kick_n.175730.html.
223. Moreover, there are no data on the number of asylum applicants who lose their claims
based on the deadline and are actually deported.
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were accurate, and to what extent they simply reflected an appli-
cant's inability to produce official documentation of entry within a
year of filing, we do not know, but we do know that almost 93,000
asylum claims fell within the scope of this procedural bar in the
first eleven years of its implementation.
Many of those who missed the filing deadline did not miss it by
much; nearly one-third of those who filed untimely did file within
two years of entry to the United States, though approximately
another quarter filed four or more years after entry. Moreover, the
percentage of cases with blank entry dates grew significantly over
time, even though the percentage of applicants who entered without
inspection remained fairly consistent. These data suggest that
asylum officers may have applied stricter evidentiary standards
over time in determining applicants' dates of entry.
Perhaps one of the most counterintuitive findings of our study
was that late asylum seekers were more often represented than
asylum seekers who filed timely. As discussed in detail above, this
phenomenon may have multiple causes.224 It may be that many who
missed the deadline perceived a greater need to obtain counsel to
overcome this bar to asylum. However, research has demonstrated
that asylum seekers face a multitude of barriers to securing
representation. These include lack of knowledge about the deadline
and its exceptions in particular and with the U.S. legal system and
procedures in general, very limited financial resources for major
legal costs, lack of time during the work day to search for counsel,
and language and cultural challenges. Given that inability to obtain
representation within a year of entry is not an enumerated excep-
tion to the one-year bar, this statistic gives rise to a concern that
the deadline fails to account for such legitimate grounds for delay,
rendering some genuine refugees ineligible for asylum on technical
procedural grounds rather than on the merits of their cases.
Exploring the nationalities of asylum seekers, we uncovered
further reason for concern. Looking at the six most frequent nation-
alities of affirmative asylum filers since April 1998-Armenian,
Chinese, Colombian, Ethiopian, Haitian, and Indonesian appli-
cants-we found some uneven relationships, confirmed by the
regression analysis, between entry without inspection and late
224. See supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
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filing. This led us to suspect that other variables, such as commu-
nity networks and cultural obstacles, account for different rates of
timely filing.
Female asylum seekers filed later than male asylum seekers in
general, and filed significantly later-three or more years after the
deadline had passed-in much higher numbers, perhaps because
the nature of persecution suffered by women made it more difficult
for them to share their stories with anyone, let alone a government
official. Older applicants more often entered through official means
and filed timely in comparison to younger applicants. And appli-
cants who entered without inspection not only filed later than
inspected entrants, but were also increasingly deemed late filers in
recent years. These data lead to a concern that asylum officers may
have increasingly applied stricter evidentiary standards over time,
rendering proof of timely filing more and more difficult for those
without official documentation of entry, despite instructions from
Asylum Headquarters that testimony alone can be sufficient
evidence of timely filing.
Finally, we learned that the eight regional Asylum Offices
determined that asylum seekers filed late at very different rates.
The regression analysis confirmed that, holding other variables
such as nationality constant, different Asylum Offices had different
rates of determining timeliness, leading us to worry that differences
in operation assumptions and procedures in the different Asylum
Offices caused these variations.
After examining the patterns in the data describing groups of
applicants who did not prove timely filing, our analysis next turned
to the application by DHS of the statutory exceptions to the
deadline. That is, we compared untimely cases that asylum officers
rejected because of the deadline with untimely cases that such
officers excepted from the deadline because of changed or extraordi-
nary circumstances. Again, we cannot tell from the data whether
cases were rejected because no exceptions existed, because potential
exceptions were not proved, or because one or more exceptions
applied but the applicant failed to file within a reasonable period.
Despite this shortcoming, the data reveal interesting and at times
surprising relationships between the variables examined and
rejection rates.
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Our first finding in the rejection analysis was that nearly 60
percent of all asylum applicants deemed untimely filers were
actually rejected because they had not met the deadline. To slice the
data a different way, from April 1998 through mid-June 2009,
54,141 people, or almost 18 percent of all asylum applicants in our
database, were determined to be ineligible for asylum because they
did not file on time.
We found that rejection rates varied by year of filing. For
example, FY 2003 saw an increase in rejections because of the
deadline accompanied by a drop in referrals on the merits, although
grant rates remained about the same. We believe that this growth
in deadline rejections was due to stricter enforcement of the
deadline that began in that year. This higher rejection rate has
remained fairly constant since it peaked in FY 2003.
Moreover, rejection rates varied by magnitude of lateness; that
is to say, asylum seekers who filed less than one year after the
deadline had passed were rejected much less often than those who
filed more than a year after the deadline had passed. Applicants
who could not prove any date of entry faced particularly high rates
of rejection. Generally, the later an applicant filed, the greater the
chance that she was rejected based on the deadline.
We next explored characteristics of asylum seekers and their
relationship to rates of rejection based on the one-year filing
deadline. Our findings concerning representation confirmed those
of numerous prior studies about the effects of representation on
asylum outcomes; unrepresented late applicants were rejected more
often than represented late applicants.
Exploring the applicants' regions of origin, untimely Latin
Americans and East Asians faced the highest rejection rates, even
when we looked only at those applicants who were inspected at
entry. Of the inspected population, late North Africans and Middle
Easterners were least often rejected on the deadline.
Perhaps the most dramatic finding of our rejection rate analysis
was the enormous disparity in rejection rates across nationalities.
Although 17 percent of untimely Iraqis were rejected, 77 percent of
late Gambians were barred from asylum by the deadline. Looking
only at inspected entrants, the disparity across these two nationali-
ties is similarly striking: only 20 percent of untimely Iraqis were
rejected but 75 percent of late Gambians were barred from asylum
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by the deadline. Moreover, an exploration of the impact of the
deadline on all, not just untimely, applicants by nationality
demonstrates that, because some nationalities had a higher
percentage of late filers than others, some national groups were
much more affected by the deadline than others. For example,
although late Haitians and Gambians faced a similar rate of
rejection, just 13 percent of all Haitians were rejected because of
the deadline compared to nearly 60 percent of all Gambians. These
data give rise to a concern that, in practice, groups of refugees are
rejected due to attributes that have little or no relationship to the
degree of persecution in their home countries.
We discovered a particularly striking dynamic relating to
religion. Late Muslim and Sikh applicants were more often denied
on the deadline than practitioners of other religions. Exploring the
data further, we discovered that untimely Muslim applicants from
sub-Saharan Africa faced particularly high rejection rates, in
contrast with Muslims from other parts of the world and Christians
from sub-Saharan Africa. Again, we do not know what caused this
disparity, but given that Muslims and Christians from outside of
sub-Saharan Africa faced nearly identical rates of rejection, these
data raise additional concerns about whether the one-year deadline
and its exceptions have been and can be applied fairly.
We also found significant disparities in rates of rejection across
and within Asylum Offices. The mean rejection rates at the eight
Asylum Offices were quite different; notably, these rejection rates
showed a relationship with the percentage of uninspected appli-
cants in each region. This finding gives rise to a concern about the
impact of asylum officers' or supervisory asylum officers' percep-
tions of immigrants on the deadline determination process.225 The
range of variation between asylum officers also varied by region,
225. Some past and present asylum officers have told us off the record that they believe
that the general outlook-skeptical or accepting of applicants' claims-on the part of
supervisory asylum officers, who must sign off on each recommended decision, strongly
influences the grant rates of the asylum officers who serve under them. Each Asylum Office
employs several supervisory asylum officers at any particular time, and during the eleven-
year period of our study, many different supervisory asylum officers served in each regional
office. DHS is not able to ascertain from its computerized data files the identity of the
supervisory asylum officer who was assigned to each case, so we were not able to determine
from the data we were given whether there is a relationship between particular supervisory
asylum officers and the rejection rates of the asylum officers who were supervised by them.
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with some regions showing remarkable consistency across officers
and others showing disturbingly low levels of consistency.
Of course, none of this would matter if all of the rejected asylum
applicants had weak cases on the merits. We began to explore this
question by comparing grant rates and demographic characteristics
of timely applicants, late-but-excepted applicants, and rejected
applicants. We saw remarkable consistency in grant rates between
the first two groups, even when broken out by each demographic
characteristic, and striking similarities in these characteristics
across all three groups. We then performed an out-of-sample
prediction, which provided the most important finding of this study:
about 44 percent of rejected asylum cases, or an additional 15,792
claims," would likely have been granted had the one-year deadline
not existed over the time period studied. Moreover, these denials
impacted an additional 5,843 refugees whose asylum claims were
subsumed under those of their parents or spouses. Although the
limitations of the data collection practices of DHS and DOJ prevent
us from knowing whether these applicants were eventually granted
asylum, withholding of removal, or actually deported, we are deeply
troubled that the deadline has operated to bar genuine refugees
from asylum. And though there are no data that would allow us to
determine scientifically what has happened to refugees who have
been returned to the country in which they fear persecution, our
study warrants serious concern that the one-year filing bar has
resulted in the deportation of a significant number of refugees, who
may have faced beatings, sexual assault, torture, and even death in
their home countries.
B. Policy Recommendations
In addition to these serious problems with the deadline in
practice-its uneven application to different groups and uneven
administration even with respect to those in the same group-we
have two very profound concerns about the deadline, even as an
ideal type. First, the deadline is ineffective in its goal of deterring
fraud. It is both overinclusive and underinclusive, in that it requires
226. As explained in more detail supra note 219, this estimate is quite conservative, as it
excludes claims with blank dates of entry.
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DHS to reject otherwise meritorious applicants who did not file
within a year of entry but imposes no barrier to the full evaluation
of fraudulent applications if they were filed within a year of entry.227
Second, the deadline is a waste of government time and resources.
We detail these concerns below.
227. In our view, a person sophisticated enough to concoct a fraudulent application is more
likely to be aware of the deadline and to file within the allowable period than to miss the
deadline and have to jump his application over an additional hurdle.
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Table 4.1. Costs of the Asylum Deadline
Proof of entry
within a year of
filing
Clear and convincing
evidence
Clear and convincing
evidence
None or insufficient
None or insufficient
Does not apply for
fear of deadline
Does not apply for
fear of deadline
Strength of asylum
claim on the
merits
Strong
Weak
Strong
Weak
Strong
Weak
Problem
Waste of government
time and resources;
additional hurdle for
genuine refugee
Waste of government
time and resources
Genuine refugee de-
nied asylum and pos-
sibly returned to per-
secution
Waste of government
time and resources
Genuine refugee
without access to asy-
lum and increased
undocumented popu-
lation
Increased undocu-
mented population
Consider the various categories of people who seek asylum. For
those who have proof of entry within a year of filing, an estimated
69.5 percent of asylum applicants, the inquiry into whether they
can establish timely filing by clear and convincing evidence is
simply a waste of time and government resources. Genuine refugees
in that situation are forced through an additional procedural hurdle
that consumes their energy and resources. As to those who have a
strong claim on the merits but either did not file timely or cannot
prove that they filed timely, and to whom no exceptions are applied,
the asylum officer must reject the application. Then, if the immi-
gration judge does the same, these genuine refugees are denied
asylum and possibly face beatings, torture, or death simply because
7632010]
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of the deadline, unless they meet the high burden of proof for
withholding of removal. For those with a weak case on the merits
who cannot establish timely filing and to whom no exception is
applied, the asylum officer must also reject the case. But if the one-
year bar did not exist, the asylum officer would have referred the
case anyway, on the merits rather than because of the deadline. As
a result of the deadline, the officer must waste government
resources to inquire into the timeliness of the application, following
the DHS requirement that asylum officers must conduct a full
interview in all cases.228
Finally, there are those applicants who do not apply for asylum
because they cannot prove that they filed within a year of entry. We
have no way of knowing how many such individuals exist, but we
suspect that the deadline forces many potential refugees under-
ground. If the one-year bar did not exist, these individuals would
come forward to claim asylum, thereby revealing their presence in
the United States to DHS. The deadline is surely counterproductive
in these instances in that it bars access to asylum for genuine
refugees and increases the undocumented immigrant population.
The argument applies with even more force to someone with a
plausible but weak claim who would have lost on the merits. That
person is someone who should be encouraged to file an asylum
application. If the claim is considered and denied, the person should
be ordered deported. Instead, that person is now likely not to file a
claim at all and to go underground instead.
Moreover, the deadline adds unnecessary expense to the asylum
process. Record-keeping limitations at DOJ and DHS prevent us
from knowing what proportion of immigration courts' denials of
asylum are based on failure to meet the deadline. Nor do these
agencies publish data on what proportion of asylum officers'
deadline-based referrals are affirmed or overturned by immigration
judges. We do know that if this turned out to be a high proportion,
it would show that many errors by the asylum officers were being
corrected by the immigration judges, but at a very high cost to both
228. USCIS ASYLUM MANUAL, supra note 32, at 124 ("Regardless of the filing date of an
application, Asylum Officers are to give all applicants an asylum interview. This includes pre-
interview familiarization with general country conditions and post-interview research of
specific country conditions relevant to the applicant's situation, where applicable.").
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the applicants and taxpayers.229 Preparing for adversarial immigra-
tion court hearings often requires months of time by lawyers and
thousands of dollars in legal fees for applicants. In addition, the
hearing itself usually requires several hours of time for the DHS
lawyers who advocate for removal of the applicant; immigration
judges; court interpreters, who at this stage of the asylum process
are paid for by the government; and supporting staff members.
In short, the only benefit of the deadline is that it ensures that
evidence is fresher for the adjudicators. We believe that the very
severe problems with the deadline heavily outweigh this positive
benefit. Congress should repeal the deadline for the sake of genuine
asylum seekers, the efficiency and accuracy of asylum adjudication,
and the reduction of unnecessary government expenditure.230
When Congress first adopted the deadline, Senator Orrin Hatch,
the floor manager of the legislation in which the provision was
included, pledged that "if the time limit and its exceptions do not
provide adequate protection to those with legitimate claims of
asylum, I will remain committed to revisiting this issue in a later
Congress."23 Fourteen years later, that time has come. Five re-
cently introduced bills contain provisions that would repeal the
deadline. Congress should adopt such a repeal.232
While awaiting congressional repeal of the deadline, the execu-
tive branch should adopt several policies to minimize its dangers.
229. If it turned out to be a low proportion, any valid critique of the deadline as adjudicated
by asylum officers would also apply to the immigration judges.
230. It should be clear that we believe that responsibility for the problems of efficiency and
fairness that result from the deadline lies with Congress, not with the asylum officers who are
tasked with administering it. The authors have met many asylum officers and greatly admire
their commitment to making accurate judgments, their willingness to listen on a daily basis
to testimony of persecution and torture that few of us would ever want to know about, and
their pride in doing a difficult job for which the public gives them scant reward and little
credit. The one-year deadline not only burdens their work but forces them to reject otherwise
valid claims for asylum, putting many of them under the strain of having to turn away some
whose experiences are traumatic and heartbreaking. We suspect that if members of Congress
had done the work of asylum officers for even a week, they would never have imposed a one-
year deadline on asylum applications.
231. 142 CONG. REC. 25,348 (1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
232. If Congress does not adopt full repeal, it should increase the deadline from one year
to two years. This could increase the percentage of applicants who meet the deadline from
69.5 percent to 78.7 percent. See supra Part II fig.2-2. However, it is possible that the actual
increase in the percentage of applicants who meet the deadline would be somewhat smaller
or larger, as the change in the law might itself affect these numbers.
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First, DHS should amend its regulations to expand the list of
"extraordinary circumstances" that asylum officers should recognize
as legitimate reasons for missing the deadline. The list currently in
the regulations consists of only six such reasons, although the
regulations explicitly state that the list is nonexclusive.2 33 Less
formal DHS training materials reiterate the list's nonexclusivity 2 34
and further advise that
other circumstances that are not specifically listed in the
nonexclusive list in the regulations, but which may constitute
extraordinary circumstances, depending on the facts of the case,
include, but are not limited to, severe family or spousal opposi-
tion, extreme isolation within a refugee community, profound
language barriers, or profound difficulties in cultural acclimati-
zation.235
This advice is commendable, but it is vague and still incomplete.
The list in the regulations should remain nonexclusive, but it
should be expanded to include the factors listed in DHS's guidance,
such as severe family or spousal opposition, extreme isolation,
profound language barriers, profound difficulties in acclimatization,
and several other common circumstances that cause late filing.236
These additional circumstances include the following: unawareness
of the existence of the right to seek asylum; unawareness of the
time limit on applications; detention within the United States; fear
that efforts to obtain the corroborating evidence necessary for a
successful asylum application will endanger family members in
the applicant's home country; victimization by a person other than
an attorney, including a person pretending to be an attorney, who
purported to be helping the applicant file an application; and
inability, despite genuine and timely effort, to obtain a repre-
sentative who could help compile the supporting evidence and file
the application.2 3 7 Expanding the list as suggested could help reduce
233. 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(5)(i)-(vi) (2010).
234. ASYLUM OFFICER BASIC TRAINING COURSE, supra note 6, at 13.
235. Id. at 20.
236. See id.
237. We do not suggest that an asylum officer would have to accept the word of the
applicant that any of these circumstances occurred. The applicant would have to prove the
existence of one of these factors to the satisfaction of the officer, just as an applicant must now
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the degree of disparity in the application of the exception and
reduce some of the differential impact of the deadline on particular
groups, as documented in this Article.
DHS should expand its training course and manual to require
that asylum officers consider a broader range of evidence in
determining the entry date for uninspected applicants. According
to DHS policy, testimony alone, if clear and convincing, is sufficient
to prove an asylum applicant's date of entry.238 Yet some advocates
report that asylum officers are unwilling to consider either affidavit
evidence or several pieces of circumstantial evidence that, in
combination, support an approximate date of entry into the United
States.239 Circumstantial evidence of these types need not be
dispositive but should always be considered.
DHS should also train its officers to take into account the unique
challenges asylum applicants face when the officers decide whether
the applicants meet the deadline and whether a late applicant
qualifies for an exception. Genuine refugees may have legitimate
reasons for their inability to produce documentation of entry. In
prove with respect to one of the six "extraordinary circumstances" listed in the regulations.
238. The DHS training manual states that "testimony can be sufficiently clear and
convincing to lead an asylum officer to a 'firm belief' that the applicant arrived within one
year before the filing date." AsYLUM OFFICER BASIC TRAINING COURSE, supra note 6, at 8. But
the large number of cases that are rejected based on the deadline leads us to recommend that
the message be reinforced. This is also the law in determining asylum eligibility. 8 C.F.R. §
208.13(a) ("The testimony of the applicant, if credible, may be sufficient to sustain the burden
of proof without corroboration.").
239. We recommend that DHS instruct its asylum officers to consider more carefully the
following types of evidence: (1) tickets for travel out of the home country that show travel to
a third country, particularly in situations in which, if the time of travel between the third
country and the United States is considered, entry into the United States should be calculated
within the one-year filing period; (2) certified airline or ship manifests showing that a
particular flight or ship route exists and that the vessel traveled that route on the dates that
the applicant claims via testimony that she traveled; (3) tickets for travel in the United States
shortly after crossing the border; (4) affidavits from workers at migrant shelters in northern
Mexico who recognize the individual as having stayed at the shelter during a certain time
period, or who have checked a list of individuals who stayed during that time period and found
the applicant's name; (5) affidavits from individuals who traveled to the United States with
the applicant; (6) affidavits from individuals who housed the applicant before or shortly after
crossing the border; (7) affidavits from individuals in the home country with knowledge of the
timing of the applicant's departure, or who received communications from the applicant about
his travel to the United States and the dates of that travel; and (8) affidavits from family or
friends in the area where the applicant arrived in the United States that state his arrival
date. E-mail from Denise Gilman, Clinical Professor & Co-Dir. of the Immigration Law Clinic,
Univ. of Tex., to Jaya Ramji-Nogales (July 6, 2010) (on file with author).
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cases in which an officer deems an application late, training and
supervision should also ensure that asylum officers do not simply
listen passively, but rather dig for all possible exceptions for which
an asylum seeker might be eligible.240 Asylum seekers unfamiliar
with the system and the law might not come up with such excep-
tions on their own. Finally, DHS should ensure that asylum officers
are assessing appropriately, on a case-by-case basis, the "reasonable
period" for filing after an officer applies an exception. In particular,
DHS should ensure that asylum officers understand that a delay of
more than six months might be reasonable.24'
We have recommendations for DHS and DOJ regarding the
statistics they keep on the one-year filing deadline and asylum
cases more generally, so that Congress and the public can be better
informed. With additional data, policymakers will have greater
knowledge of the extent to which refugees are ordered removed due
to the deadline. More data would enable government officials and
researchers to make recommendations for systemic reform based on
evidence, rather than speculation.
First, DOJ should keep statistics on one-year deadline cases at
the immigration court and the Board of Immigration Appeals.
Furthermore, DHS and DOJ should institute a joint recordkeeping
240. In re S-M-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 722 (B.I.A. 1997), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/
vl1I/intdeclvol2113303.pdf; 8 C.F.R. § 1208.9(b); ASYLUM OFFICER BASIC TRAINING COURSE,
supra note 6, at 21-22 ("While the burden of proof is on the applicant to show that there are
changed circumstances that now materially affect his or her eligibility for asylum, many
applicants affected by changed circumstances may not be able to articulate this. The unique
nature of assessing an applicant's need of protection places the officer in a 'cooperative' role
with the applicant. It is an asylum officer's affirmative duty 'to elicit all relevant and useful
information bearing on the applicant's eligibility for asylum."' (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.9(b))).
241. Congress thought that it was reasonable for applications to be filed within a year. As
long as the year remains the standard, the "reasonable time" period should also generally be
no less than a year. At the very least, decisions should be made on a case-by-case basis
without any presumption that filing more than six months late is not reasonable. Cf. supra
note 103 and accompanying text. For example, in cases in which the basis for an exception is
that the applicant was in lawful status, the DHS training materials state that "guidance
offered by the Department of Justice states that more than a six-month delay would usually
be considered unreasonable," citing language that appeared in the Federal Register in 2000,
before the Department of Homeland Security was created. ASYLUM OFFICER BASIC TRAINING
COURSE, supra note 6, at 24. We would encourage the Asylum Office to examine the totality
of the circumstances in each case rather than follow such a blunt approach that cannot take
into account such circumstances. In any event, that DOJ guidance did not purport to apply
to the reasonable time for filing after the occurrence of circumstances other than the
termination of lawful status.
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system that can track cases as they move from the asylum office to
the immigration court to the Board. Second, DHS and DOJ should
create separate codes for applicants rejected on the deadline to
distinguish between late asylum seekers (1) for whom no exception
is applicable, (2) who might be eligible for an exception but cannot
meet the evidentiary standard required to prove that such an
exception applies, and (3) who establish eligibility for an exception
but fail to apply within a reasonable period of the end of the
condition giving rise to the exception. Third, in cases of late
applicants who meet one of the exceptions to the deadline, DHS and
DOJ should code the type of exception applied so that analysts can
understand how wedded asylum officers, immigration judges, and
appeals board members are to the enumerated exceptions and
determine which obstacles most commonly prevent asylum seekers
from applying on time. Fourth, for all applicants, DHS and DOJ
should code the time period between the end of the condition giving
rise to the exception and the date of filing, thereby enabling a
reliable assessment of the "reasonable period" requirement and its
implementation by asylum officers. Fifth, DHS and DOJ should
code for type of representation, distinguishing, for example,
between accredited representatives, law firms, and law school
clinics.242 We know that represented asylum seekers generally were
much less likely to be rejected on the one-year deadline than those
who were unrepresented. It would be valuable to know whether the
type of representation makes a significant difference in grant rates
and, for those who do not file within the deadline, rejection rates.2 43
Finally, we strongly encourage DHS and DOJ to work together
closely to find the best possible way to use current data to provide
information on what happened to those rejected and referred to
242. Representatives must file a "G-28" form when they assist applicants. USCIS ASYLUM
MANUAL, supra note 32, at 24. This form indicates the type of representative who is filing it,
facilitating coding of the type we suggest. Id.
243. One recent empirical study, controlling for other variables, found that experienced
public defenders were significantly more successful than those who had spent less time on the
job. David S. Abrams & Albert H. Yoon, The Luck of the Draw: Using Random Case
Assignment To Investigate Attorney Ability, 74 U. CHI. L. REv. 1145, 1173 (2007). It would be
ideal if DHS and scholars could learn what characteristics of applicants' lawyers correlate
with success, but that investigation would probably involve too much work for both the agency
and the lawyers, who would be called upon to reveal information about themselves. It would
require only some additional coding, however, for DHS to distinguish among members of the
bar, law students, and other permitted representatives.
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immigration court in terms of outcome since the deadline came into
effect.
Our previous Refugee Roulette study indicated that random
factors, such as the identity of the adjudicator, deeply affect the
asylum adjudication process.2 4 4 The one-year deadline adds an
additional random factor, because it is not, nor can it be, evenly
applied to all applicants. First, various groups of applicants are
deemed timely in differing degrees, probably reflecting not only
differences in immigrant support systems that advise applicants to
file promptly, but also the extent to which different asylum officers
or their supervisors apply strict or generous evidentiary standards
in determining entry dates. The asylum officers grant exceptions to
late applicants at rates that differ for different groups, and different
officers, even within regional offices, grant exceptions to late
applicants at varying rates. Thus, even aside from the inherent
unfairness of refusing asylum to people for reasons beyond their
control, the deadline introduces irrelevant sociological factors, such
as the existence of coethnic support groups in the applicant's
community, and factors related to the attitudes of the adjudicators,
into the determination of who obtains refuge in America. The
deadline has not been, and probably cannot be, administered in a
way that treats late applicants fairly and equally. The best solution
to these problems is the one now before Congress: the deadline's
total repeal.
244. See REFUGEE ROULETTE, supra note 9.
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METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX
The DHS U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)
provided us with data drawn from its Refugee Asylum and Parole
System (RAPS), a computerized database used to track the
processing of asylum claims through the affirmative asylum
process. 245 USCIS staff at one of four regional service centers enter
new asylum cases into the system, inputting data that asylum
seekers provide on Form 1-589, Application for Asylum and for
Withholding of Removal.24 As discussed further below, Asylum
Office personnel have access to RAPS in order to update and correct
the database with information provided by asylum applicants at
their interviews. 24 7 The data sets provided by USCIS contained
552,760 asylum decisions rendered between October 1, 1996, and
June 8, 2009.248 Some cases involved both an applicant and a spouse
or child who was already in the United States. To avoid duplication
of data, USCIS eliminated the separate entries of dependents from
the database. But as discussed further below, the existence of one
or more dependents in the United States was noted in the record of
the principal applicant. 249
DHS provided us with fifteen variables for each case: asylum
officer identification number, asylum officer region, case identifica-
tion number, filing date, date of entry, status at entry, nationality,
gender, religion, ethnic group, age at filing, dependents, representa-
tion, final disposition code, and final decision date.250
245. USCIS ASYLUM MANUAL, supra note 32, at 2-3, 7. RAPS also allows users to determine
the status of asylum cases in the immigration court system. Id. at 3.
246. Id. at 2-3, 7. USCIS service centers are located in California, Nebraska, Vermont, and
Texas. USCIS Home Page, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis (follow "About Us" hyperlink;
then follow "Contact Us" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 12, 2010).
247. USCIS ASYLUM MANUAL, supra note 32, at 2-3, 7. In rare cases, generally involving
reapplication after denial and filing by an applicant who had previously been included as a
dependent on another asylum application, in which direct filing with the Asylum Office is per-
mitted, the data provided on Form 1-589 are inputted by Asylum Office personnel. Id. at 7.
248. These data were provided in Excel format; we used StatTransfer to convert it to SPSS
and Stata for purposes of analysis.
249. E-mails from Sally Armstrong, Mgmt. & Program Analyst, Asylum Div., Office of
Refugee, Asylum & Int'l Operations, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., to Philip G.
Schrag (Apr. 30, 2009, and May 5, 2009) (on file with author).
250. Once we have completed the second portion of this study, which will examine the
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DHS provided the data to us organized by the fiscal year in which
the case was filed.251 As a result, our data will not match up with
DHS published statistics, which are organized by year of decision.252
The FY 1998 data set was split into two parts: those who filed
before and those who filed after April 16, 1998, the effective date of
the one-year deadline. The FY 2009 data set included only cases
that had been decided as of June 8, 2009.
We began by excluding data that were not relevant to our
analysis. First, we eliminated the cases of all Mexican nationals.
During the years in question, the vast majority of Mexican asylum
applicants were not genuine asylum seekers; they applied for
asylum in order for DHS to deny them and refer them to immigra-
tion court, where they could seek another form of relief.253 We
dependent variable of asylum grant rates, we will make the original data, as well as keys to
relevant codes, and other information available at this website: http://www.law.georgetown.
edulhumanrightsinstituteLivesInTheBalance. This is a website associated with this Article
and the book LIVES IN THE BALANCE (NYU Press, forthcoming 2013), also by Philip G. Schrag,
Andrew I. Schoenholtz, Jaya Ramji-Nogales, and James P. Dombach. Certain links are
currently live. The original data from DHS from which the two studies were performed will
be posted on this site after LIVES IN THE BALANCE is published.
251. The U.S. Senate website defines the federal government's fiscal year as "[t]he
accounting period for the federal government which begins on October 1 and ends on
September 30. The fiscal year is designated by the calendar year in which it ends; for
example, fiscal year 2006 begins on October 1, 2005 and ends on September 30, 2006." United
States Senate, Glossary, http://www.senate.gov/referencelglossaryiterm/fiscal.year.htm (last
visited Nov. 12, 2010).
252. See, e.g., DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2009 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS
(2010), available at http://www.dhs.gov/files/statistics/publications/yearbook.shtm.
253. The database that we used excluded 62,568 cases filed by Mexican nation-
als. According to the U.S. Headquarters Asylum Division of DHS, a very large proportion of
these claims were filed only to enable Mexicans who were residing in the United States to
receive referrals to immigration court, where they could abandon their asylum claims and
seek some other type of immigration benefit to which they believed they were entitled, such
as cancellation of removal. See Schoenholtz, supra note 133, at 338 n.62. Cancellation of
removal, which can be granted by an immigration judge but not by an asylum officer, allows
a foreign national to remain in the United States if the judge finds that the applicant (a) has
resided in the United States for at least ten years before being served with a notice to appear
in immigration court, (b) has been of good moral character during that period, (c) has not been
convicted of certain offenses, and (d) has a spouse, parent, or child who is an American citizen
or lawful permanent U.S. resident and who would suffer an "exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship" if the applicant was removed. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (2006). DHS did not
claim, nor do we believe, that there are not a number of valid Mexican asylum claims during
the years covered by the database. But we respect the DHS judgment that many of the
Mexican claims were for other purposes. In order to keep the focus of the study on how the
deadline affected asylum seekers, we have excluded the Mexican claims from our analysis.
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eliminated 62,568 Mexican cases. Second, we removed from the
data all cases that had not yet been completed as of June 8, 2009
(the end date for our data set) and cases that had been administra-
tively closed (such as cases in which applicants did not appear for
their interviews or discontinued their applications). 254 There were
2,462 cases that had not been decided and 121,959 cases that were
administratively closed. We excluded only 102,484 undecided and
administratively closed cases because of category overlap; that is,
some cases that remained undecided or were administratively
closed were also Mexican cases, and for that reason had already
been eliminated from the database. Third, we eliminated cases in
the data set that the Asylum Office did not adjudicate. For example,
the database included the cases of individuals who entered as
dependents of successful asylum applicants.2 s' Because these
entries did not represent new individual asylum determinations, we
eliminated 2,955 such cases. Finally, we removed from the data
cases that had obviously been miscoded in such a way that they
could not be used to address questions about the impact of the filing
deadline. Specifically, these were cases in which the dates of entry
were later than the dates of application. Asylum seekers cannot
apply for asylum from abroad, and DHS informed us that these
were coding errors. There were 1,875 cases in the database for
which the date of entry was later than the date of application; we
excluded only 1,273 for this reason as the others were already
excluded on other grounds. In total, we eliminated 169,280 cases
from the data, leaving 383,480 cases for our analysis.
254. Cases that had been administratively closed with no decision had final decision codes
beginning with "C."
255. Asylum seekers can include their spouses and minor children in their applications for
protection. If their applications are successful, asylum is also granted to these dependents.
If an asylee's dependents live overseas, they can then enter the United States with asylee
status. We identified these cases using the following status at entry codes: AS1, AS2, AS3, and
AY. See our website for further description and explanation of status at entry codes:
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/humanrightsinstituteLivesInTheBalance.
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Regression Analyses
We ran a total of four binary logistic regressions to confirm the
statistical significance of the data we reported in descriptive form.
Two of these regressions explored the dependent variable of timely
filing; the other two used rejection on the deadline as the dependent
variable. The independent variables were essentially the same in
each regression, but we ran additional regressions because we
grouped the asylum seeker nationality variable into asylum seeker
geographic region of origin, which required us to run separate
regressions. We describe these dependent and independent vari-
ables further below. The timeliness regressions analyzed the entire
database of asylum seekers, but the rejection regressions analyzed
only asylum applicants who filed more than a year after entry.
The independent variables common to all four regressions are
Asylum Office region, asylum officer cases decided, the fiscal year
in which the applicant filed for asylum, applicant's mode of entry,
human rights conditions in the applicant's country of origin,
applicant's gender, applicant's religion, whether the applicant had
dependents, whether the applicant was represented by an attorney
or other representative, and applicant's age at filing. One of the
timeliness regressions also included applicant's nationality, and the
other replaced this variable with applicant's geographic region of
origin, as the latter variable was derived from the former. Similarly,
one of the rejection regressions also included applicant's nationality,
and the other replaced this variable with applicant's geographic
region of origin, as again, the latter variable was derived from the
first. Both of the rejection regressions also included the independent
variable lapse between date of entry and date of filing.
These regression analyses generally confirmed the cross-tabula-
tion analysis; we have noted in the text of the Article when they did
not. The results of these regression analyses are provided in the
Regression Appendix.
Estimation
We ran an out-of-sample prediction to determine how many late
applicants barred by the deadline would have been granted asylum
in the absence of the deadline. We performed a binary logistic
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regression on untimely and excepted cases, using the dependent
variable of grant rate and the following independent variables:
asylum officer's region, whether the applicant had dependents, the
applicant's filing date, the applicant's geographic region of origin,
the applicant's gender, the lapse between the applicant's date of
entry and date of filing, whether the applicant was inspected at
entry, the applicant's religion, and whether the applicant was
represented. This regression calculated coefficients, which were
then applied through a regression equation to cases rejected
because of the deadline. This provided us with the probability that
each particular case would be granted asylum. We then used the
mean of these values to determine the percentage of all rejected
cases that would have received asylum had the one-year deadline
not been in effect.256
We could not include applicants with blank dates of entry in this
estimation, because we could not determine the lapse between date
of entry and date of filing for these asylum seekers.
Dependent Variables
Timely. We created a binary variable that signifies timely filing,
a value of 1, or untimely filing, a value of 0. Where the final
decision code described below did not indicate that the case had
been denied based on the deadline, code D5, or referred to immigra-
tion court because of the deadline, code 15, and the lapse variable
described below was 364 or fewer days,257 we considered the asylum
256. See supra text accompanying notes 216-20 (providing results of this estimation).
257. If the 364th day fell on a weekend or a federal holiday, neither we nor DHS counted
the case as late if filed on the following business day. If February 29 of a leap year was one
of the days between entry and filing, we treated the case as not late if it was filed on the 365th
day after entry, or if the 365th day was a nonbusiness day, on the next business day. The
following were treated as holidays: New Year's Day, Martin Luther King, Jr. Day, President's
Day, Memorial Day, Independence Day, Labor Day, Columbus Day, Veterans Day,
Thanksgiving Day, and Christmas Day. At least until 2009, DHS regarded a person as late
if the person filed 365 days after entry, though a 2009 Ninth Circuit case held that DHS
should have used 366 as the number of days in question. Minasyan v. Mukasey, 553 F.3d
1224, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 2009). DHS changed its practice in March 2009, after Minasyan was
decided. ASYLUM OFFICER BASIC TRAINING COURSE, supra note 6, at 5. We used 364 days
because that is how DHS calculated timely filing until the final months of the time frame
studied. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., ASYLUM OFFICER BASIC TRAINING COURSE:
ONE-YEAR FILING DEADLINE 4 (Mar. 15, 2001), available at http://www.asylumlaw.org/docs/
united states/one year lesson March2001.pdf.
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application to have been filed timely. Under all other conditions,
such as when no entry date was listed, or lapse exceeded 364 days,
or lapse was 364 days or less but the DHS final decision code was
D5 or 15, we considered the asylum application to have been filed
untimely.
Final decision code (FDEC). DHS provided us with nineteen
decision codes that we combined into three categories: (1) de-
nial/referral, (2) grant, and (3) administrative closure.258 As de-
scribed above, we eliminated from our data the cases that had been
administratively closed as well as those with no final decision.
Lapse. This variable calculates the number of days between entry
into the United States and the date of filing the asylum claim. The
date of entry and date of filing variables are discussed below.
Following the DHS practice in determining whether an asylum
seeker filed timely, we did not count the day of entry but we did
count day of filing in our calculation of the lapse variable.259 If no
date of entry for the applicant was listed, lapse is blank.
Date of entry. Each case listed the applicant's date of entry, which
was generally taken from the answer to question 18 on Form 1-589,
Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal, as filled
out by the asylum seeker. Also, 21,256 cases had blank dates of
entry.
If the date of entry field is left blank in the asylum application,
national procedures direct the regional service centers that initially
process these applications to leave the field blank in RAPS and
suggest that staff may review supporting documentation to
establish the date of entry.260 However, regional service centers may
devise regional procedures that are more stringent than these
instructions. For example, if the date of entry is blank, the Vermont
Service Center instructs staff to look at the applicant's list of prior
residences in the 1-589 and use the earliest date of U.S. residence.
Similarly, the Nebraska Service Center instructs staff to use the
last date of departure from their country or the date listed on the
applicant's Form 1-94 Arrival-Departure Record-but if no date is
found, the 1-589 will be refused and returned to the applicant as
258. These decision codes are available at the Georgetown Human Rights Institute website:
http://www.law.georgetown.edulhumanrightsinstitute/LivesInTheBalance/.
259. ASYLUM OFFICER BASIC TRAINING COURSE, supra note 6, at 5.
260. USCIS ASYLUM MANUAL, supra note 32, at 126.
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incomplete. In the same situation, the California Service Center
instructs staff to leave the date of entry field blank. And, in the
same circumstance, the Texas Service Center returns the 1-589 to
the applicant as incomplete. Both the California Service Center and
the Vermont Service Center provide instructions for completing the
date where it is incomplete on the I-589.261
In addition, the asylum officers who adjudicate claims are
required to update the computerized system, including adding entry
dates where appropriate.262 The instructions on how to address
blank dates of entry have changed over time. In May 1998, with the
implementation of the one-year deadline, the Asylum Division
altered the computerized system to allow the date of entry field to
be left blank. At that time, asylum officers were instructed to enter
a date of entry only when the asylum seeker presented documen-
tary evidence, such as an 1-94 or passport, or credible testimony as
to that date, or when a computer record of the lawful entry
existed.263 These procedures were not fully incorporated into the
USCIS Asylum Manual until 2003; indeed, the USCIS Asylum
Manual did not address leaving the date of entry field blank until
2003.264 As a result, not all asylum applicants who left the date of
entry blank on their initial 1-589 ended up with a blank date of
261. E-mail from Mary Margaret Stone, Chief of Operations, Asylum Div., Office of
Refugee, Asylum & Int'l Operations Directorate, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., to
Philip G. Schrag (Sept. 11, 2009) (on file with author).
262. See USCIS ASYLUM MANUAL, supra note 32, at 3, 126.
263. In addition, leaving the date of entry blank results in an "unknown date of entry" on
the NTA, which may cause problems with the different EOIR jurisdictions.
264. The 2003 guidance is as follows:
The date of entry is recorded in RAPS according to whether the applicant met
his or her burden of proof. Regardless of the claimed manner of entry, whenever
the applicant has failed to meet the burden of proof with respect to his or her
last arrival date, no date shall be entered into the DOE (Date of Entry) field on
the 1589 or OSCG screens. When the field is left blank, the words "UNKNOWN
DOE" will automatically be printed on the NTA and the 1-213 (where
applicable). Asylum officers must address any credibility issues relating to the
date of entry in the assessment. For guidance on the applicant's burden of proof
and determining the appropriate standards of proof required for entry dates, see
AOBTC Lesson Plans One-Year Filing Deadline and Asylum Eligibility Part
IV-Burden of Proof and Evidence.
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., AFFIRMATIVE ASYLUM PROCEDURES MANUAL 129
(2003), available at http://www.ilw.com/resources/AffirmativeAsylum.pdf. This language is
incorporated into the 2007 edition of the USCIS Asylum Manual with two slight grammatical
alterations. See USCIS ASYLUM MANUAL, supra note 32, at 126.
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entry in our database; the extent to which this occurred varied by
region and likely by asylum officer.
Rejection on the deadline. Relying on the recoded final decision
code variable described below, we created a binary rejected for
deadline variable that found a deadline rejection, value of 1, when
the recoded final decision code had a value of 2, and found there was
no deadline rejection, value of 0, when the recoded final decision
code had a value of 1 or 3.
Recoded final decision code. Using the FDEC final decision code
variable provided by DHS and described above, we grouped asylum
applicants into three categories related to the one-year filing
deadline: (1) asylum granted, code G1, which was awarded a value
of 1; (2) asylum denied or referred based on deadline, code D5 or 15,
which was awarded a value of 2; and (3) asylum denied or referred
on merits, all other FDEC codes, including FDEC codes beginning
with "R," which represent cases that were reopened and then denied
or referred on the merits, which was awarded a value of 3.265
Grant. Relying on the recoded final decision code variable de-
scribed above, we grouped asylum applicants into two categories-
asylum granted, code G1, which was awarded a value of 1, and all
other final decision values, including denials and referrals on the
deadline and the merits, which were awarded a value of 0.
Independent Variables
Age at filing. DHS provided us with the asylum seeker's age at
filing.
Asylum officer number of cases decided. Using the asylum officer
identification number provided to us by DHS, we sorted each
asylum officer's cases by the final decision date provided by DHS.
We then ranked each case by asylum officer identification number.
When two cases were decided on the same day, both were assigned
the average of the ranks.266
Asylum officer region. Asylum cases are filed and adjudicated in
eight Asylum Offices that cover specific geographic regions,
265. These decision codes are available at the Georgetown Human Rights Institute website:
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/humanrightsinstitute/LivesInTheBalance/.
266. For instance, if two cases would be the eleventh and twelfth cases, each would be
assigned 11.5.
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identified to us by DHS only as Regions A through H. DHS declined
to tell us which regional Asylum Offices correspond to these letters.
Dependents. DHS provided us with a "yes" or "no" answer to the
question of whether an asylum seeker had dependents. We there-
fore have two groups of applicants: asylum seekers with no
dependents in the United States listed on their application, and
asylum seekers with one or more dependents in the United States
listed on their application.
Ethnic group. DHS provided us with an ethnic group variable
for each asylum applicant. Unfortunately, the overwhelming
majority of entries in this field-514,757 of 552,760, or approxi-
mately 93 percent-were "OTHER" (446,016) or "UNKNOWN"
(68,741). Apparently, most applicants did not enter this information
on the application form. We did not use this field for any purpose.
Filing date. DHS provided us with the filing date for each asylum
applicant.
Fiscal year. DHS provided the data in cohorts by fiscal year of
decision.
Gender. DHS provided us with the gender of each asylum appli-
cant. We awarded male gender a value of 0 and female gender a
value of 1.
Inspection at entry. Using the status at entry variable provided
by DHS and described below, we categorized all asylum applicants
who entered EWI, or "entered without inspection," and UU, or
"unknown," used interchangeably over the years with EWI, as
"uninspected at entry," and all other asylum seekers as "inspected
at entry."
Status at entry. The status at entry variable coded whether the
asylum applicant was inspected at entry, and if so, on what type of
visa she entered the United States. Those who entered without
inspection or visas were coded EWI, "entered without inspection,"
or UU, "unknown." Those who entered with visas or visa waiver
documents were coded for the type of visa, for example, B2 for
tourist and Fl for student. When an applicant testified that he or
she used fraudulent documents to enter the United States and
presented these documents to the asylum officer, the asylum officer
coded his or her case SDF, or "suspected document fraud."267
267. A complete listing of visa types is available at the Georgetown Human Rights institute
website: http://www.law.georgetown.edu/humanrightsinstitutef/ivesInTheBalance/.
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Nationality. DHS provided us with nationality abbreviations for
each asylum case. Most abbreviations are self-explanatory, but a
few took some work to decode. For example, DECON is Democratic
Republic of the Congo, and UINEA is Guinea. Ivory Coast has two
different designations, COTED and IVORY, and these were both
converted to IVORY. Belarus has two designations, BELAR and
BYELO, and these were both converted to BELAR. The code STATE
is used for stateless persons.
Geographic region of origin. Using the World Bank definition of
the regions of the world,268 we divided nationalities into eight
regions. Although the World Bank combines Europe and Central
Asia, we made separate regions for those two categories. Only
Canada was placed in the North America region, as Mexicans were
excluded from the database.269 Stateless persons and persons of
unknown nationality were treated as regions of their own.270
Human rights conditions in country of origin. Using the Freedom
House indices for civil liberties and political rights for the years
1997 through 2008, or editions 1998-2008, we created a combined
score for both indices for each country of origin.271 Using the final
decision date provided to us by DHS, we used the prior year score
for cases decided between January and March and the current year
score for cases decided between April and December. That is, for a
case decided in February of 2002, we used the human rights indices
for 2001; for a case decided in May of 2002, we used the human
rights indices for 2002. We used this approach to accurately reflect
the information before asylum officers, who rely most heavily on the
U.S. State Department Country Human Rights Practices reports for
their country conditions research. These State Department reports
are published in late March or early April each year, so the time lag
renders our data more accurate.
268. The World Bank, http://www.worldbank.org (follow "Countries" hyperlink) (last visited
Nov. 12, 2010).
269. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
270. Our division of countries into regions is available at the Georgetown Human Rights
Institute website: http1/www.law.georgetown.edu/humanrightsinstitute/LivesInTheBalance/.
271. See FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD RATINGS, available at http://www.
freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiwlFIWALLScores.xls (years 1998-2006), and http://www.
freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15 (years 2002-2010) (last visited Nov. 12, 2010). We
simply added the two scores together to create a combined score.
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Religion. DHS provided us with the religion of each asylum
applicant. We combined some of these into one category. DHS uses
three categories for Christians, including Christian, Catholic, and
Orthodox, all of which we coded as Christian. Likewise, DHS uses
three categories for Muslims, including Muslim, Shiite, and Sunni,
all of which we recoded as Muslim. We recoded Parsi (PARSI) as
Zoroastrian (ZOROA) because Parsis are a particular group of
Zoroastrians. DHS uses both BADDH and BUDDH for Buddhist; we
converted BADDH to BUDDH.
In all, 48,872 asylum seekers had "unknown" and 26,624 had
"other" entered in the religion field, for a total of 75,496 cases. The
National Service Center 1-589 procedures direct staff to leave a field
blank in RAPS if the field is blank on the 1-589 unless otherwise
directed.272 In the case of religion, the procedures specifically direct
staff to enter "OTHER" if the asylum seeker does not designate a
religion on the asylum application.27 3
The national procedures are the minimum requirements for
processing at the service center. Each service center may devise
local procedures that are more stringent. The Nebraska, Texas, and
Vermont Service Centers instruct staff to enter "OTHER" if the
religion designated by the applicant is not included in the list of
religions in RAPS. The Vermont Service Center instructs staff to
use "UNKNO" where the applicant states "none," "N/A," "no reli-
gion," or "unknown." The California Service Center instructs staff
to pick the code that most closely matches the religion listed on the
1-589. If the applicant leaves the religion field blank on the 1-589,
staff must enter "UNKNO." The Texas Service Center also instructs
"UNKNO" to be used where the religion field is blank. If California
Service Center staff cannot determine the religion written, then
they must enter "OTHER."274
Moreover, the table of religions in RAPS lists only nineteen
choices, including "OTHER" and "UNKNO." Although the table lists
major religions of the world, it does not list many subgroups or
denominations. As a result, if an asylum applicant describes herself
as a member of a religious subgroup that is not listed in RAPS,
service center staff might enter "OTHER" or "UNKNO" rather than
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. E-mail from Mary Margaret Stone, supra note 261.
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selecting the larger religion to which that subgroup belongs. For
example, if the applicant lists Anglican, Episcopal, or Methodist on
the 1-589, service center staff may not select "PROTE" on RAPS.
There is also no specific category for Agnostic, Atheist, "none," or
traditional religions, which might as a result be classified as "other"
or "unknown."
Section II.L.1.g of the USCIS Asylum Manual instructs asylum
officers to make changes to information in RAPS, such as religion,
if these fields were changed on the 1-589 during the interview.27 5 it
does not, however, give instructions on when to use "OTHER"
versus "UNKNO." As a result, the Asylum Division believes that the
terms "other" and "unknown" are being used interchangeably in the
religion field.2 76 Moreover, these terms can mean anything from an
illegible or blank religion entry on Form 1-589 to atheism or even a
traditional religion. Since "other" and "unknown" were often used
interchangeably, we combined them into a single category for
purposes of analysis.
Representation. Although DHS names this field "attorney,"
"representative" is a more accurate term as this variable captures
the presence of lawyers, law students, accredited representatives
from nongovernmental organizations, and other "reputable
individual[s] of good moral character" who provide free assistance
to asylum applicants.27 7 DHS coded all of these types of representa-
tion as a "yes" in the "attorney" field without making distinctions
among them.
275. USCIS ASYLUM MANUAL, supra note 32, at 37.
276. E-mail from Mary Margaret Stone, supra note 261.
277. 8 C.F.R. §§ 292.1-292.2 (2010).
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REGRESSION APPENDIX
Timeliness Regressions
Standard Significance
-Coefficient Error (p value)
Asylum Office Region B
Asylum Office Region A
Asylum Office Region C
Asylum Office Region D
Asylum Office Region E
Asylum Office Region F
Asylum Office Region G
Asylum Office Region H
-.859
-.256
-.730
-.995
-.288
-.734
-1.137
.023
.021
.021
.020
.020
.026
.020
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
Entry with inspection .666 .010 .000
Asylum seeker's region
of origin
East Asia/Pacific .000
Latin .144 .020 .000
America/Caribbean
Europe .897 .020 .000
Central Asia .748 .024 .000
North Africa/Middle .320 .023 .000
East
Africa .548 .016 .000
South Asia .668 .027 .000
North America 1.200 .418 .004
Asylum seeker's religion
Christian
Baha'i
Buddhist
Druze
Hindu
Jainist
.399
-.036
-.189
.139
-1.058
.164
.022
.688
.043
.787
A. I U &
.000
.015
.098
.783
.001
.179
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Coefficient Standard Significance
I Error (p value)
Jewish
Muslim
Other
Sikh
Unknown
Zoroastrian
-.396
-.224
-.021
1.370
-.168
-.887
.056
.015
.012
.045
.017
.303
.000
.000
.098
.000
.000
.003
Asylum seeker's gender -.184 .009 .000
Asylum seeker's -.115 .011 .000
dependents
Representation -.276 .009 .000
Asylum seeker's age at .093 .005 .000
filing
Fiscal year of filing -.043 .002 .000
Asylum officer's .027 .002 .000
caseload
Human rights .167 .002 .000
conditions in asylum
seeker's country of
origin
Constant 84.700 3.021 .000
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients
Chi-square df Sig.
Step 1 Step 30246.916 43 .000
Block 30246.916 43 .000
Model 30246.916 43 .000
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test
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Coefficient Standard Significance
E rror (p value)
Asylum Office Region B
Asylum Office Region A
Asylum Office Region C
Asylum Office Region D
Asylum Office Region E
Asylum Office Region F
Asylum Office Region G
Asylum Office Region H
-.217
.328
-.346
-.461
.262
-. 148
-.576
.026
.025
.024
.023
.023
.028
.023
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
Entry with inspection .759 .011 .000
Asylum seeker's
nationality
China
Afghanistan
Albania
Algeria
Angola
Antigua
Argentina
Armenia
Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Bahamas
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belarus
Belgium
Belize
Benin
Bhutan
Bolivia
.811
.876
-.330
.105
-.541
-1.685
.576
-1.339
20.410
.909
-1.241
.406
-.227
21.104
.172
-.469
-1.399
.005
.852
-.825
.081
.042
.108
.128
1.454
.149
.040
.860
17810.930
.075
.544
.808
.077
40192.970
.052
.592
.432
.242
.296
.220
.000
.000
.000
.002
.412
.710
.000
.000
.120
.999
.000
.022
.615
.003
1.000
.001
.428
.001
.984
.004
.000
Step
la
I
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I
Coefficient Standard Significance
I _ _ Error (p value)
.351
1.093
-.998
.367
-.366
.153
.471
.261
.893
.101
-.634
.148
Bosnia
Botswana
Brazil
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Burma
Burundi
Cambodia
Cameroon
Canada
Cape Verde
Central African
Republic
Chad
Chile
Colombia
Comoros
Costa Rica
C6te d'Ivoire
Croatia
Cuba
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Democratic Republic of
the Congo
Denmark
Djibouti
Dominica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
.129
1.140
.088
.088
.105
.042
.091
.148
.036
.420
1.229
.129
.121
.233
.037
19940.929
.559
.052
.200
.090
.880
.421
.041
28395.460
.495
.815
.338
.162
.046
.062
.006
.338
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.077
.000
.810
.606
.251
.000
.001
.006
.999
.000
.000
.398
.000
.197
.009
.000
.999
.017
.053
.172
.000
.000
.000
.863
-.790
.100
20.812
-2.076
-.849
.170
.446
-1.137
-1.105
.222
21.074
1.187
-1.578
-.463
-1.016
.805
-1.442
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Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Estonia
Ethiopia
Fiji
Finland
France
Gabon
Georgia
Germany
Ghana
Greece
Grenada
Guatemala
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Hungary
India
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Coefficient Standard Significance
I I Error (p value)
-.940
.409
-.388
.948
-.433
22.191
.273
-. 124
-.174
.900
.176
.939
-.696
-1.129
-.121
-.464
-.390
.937
-1.112
-.095
.258
-.543
.038
.167
20.465
.567
.062
-1.069
-.791
-.626
.059
-.318
.684
.053
.153
.036
.085
40192.970
.338
.282
.068
.332
.178
.634
.886
.043
.038
.259
.265
.029
.118
.319
.071
.036
.037
.044
28369.006
.164
.518
.151
.601
.096
.101
.051
.170
.000
.011
.000
.000
1.000
.419
.659
.011
.007
.323
.139
.432
.000
.001
.074
.141
.000
.000
.767
.000
.000
.305
.000
.999
.001
.905
.000
.188
.000
.558
.000
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Coefficient Standard Significance
Error (p value)
Kiribati 21.364 40192.970 1.000
Kuwait -.503 .304 .098
Kyrgyzstan -.044 .111 .690
Laos -.594 .165 .000
Latvia -.103 .152 .500
Lebanon -.306 .095 .001
Liberia .631 .041 .000
Libya -.867 .299 .004
Lithuania -.592 .141 .000
Macedonia .318 .121 .009
Madagascar .655 .804 .416
Malawi -.865 .371 .020
Malaysia -1.202 .141 .000
Maldives 20.465 17919.305 .999
Mali -1.545 .102 .000
Malta 20.976 40192.970 1.000
Mauritania .296 .041 .000
Mauritius 1.328 .799 .097
Moldova .428 .104 .000
Mongolia -.352 .096 .000
Montenegro -.500 .884 .572
Morocco -1.093 .219 .000
Mozambique 20.993 28382.315 .999
Namibia -1.086 .917 .236
Nauru 20.590 28404.915 .999
Nepal .213 .057 .000
Netherlands 20.974 12880.596 .999
New Zealand -.867 1.416 .540
Nicaragua -.573 .152 .000
Niger -.190 .098 .053
Nigeria -.325 .080 .000
North Korea -1.448 .721 .044
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Coefficient Standard Significance
I I_ Error (p value)
Norway
Oman
Pakistan
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Qatar
Romania
Russia
Rwanda
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Serbia
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Slovakia
Slovenia
Somalia
South Africa
South Korea
Spain
Sri Lanka
St. Lucia
St. Vincent
Sudan
Suriname
Swaziland
20.282
.256
.125
-1.281
-21.520
-.766
-.597
-1.571
-1.131
-2.375
-.618
.543
.007
.839
-.554
-.731
.585
-1.056
.064
-.637
-.859
.212
1.178
-.188
-.400
-.269
.487
-2.041
-22.149
1.026
-2.182
--733
40192.970
1.174
.046
.470
28360.081
.429
.069
.123
.143
.774
.770
.096
.035
.090
.279
.097
.119
1.418
.051
.370
.298
.772
.038
.157
.343
.500
.076
1.126
40192.970
.062
.758
.922
1.000
.828
.006
.006
.999
.074
.000
.000
.000
.002
.422
.000
.834
.000
.047
.000
.000
.457
.205
.085
.004
.783
.000
.230
.244
.591
.000
.070
1.000
.000
.004
.427
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Coefficient Standard Significance
Error (p value)
Sweden .369 .683 .589
Switzerland -.708 1.020 .488
Syria -.562 .117 .000
Taiwan -1.088 .356 .002
Tajikistan .286 .204 .161
Tanzania -.937 .141 .000
Thailand -1.300 .358 .000
The Gambia -1.414 .077 .000
Togo .427 .052 .000
Tonga -2.902 .767 .000
Trinidad and Tobago -1.485 .278 .000
Tunisia -1.115 .307 .000
Turkey .108 .105 .301
Turkmenistan .308 .152 .042
Uganda .229 .064 .000
Ukraine -.194 .060 .001
United Arab Emirates -1.416 .568 .013
United Kingdom .060 .384 .876
Uruguay .000 .345 1.000
Uzbekistan .031 .053 .560
Venezuela -.113 .045 .013
Vietnam -.809 .139 .000
Yemen -.229 .122 .061
Yugoslavia 1.030 .054 .000
Zambia -.440 .170 .010
Zimbabwe -1.242 .051 .000
Asylum seeker's religion
Christian .000
Baha'i .565 .166 .001
Buddhist -.026 .023 .261
Druze .415 .687 .546
Hindu .035 .054 .518
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Coefficient Standard Significance
Error (p value)
Jainist
Jewish
Muslim
Other
Sikh
Unknown
Zoroastrian
-1.082
.029
-.068
-.020
1.022
-.093
-.835
.783
.057
.020
.013
.068
.018
.303
.167
.609
.001
.141
.000
.000
.006
Asylum seeker's gender -.164 .009 .000
Asylum seeker's -.085 .012 .000
dependents
Representation -.253 .010 .000
Asylum seeker's age at .083 .005 .000
filing
Fiscal year of filing -.030 .002 .000
Asylum officer's .028 .002 .000
caseload
Human rights .062 .005 .000
conditions in asylum
seeker's country of
origin
Constant 59.792 1 3.300 .000
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients
Chi-square df Sig.
Step 1 Step 41102.168 208 .000
Block 41102.168 208 .000
Model 41102.168 208 .000
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test
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Rejection Regressions
Coefficient Standard Significance
SI _ Error (p value)
Step
la I
Asylum Office Region B
Asylum Office Region A
Asylum Office Region C
Asylum Office Region D
Asylum Office Region E
Asylum Office Region F
Asylum Office Region G
Asylum Office Region H
-.286
-1.100
-1.045
-.216
-.369
-.560
-.461
.039
.038
.038
.036
.035
.043
.035
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
Entry with inspection -.729 .021 .000
Asylum seeker's region
of origin
East Asia/Pacific .000
Latin -.447 .034 .000
America/Caribbean
Europe -.571 .037 .000
Central Asia -.376 .046 .000
North Africa/Middle -.760 .045 .000
East
Africa -.543 .030 .000
South Asia -.752 .050 .000
North America .668 1.120 .551
Asylum seeker's religion
Christian
Baha'i
Buddhist
Druze
Hindu
Jainist
Jewish
Muslim
Other
.055
-.257
2.383
-.159
-.723
-.170
.580
.099
.369
.041
1.242
.079
1.202
.101
.030
.024
.000
.882
.000
.055
.044
.548
.094
.000
.000
__ _ _a _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _I_ _ .I '
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Coefficient Standard Significance
I I_ Error (p value)
I
Sikh
Unknown
Zoroastrian
.901
-. 076
-.023
.098
.034
.517
.000
.024
.964
Asylum seeker's gender -.157 .017 .000
Asylum seeker's -.172 .020 .000
dependents
Representation -.458 .018 .000
Asylum seeker's age at .213 .009 .000
filing
Fiscal year of filing .076 .003 .000
Asylum officer's .005 .003 .099
caseload
Human rights -.097 .004 .000
conditions in asylum
seeker's country of
origin
Lapse between entry .000 .000 .000
date and filing date I
Constant -151.092 6.074 .000
1 I I Ia
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients
Chi-square df Sig.
Step 1 Step 6311.420 37 .000
Block 6311.420 37 .000
Model 6311.420 37 .000
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test
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Coefficient Standard Significance
Error (p value)
Step Asylum Office Region B .000
la Asylum Office Region A -.079 .044 .073
Asylum Office Region C -.890 .042 .000
Asylum Office Region D -.774 .042 .000
Asylum Office Region E -.021 .039 .581
Asylum Office Region F -. 152 .039 .000
Asylum Office Region G -.355 .047 .000
Asylum Office Region H -.337 .039 .000
Entry with inspection -.776 .025 .000
Asylum seeker's
nationality
China .000
Afghanistan -.703 .198 .000
Albania -.610 .090 .000
Algeria -.339 .182 .062
Angola -.308 .253 .223
Antigua 20.915 40192.970 1.000
Argentina .664 .219 .002
Armenia -.375 .083 .000
Australia -1.605 .953 .092
Azerbaijan -.330 .185 .075
Bahamas -1.020 .646 .115
Bahrain 21.332 28105.001 .999
Bangladesh -.699 .131 .000
Belarus -.165 .097 .088
Belgium -1.987 1.127 .078
Belize -.388 .618 .530
Benin -.744 .388 .055
Bhutan -.431 .696 .536
Bolivia -.496 .322 .123
Bosnia -1.210 .246 .000
Botswana 20.978 40192.970 1.000
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Coefficient Standard Significance
Error (p value)
Brazil -.063 .131 .630
Bulgaria -.931 .172 .000
Burkina Faso .054 .158 .730
Burma -.316 .087 .000
Burundi -1.065 .214 .000
Central African -.154 .255 .545
Republic
Cambodia .442 .256 .084
Cameroon -.826 .087 .000
Canada .756 1.125 .501
Cape Verde 19.693 28340.599 .999
Chad -1.205 .268 .000
Chile -.648 .339 .056
Colombia -.277 .067 .000
Costa Rica -.786 .513 .126
Cote d'Ivoire .357 .089 .000
Croatia -.920 .365 .012
Cuba -1.194 .199 .000
Cyprus -1.090 1.014 .282
Czech Republic 1.010 .766 .187
Democratic Republic of -.555 .083 .000
the Congo
Djibouti -1.057 1.164 .364
Dominica -.702 .910 .441
Dominican Republic -.864 .484 .074
Ecuador -.460 .228 .044
Egypt -.319 .091 .000
El Salvador -.965 .094 .000
Equatorial Guinea -20.555 23122.216 .999
Eritrea -.389 .118 .001
Estonia -.349 .242 .151
Ethiopia -1.103 .084 .000
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Coefficient Standard Significance
Error (p value)
Fiji -.253 .150 .092
France -1.073 .565 .058
Gabon -.758 .496 .126
Georgia .039 .123 .751
Germany -1.480 .648 .022
Ghana -.708 .312 .023
Greece -22.187 23165.018 .999
Grenada -2.722 1.323 .040
Guatemala -.182 .074 .013
Guinea .180 .074 .016
Guinea-Bissau -.010 .444 .983
Guyana .051 .435 .907
Haiti .207 .058 .000
Honduras -1.224 .153 .000
Hungary .076 .549 .890
India -.465 .134 .001
Indonesia .344 .066 .000
Iran -.809 .079 .000
Iraq -1.208 .118 .000
Israel -.619 .294 .035
Italy -1.203 .849 .157
Jamaica -.405 .207 .051
Japan -1.530 .850 .072
Jordan -.053 .152 .728
Kazakhstan -.174 .178 .330
Kenya -.304 .090 .001
Kuwait -1.061 .544 .051
Kyrgyzstan .183 .192 .340
Laos .591 .271 .029
Latvia -.758 .249 .002
Lebanon -.300 .158 .057
Liberia -1.977 .104 .000
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Coefficient Standard Significance
Error (p value)
Libya -.678 .513 .186
Lithuania .200 .222 .368
Macedonia -.895 .230 .000
Madagascar -.003 1.452 .998
Malawi .694 .594 .243
Malaysia -.419 .200 .036
Mali .021 .129 .869
Mauritania .957 .120 .000
Mauritius 19.760 40192.970 1.000
Moldova -1.014 .200 .000
Mongolia -.377 .160 .019
Montenegro -2.218 1.622 .171
Morocco -.612 .306 .045
Namibia -.200 1.244 .872
Nepal -.793 .108 .000
New Zealand -21.153 40192.970 1.000
Nicaragua -.392 .243 .107
Niger -.576 .171 .001
Nigeria -.136 .135 .316
North Korea .076 1.046 .942
Oman 21.612 40192.970 1.000
Pakistan -.300 .086 .000
Panama .105 .691 .879
Papua New Guinea -.361 1.428 .801
Paraguay -1.711 .690 .013
Peru -.540 .116 .000
Philippines .421 .175 .016
Poland .792 .221 .000
Portugal -.395 .704 .575
Qatar 1.728 1.237 .163
Romania .077 .186 .681
Russia -.191 .066 .004
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Coefficient Standard Significance
Error (p value)
Rwanda -1.625 .271 .000
Saudi Arabia -.631 .498 .205
Senegal .129 .155 .404
Serbia -1.022 .274 .000
Seychelles -21.542 40192.970 1.000
Sierra Leone -. 791 .100 .000
Singapore -1.762 .793 .026
Slovakia -.774 .391 .048
Slovenia 20.281 22016.808 .999
Somalia .071 .121 .557
South Africa -.485 .253 .055
South Korea .320 .682 .639
Spain -.823 .811 .310
Sri Lanka -.952 .147 .000
St. Lucia 19.990 19680.813 .999
St. Vincent -21.287 40192.970 1.000
Sudan -1.337 .169 .000
Suriname -.890 .576 .122
Swaziland 21.143 28320.028 .999
Sweden -22.042 22670.722 .999
Switzerland -1.665 1.436 .246
Syria .566 .193 .003
Taiwan -.915 .498 .066
Tajikistan -.148 .377 .695
Tanzania .430 .195 .027
Thailand -.664 .465 .153
The Gambia .545 .104 .000
Togo -.744 .106 .000
Tonga 20.454 11158.542 .999
Trinidad and Tobago -1.023 .296 .001
Tunisia .174 .429 .684
Turkey -.565 .188 .003
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Coefficient Standard Significance
Error (p value)
Turkmenistan -.413 .296 .164
Uganda -.045 .114 .690
Ukraine -.186 .109 .088
United Arab Emirates .159 .684 .816
United Kingdom -1.053 .638 .099
Uruguay .191 .671 .776
Uzbekistan .043 .096 .658
Venezuela -.153 .082 .063
Vietnam -.146 .237 .538
Yemen -.174 .211 .408
Yugoslavia -.655 .109 .000
Zambia 1.112 .290 .000
Zimbabwe .064 .071 .367
Asylum seeker's religion
Christian .000
Baha'i .187 .374 .617
Buddhist -.137 .045 .002
Druze 1.378 1.236 .265
Hindu -.061 .098 .534
Jainist -.933 1.207 .440
Jewish -.389 .105 .000
Muslim .293 .040 .000
Other -.004 .026 .890
Sikh .660 .137 .000
Unknown .000 .036 .991
Zoroastrian .043 .529 .935
Asylum seeker's gender -.167 .017 .000
Asylum seeker's -.193 .021 .000
dependents
Representation -.443 .019 .000
Asylum seeker's age at .234 .009 .000
filing
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Coefficient Standard Significance
Error (p value)
Fiscal year of filing .068 .003 .000
Asylum officer's .006 .003 .056
caseload
Human rights -.103 .009 .000
conditions in asylum
seeker's country of
origin
Lapse between entry .000 .000 .000
date and filing date
Constant -135.138 6.584 .000
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients
Chi-square df Sig.
Step 1 Step 8011.662 191 .000
Block 8011.662 191 .000
Model 8011.662 191 .000
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test
Chi-square df Sig.
Step 1 42.510 8 .000
800 [Vol. 52:651
REJECTING REFUGEES
ESTIMATION APPENDIX
Figures 4-1, 4-2, and 4-3 display the values obtained through the
estimation and creation of 95 percent confidence intervals .2 " Figure
4-1 shows that 97.6 percent of all cases had at least a 20 percent
probability of being granted asylum, and just over 80 percent had
at least a 30 percent probability of being granted asylum. Even with
an extremely conservative estimate that relies on the lower bounds
of the 95 percent confidence interval, more than 90 percent of all
rejected cases had at least a 20 percent chance of being granted
asylum.
278. Any values that were below 0 percent and above 100 percent for confidence intervals
were simply transformed into 0 percent or 100 percent, respectively.
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Figure 4-1. Distribution of Predicted Probabilities of
Grants for Rejected Cases
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Figure 4-2. Distribution of Lower Bounds for 95 Percent
Confidence Interval
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Figure 4-3. Distribution of Upper Bounds for 95 Percent
Confidence Interval
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